On 10/6/20 2:21 PM, Gaba wrote:
> On 10/6/20 10:10 AM, d...@foundingdocuments.org wrote:
>> Not too long ago I used Tor Browser to visit a website and found I was
>> rejected completely. Not even a captcha. Clicking new circuit many times
>> didn’t help either.
>>
>> At least their site wasn’t j
George Kadianakis writes:
> Hello list,
>
> I'm glad to announce that onionbalance for v3 onions is now ready for
> preliminary testing.
>
> Please see
> https://github.com/asn-d6/onionbalance/blob/master/docs/alpha-testing-v3.txt
> for more details, and don't
Matthew Finkel writes:
> Hello everyone,
>
> I'm curious if anyone has recently experienced issues with websites
> offering .onion alternative services. We have a slightly old Tor Browser
> ticket for "prioritizing" .onion alt-svc entries over non-.onions, but
> in my testing I could not reproduc
Hello list,
I'm glad to announce that onionbalance for v3 onions is now ready for
preliminary testing.
Please see
https://github.com/asn-d6/onionbalance/blob/master/docs/alpha-testing-v3.txt
for more details, and don't hesitate to ask questions.
I'm looking forward to your testing!
Thanks a lo
Forst writes:
> Dear list subscribers,
>
> Which ports are required for Tor and Tor hidden services though the
> firewall if goal is to only allow traffic though Tor?
>
Hello,
Tor hidden services are Tor clients and hence you don't need to forward
any ports for them to work. They punch through
"Bernhard R. Fischer" writes:
> On 02.12.19 09:55, grarpamp wrote:
>>
>> Either HSv2 support must not be allowed to go away,
>> or onioncat must be made to work with HSv3.
>> Otherwise tor permanently loses a major onionland capability.
>>
>
> Definitely.
>
> For v3 to integrate smoothly into Oni
Memory Vandal writes:
> Hi,
>
> Are client connections to a hidden service .onion address that do not
> disconnect for hours safe?
>
> It may be a big file download or multiple keep-alive transactions that uses
> the established connection over and over for lets say few hours.
>
> If its not safe
Chelsea Komlo:
> The below language is abusive and is unacceptable on Tor mailing lists.
>
> This is your last warning; this is a moderated mailing list and we expect
> anyone posting to abide by our Code of Conduct.
>
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/community/policies.git/tree/code_of_conduct.tx
Conrad Rockenhaus:
> For a small donation in relation to the number of physical CPUs (and x
> cores each) plus bandwidth you want, (mbp/s or gbp/s) I can provide you
> your own instance on my OpenStack cloud that I just built out on AS19624.
> No exit policy restrictions, I handle all abuse complai
Ralph Seichter:
> * George:
>
>> Speaking as someone on the TPO Community Council, contributing to a
>> software project means contributions, not jumping onto an avalanche of
>> criticisms. The previous discussions on the new www site were utterly
>> inappropriate.
Kevin Simper:
> Hi Tor users and contributors
>
> I wrote down my thoughts about how to feels like getting started
> contributing to the tor project.
>
> https://www.kevinsimper.dk/posts/how-to-contribute-to-the-tor-project
Wow.
>
> Last year I did successfully submit a couple of changes to
>
Lars Noodén writes:
> The log messages "Your Guard" make produce confusion, Looking at the
> latest code base I see the string "Your Guard" recurring.
>
> Does this string actually refer to a Guard the user is responsible for
> operating and maintaining? Or does it refer to the guard the Tor cl
bo0od writes:
> I see that from a safe hosting perspective to Tor Hidden services, That
> Tor should maintain and ship onion balance by default.
>
> Which is sadly last ever maintained before more than 1 year or so, and
> also it lacks the support of onion v3.
>
> This is really useful and needed
Patrick Schleizer writes:
> Hi,
>
> is it possible to derive an hidden service onion v3 private key from a
> mnemonic seed [1]?
>
> Cheers,
> Patrick
>
> [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Seed_phrase
I think that should be possible reading
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediaw
Iain Learmonth:
> Hi,
>
> On 16/10/18 13:17, George wrote:
>> While metrics. continues to be a next step, I still find myself wishing
>> for the simple birds-eye view that your Tor Status provides.
>
> Can you provide some examples of things you can do with torstatus t
Conrad Rockenhaus:
> Hello,
>
> GreyPony Consulting is coming out with a OSS PBX Service that will use Tor as
> a Transport to allow for anonymous VoIP services and I’m looking for anyone
> that might be
Conrad:
It has been stated multiple times to you and at least one other
collaborator of y
Olaf Selke:
> Hello folks,
>
> I'm planning to shut down my Tor network status site within the next
Enormous thanks for all your work Olaf.
I'm among many who've used BlutMagie to get a grasp of the public Tor
network, and we at TorBSD also used your CSV data to create useful stats
about networ
hi...@safe-mail.net writes:
> I run both a V2 and V3 service on my Linux server. I'm using the same Tor
> process with both. The torrc file is fairly standard, except I'm forcing
> some custom entry nodes, and I compile Tor from source on Debian Stretch.
>
> The V2 service has worked flawlessly,
thelamalurker:
> On 13/04/18 19:20, George wrote:
>> It doesn't seem consistently blocked from my angle. I can access over
>> Tor, even without javascript enabled, but on occasion it is blocked.
>> It's possible there's dynamic blocking of specific exits.
>
George:
> lama the:
resending with correct subject line...
>> Are you aware that the FreeBSD project indiscriminately block all Tor
>> users from their official forums? Not even read access. This is a
>> problem because the forums are a vital source of help and solutions
&
lama the:
> Are you aware that the FreeBSD project indiscriminately block all Tor
> users from their official forums? Not even read access. This is a
> problem because the forums are a vital source of help and solutions
> to problems. Why do you block even read access if not to send a very
> aggres
Wanderingnet:
> I have considered it, as I explored various distros, most buggy and
> by no means secured out-of-the-box, in my view. But I have had such a
> nightmare experience working to any degree of satisfaction with
> Linux, I am reluctant to work on anything more stripped down. Alpine
> Linu
Udo van den Heuvel:
> Hello,
>
> After migration to a fresh new box, tor runs but does not create
> /var/log/tor/notices.log anymore.
> Config was unchanged.
> Permissions on /var/log/tor appear OK.
>
> How can I fix this?
Log files aren't necessarily created. You may need touch(1)
$ touch /va
George:
> I thought it might be interesting for others to hear some of the
> questions that arose in the discussion at the NYC Tor event on Feb 15
> this past week.
>
> https://blog.torproject.org/explore-tor-nyc-meetup-feb-15/
>
> This list isn't exhaustive, but it
I thought it might be interesting for others to hear some of the
questions that arose in the discussion at the NYC Tor event on Feb 15
this past week.
https://blog.torproject.org/explore-tor-nyc-meetup-feb-15/
This list isn't exhaustive, but it may connect with others on this list,
and could poss
Ben Tasker writes:
> [ text/plain ]
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Andreas Krey wrote:
>
>> Hi everyone,
>>
>> I keep noticing a phenomenon regarding onion sites reachability.
>> Every now and then some onion site becomes unreachable from
>> a given tor browser instance while continuing to be
Fabio Pietrosanti - Lists writes:
> On 29/11/2017 19:30, Allen wrote:
>>> On 17/11/2017 05:51, Cyberpotato wrote:
Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the
number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate
and/or use to access
Cyberpotato writes:
> Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the
> number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate
> and/or use to access a single hidden service? The use case would be to
> generate a unique .onion address/descriptor for e
bob1983 writes:
>>> Is there a way to limit resource usage originated from a single Tor circuit?
>
>> There is no such functionality right now I'm afraid. People have been
>> wanting some sort of functionality like that for a while:
>> https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/777-Sto
bob1983 writes:
> Hi.
>
> I'm the sysadmin of an unnamed computer club, we support online security and
> privacy, so our website is available via a Tor hidden service. Recently, we
> found a surge of CPU and RAM usage as soon as Tor has been started. A closer
> look
> showed it was the result of
Franps:
> https://www.networkworld.com/article/3236064/servers/minix-the-most-popular-os-in-the-world-thanks-to-intel.amp.html
>
> You might not know it, but inside your Intel system, you have an
> operating system running in addition to your main OS, MINIX. And it’s
> raising eyebrows and concern
Geoff Down:
> Sadly not available for my OS.
>
Troubleshooting a combination of Tor from source + Vidalia (still
maintained?) + some browser on an unknown OS is difficult.
What is your OS and browser?
The route to determining the issue probably comes down to this error:
Oct 29 12:50:06.000 [in
x9p writes:
> Hi,
>
> I believe you should not trust just 1 .onion address, there are latency
> problems, AS problems, circuit congestion, I believe much more.
>
> You should compile a list of different public .onion addresses hosted in
> different AS/countries and try them in a round robin way
obfs4proxy arrived in NetBSD and OpenBSD (-current) ports with the
relevant dependencies. It's in the queue for FreeBSD, and will be in the
OpenBSD -stable 6.2 release coming on November 1.
https://torbsd.github.io/blog.html#obfs4-everywhere
In an upcoming release, the OpenBSD Tor Browser should
nusenu:
>
>
> George:
>> There are regular checks about expired versions of Tor
>
> Can you elaborate on that?
As per this thread about Atlas reporting:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-August/012715.html
Although I'm not aware of any active no
Jason Long:
> Hello.
> How can I sure a Tor node that I connected to it is secure and is not a NSA
> or CIA node?
You can't ensure that none of the Tor nodes in a particular three-node
circuit aren't run by some three-letter government agency.
There are regular checks about expired versions of
Part of the Tor BSD Diversity Project's role has been to highlight the
lack of operating system diversity in the Tor network in order to begin
rectifying it.
There are plenty of resources to show Tor network statistics, from the
(deprecated?) torstatus sites such as https://torstatus.bluemagie.de/
One of the Tor BSD Diversity Project's recent activities is to aggregate
a list of *BSD VPS and similar services that allow Tor to be run as a
server/daemon.
While we are personally bare-metal advocates, we understand that for a
variety of reasons VPS-type systems provide a low-barrier of entry to
Jeremy Rand writes:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> My understanding is that the communication between circuit hops has
> forward secrecy, but I've been unable to find any documentation on
> whether forward secrecy exists for traffic sent between a Tor client
> and a Tor o
t 1.39MB/s traffic at the most recent check.
We have some recent blog post about it which addresses a number of
questions including running OpenBSD -current versus -stable for relays,
basic OpenBSD tweaking for a relay, etc.
https://torbsd.github.io/blog.html
Thanks.
George
--
5F77 765E 40D6
Lolint writes:
> Hi,
>
> I just thought about a possible (partial) solution to solve the "UX disaster"
> of next-gen onion services, namely the very long addresses. Tor Browser
> already ships with HTTPS
> Everywhere, and one can easily write rules that redirect from http or https
> to onion s
Hello list,
in this email we will present you the current state of bad relays on the Tor
network.
It should be no surprise that the Tor network is under constant attack. As part
of critical Internet infrastructure, people have been attacking our network in
various ways and for multiple reasons.
Alec Muffett writes:
> I would post this to the tor-onions list, but it might be more generally
> interesting to folk, so I'm posting here and will shift it if it gets too
> technical.
>
>
> I'm working on load-balanced, high-availability Tor deployment
> architectures, and on that basis I am run
On 10/17/16 21:18, Mirimir wrote:
> On 10/17/2016 06:50 PM, I wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Running Tor on Windows makes little sense,
>>
>> Didn't Roger ask for more operating system diversity and mention Windows?
>
> Maybe he did. Cite?
>
> But nevertheless, in my opinion, Windows is too snoopy.
>
The o
Greetings all.
There was a lightly contentious and confusing thread of posts on the
most recent Tor blog(1) regarding the BSDs, OpenBSD in particular, and
the Tor Project. The comments haven't been ok'd for a few days, but we
at the Tor BSD Diversity Project decided to reply with a blog post:
htt
On 2016-08-20 12:59 AM, m...@beroal.in.ua wrote:
> Great news! Beware that when a bridge's address becomes known to many
> people, it becomes known to censors. So it's better to give the
> address only to trusted people.
>
>
> On 19.08.16 20:00, Marina Brown wrote:
>> Sorry i can't start up a full
some point, their IP addresses will be profiled.
George
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Spencer writes:
> Hi,
>
>>
>> Roger Dingledine:
>> more improvements in the field of
>> privacy-preserving statistics and
>> measurements
>>
>
> Like what?
>
Potentially systems using Multi-Party Computation, or maybe approaches similar
to PrivEx. For example see:
http://www0.cs.ucl.a
>> We are regularly keeping the blog updated at
>> https://torbsd.github.io/blog.html as we make progress.
>>
>> Feedback always welcome for the testers and code-readers out there.
>
> I see your correspondence in OpenBSD's ports mailing list, but I don't have
> clear understanding about future
there.
George
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On 02/06/16 10:14, flipc...@riseup.net wrote:
> Great! i will check it out
>
Thanks. Let us know if you have any comments or questions offline or via
GitHub.
Note that the Tor Project's update to 5.5.1 is mostly irrelevant for
OpenBSD users.
g
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The Tor BSD Diversity Project just released Tor Browser version 5.5 for
OpenBSD/amd64. For those interested in running it, you need a very
recent -current (snapshot) of OpenBSD/amd64.
Here's the official announce:
TDP Announce for Tor Browser 5.5 for OpenBSD
20160205
The Tor BSD Diversity Project
Hello,
we would like to inform you of [tor-onions], a new mailing list that we just
launched: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-onions
The idea is that it will become a place to discuss anything about operating and
administrating hidden services. We figured that with all t
aka:
>> George:
>> Moreover, if Facebook, etc, decide to employ hidden services, it is good
>> publicity against the "hidden services are for terrorists and other
>> evil-doers" meme.
> Absolutely this.
>
> Also Facebook's intention was to give
Markus Hitter:
>
> On 32C3 a few weeks ago ...
>
> https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7322-tor_onion_services_more_useful_than_you_think
>
> ... Roger cheered a lot about Facebook offering a hidden service.
>
> To be honest, this surprises me quite a bit. Tor is for anonymisation,
> so one can escape
Greetings.
The Tor BSD Diversity Project (TDP) is working on a number of smaller
sub-projects besides porting Tor Browser to OpenBSD.
We are proud to formally announce "Porting PETs," a list of common
privacy-related ports and their statuses in the BSD ports systems.
Some of the applications are
Olaf Selke:
> Hello,
>
> https://torstatus.blutmagie.de is still alive now with five additional
> columns:
>
> "FirstSeen"
> ===
> Date when router's fingerprint was first seen starting 10/27/15. All
> routers alive before are dated 2000-01-01 simply meaning I have no clue
> about the pas
Thanks for the feedback.
Some replies inline:
> Thank you very much for your effort. It is long awaited effort for
> people like me on OpenBSD.
>
> I have only one suggestion. Can you please build Tor Browser not only
> for -current but also for stable version like 5.7 and 5.8?
Ideally, we want
Donncha O'Cearbhaill writes:
> On 11/03/15 17:40, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> MacLemon writes:
>>
>>> Hoi!
>>>
>>> I'm looking into ideas for creating “load balanced” or “high availability”
>>> hidden services. Mostly pertaining to
MacLemon writes:
> Hoi!
>
> I'm looking into ideas for creating “load balanced” or “high availability”
> hidden services. Mostly pertaining to web servers serving large-ish static
> files. (Let's say 5-100MB each.)
>
> Load balanced as in not all requests end up at the same box to speed up
> d
grarpamp writes:
> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 12:16 PM, George Kadianakis
> wrote:
>> I find their concern very valid
>
> Respectfully... invalid. Onions are going to be mined, shared, leaked,
> indexed, and copied anyways. And most certainly by your adversaries.
> Do we
Hello Virgil,
I have received mails from a few people who are feeling bad about the
disallowed.html list of onioncity. Some of them are afraid that it
might list their private hidden service, just because an inexperienced
user accidentally tried to access it over tor2web.
I find their concern ver
MegaBrutal writes:
> Could someone please help me with this?
>
I think ticket #11211 might be related to what you want. It's still
open. As a start, the wanted behavior should be specified and we
should update the PT spec accordingly.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11211
>
>
Virgil Griffith writes:
> I present:
>
> http://onion.city
>
> currently searching ~348,000 pages according to site:onion.city on GOOG.
>
> -V
Ah, exciting!
The use of a custom google search is an interesting idea. I also like
the motto and the logo! (although search engine logos are supposed t
Dmitry Alexandrov writes:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_DNS
>
> The goal is to place Hidden Service in multiple data centers to prevent
> single point of failure.
It's not so easy (to implement something like Round Robin DNS for
HSes). It requires complicated protocol modifications.
Mike Fikuart writes:
> Hi Tor-Talk,
>
> I am interested in the scaling limits to Tor and what present the
> bottlenecks to Tor’s future expansion. I have looked into the
> documentation available and see that Tor has far exceeded initial
> projections through structural changes to the relationsh
saurav dahal writes:
> Under which condition, the client will choose Guard flagged node and
> Guard+Exit flagged node for guard position?
>
Tor will consider any node with the Guard flag during guard selection
(this also includes Guard+Exit nodes). As you noticed, it will apply
different weights
saurav dahal writes:
> Hello,
>
> While choosing a possible guard, a client multiplies Wgg with the bandwidth
> weight of a possible relay having guard flag.
>
> But if a client wants to choose a relay, for guard position, having both
> Guard and Exit flag (EE), then will it multiply bandwidth we
andr...@fastmail.fm writes:
> I'm not sure if I'm setting up Network Settings correctly.
>
> I got the Obfs3 Bridges from the BridgeDB site and added them to Network
> Settings under "Enter Custom Bridges".
>
> Is that all that's needed to add and use the Obfs3 bridges or must the
> "Connect with
Mateus Meyer Jiacomelli writes:
>> Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 16:50:36 -0700
>> From: da...@bamsoftware.com
>> To: meyer...@live.com
>> CC: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
>> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Meek bridges request
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 10:29:05PM +, МΞYΞЯ - Meyer wrote:
>> > Thanks f
Hello friends,
this is a brief post on recent and upcoming developments in the PT
universe.
What has happened:
TBB 3.6:
As many of you know, the TBB team recently started releasing TBB-3.6
with built-in PT support. This is great and has taken PT usage to new
levels [0]. Maaad
Roman Mamedov writes:
> Hello,
>
> The [1] page currently does not mention anything about IPv6 at all; after
> following the instructions in it, the bridge only listens on IPv4.
>
> If I add an IPv6 ORPort as described in [2], this does make Tor itself listen
> on IPv6, but still the obfsproxy on
Nathan Freitas writes:
> On 05/04/2014 05:18 AM, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Nathan Freitas writes:
>>
>>> On May 3, 2014 4:18:28 PM EDT, George Kadianakis
>>> wrote:
>>>> George Kadianakis writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Na
Nathan Freitas writes:
> On May 3, 2014 4:18:28 PM EDT, George Kadianakis wrote:
>>George Kadianakis writes:
>>
>>> Nathan Freitas writes:
>>>
>>>> On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis
>> wrote:
>>>>>Nathan Freit
George Kadianakis writes:
> Nathan Freitas writes:
>
>> On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis
>> wrote:
>>>Nathan Freitas writes:
>>>
>>>> Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help.
>>>
Nathan Freitas writes:
> On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis wrote:
>>Nathan Freitas writes:
>>
>>> Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help.
>>>
>>
>>Great news! Thanks!
>>
>>BTW, how are o
Nathan Freitas writes:
> Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help.
>
Great news! Thanks!
BTW, how are obfs3 bridges supposed to be used?
I installed Orbot-v14.0.0-ALPHA-2a.apk and checked the Preferences
menu. There used to be an option called 'Obfuscated Bridges' th
Patrick ZAJDA writes:
> Le 11/02/2014 15:56, Lunar a écrit :
>> Patrick ZAJDA:
>>> I want to set an obfuscated bridge on my Raspberry Pi.
>>>
>>> When I do sudo apt-get source obfsproxy apt notices me it needs
>>> python-pyptlib which cannot be found.
>>>
>>> How can I install python-pyptlib o
TheMindwareGroup writes:
> Bypassing DPI filters is a constantly evolving art form and entire
> field of research all on its own, and just like encryption extremely
> difficult to do well (check out bit torrent and emule obfuscation for
> example, a nice effort but when scrutinized not particular
Qingping Hou writes:
> On 12/28/2013 06:46 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
>> One of the current unfortunate properties of hidden services is that
>> the identity of the hidden service is its public key (or the
>> equivalent hash, in the current setup), and this key must always be
>> available for sig
Philipp Winter writes:
> Over the past months, we have been working on the ScrambleSuit pluggable
> transport protocol [1]. The code has now reached some maturity and it's time
> to test it! I set up a dedicated bridge and compiled a set of installation
> instructions listed below. You get bon
bm-2d8jtri23dyth7whmaldhsvhdfwp91z...@bitmessage.ch writes:
> Hi,
>
> I'm wondering how safe is it to use custom hidden service names (.onion).
> I'm not asking this for public hidden services but for private ones (only
> for myself or for friends). Using an easy to remember address just for
> usi
Adrelanos said:
> Overall I like the idea, since it forces no one to participate. Nodes
> not interested in getting bitcoin donations, just don't get any.
>
> What about bridges? Any way to reward them as well?
>
> George Kadianakis:
> > As a simplified example, if
==tldr (Too Long, Didn't Read)
Where will Tor's bandwidth come from in 20 years? Will solo volunteers
still exist, or will all the bandwidth come from Tor-friendly
organizations?
Tor incentive schemes are interesting. There are many proposed schemes
but their crypto needs to be reviewed and lots
Hi lee,
it seems like you are using an old version of obfsproxy which does not
support obfs3. obfsproxy was recently rewritten in Python and that's
the version you want to use (the version you are currently using is
written in C). That is, you are currently using obfsproxy-0.1.4 but
you should be
> The Parrot is Dead:
>
> Observing Unobservable Network Communications
>
> http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/abstracts.html
>
> http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/2010/anon/papers/parrot-abs
>
That paper made me even more doubtful that we can emulate a popular
implementation of a non-trivial protocol with
an you imagine it
currently to be. To decrypt keys, It does not take what you might
otherwise expect.
>
> I'm sure one or more of the developers are either in denial or part of
the "security" apparatus or both. I would not hold your breath.
>
> Be well.
>
> On Thu,
> >> Is there a reason 1024 bit keys, instead of something higher is not
> used?
> >> Do higher bit keys affect host performance, or network latency?
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Bernard
> >>
> >>
> >>
> &
ill really try not to go conspiracy crazy... but that is always a risk
when discussing the NSA on this list :)
if they intercepted everything, there wont be much of a need to decrypt it.
they could watch it going in plaintext to the exit nodes, and use timing attacks and get a pretty good
sense
> Hi,
>
> would it be possible to have metrics for pluggable transports?
>
Sure. However, much of the work in pluggable transport metrics is
currently under development and not ready for end-users.
I will answer the general pluggable transport questions and leave the
flashproxy stuff for David.
true, but looking at the massive amounts of government's requests from say,
google for inbox content.
i would say that storing your own mail will help a lot.
of course, i don't know the true magnitude of interceptions, and encryption
is a must to hide content.
but it seems to me that practically, t
really want to hear about it.
thanks
On 17 November 2012 12:41, Julian Yon wrote:
> On Fri, 9 Nov 2012 12:59:55 -0500
> george torwell wrote:
>
> > i have a few unrelated questions, if i may.
> > ive noticed that you have your own mail server, which is cool.
>
> I do
so, if the privacy and anonymity needs are not purely academic,
experiment a lot before committing to a setup.
good luck!
On 16 November 2012 05:46, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
> Hi George,
>
> Yes I think much about IRC, but I am looking for some solution that is
> easier on the setup for newbi
hi, how about an IRC server running as a hidden service?
you could even use ssl with it (but since the key has to be blindly trusted
by others,
that doesn't add much over the encryption and prevention of MITM attacks
that Tor will already provide you with.)
people on the server who seek a private c
thanks everyone!
Julian Yon: perhaps they can force me to log the ip of every bit torrent
user and hand it over?
not the relay it was coming from, the original ip that used bit torrent.
adrelanos: maybe that could get me in trouble for not doing enough to help
the rights holder?
andrew: thanks,
Hi guys, I have a quick question regarding the following blog entry:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/top-changes-tor-2004-design-paper-part-2
the last part states that Bit-torrent traffic can be trivially identified
to originate at the user's ip.
As an exit node operator, I get those annoying inf
sy00963-gen at yahoo.fr wrote:
> I have a question about Obfsproxy...
>
> If I correctly understood the function of this package, I tried to use
> it
> in Blocked HTTPS network... but when I try to put the proxy of the
> network I got "You have configured more than one proxy type" and
> return
Sebastian Lechte wrote:
> > tl;dr Did you by any chance compile tor with bufferevents enabled
> > (--enable-bufferevents)?
>
> Yes, I did.
>
I see.
We've noticed this issue some months ago with bufferevents enabled,
but it's not easy to reproduce or track down [0].
I left a note on the bug r
tl;dr Did you by any chance compile tor with bufferevents enabled
(--enable-bufferevents)?
Let's see the path of the sent bytes string:
The heartbeat code (src/or/status.c) receives the bytes sent in
log_heartbeat() using 'uint64_t get_bytes_written(void)' and stores it
into a uint64_t.
Then it
Some facts described in these articles are strange:
1) There aren't so many nodes, i count only ~2400 of them. (9000 in the
articles)
2) They say 50% of them are on Windows, while a rapid check here
http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/index.php?SR=Bandwidth&SO=Desc indicates
only ~22% of them are
3) It's
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