Nathan Freitas writes:
> Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help.
>
Great news! Thanks!
BTW, how are obfs3 bridges supposed to be used?
I installed Orbot-v14.0.0-ALPHA-2a.apk and checked the Preferences
menu. There used to be an option called 'Obfuscated Bridges' th
Nathan Freitas writes:
> On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis wrote:
>>Nathan Freitas writes:
>>
>>> Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help.
>>>
>>
>>Great news! Thanks!
>>
>>BTW, how are o
George Kadianakis writes:
> Nathan Freitas writes:
>
>> On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis
>> wrote:
>>>Nathan Freitas writes:
>>>
>>>> Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help.
>>>
Nathan Freitas writes:
> On May 3, 2014 4:18:28 PM EDT, George Kadianakis wrote:
>>George Kadianakis writes:
>>
>>> Nathan Freitas writes:
>>>
>>>> On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis
>> wrote:
>>>>>Nathan Freit
Nathan Freitas writes:
> On 05/04/2014 05:18 AM, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Nathan Freitas writes:
>>
>>> On May 3, 2014 4:18:28 PM EDT, George Kadianakis
>>> wrote:
>>>> George Kadianakis writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Na
Roman Mamedov writes:
> Hello,
>
> The [1] page currently does not mention anything about IPv6 at all; after
> following the instructions in it, the bridge only listens on IPv4.
>
> If I add an IPv6 ORPort as described in [2], this does make Tor itself listen
> on IPv6, but still the obfsproxy on
Hello friends,
this is a brief post on recent and upcoming developments in the PT
universe.
What has happened:
TBB 3.6:
As many of you know, the TBB team recently started releasing TBB-3.6
with built-in PT support. This is great and has taken PT usage to new
levels [0]. Maaad
Mateus Meyer Jiacomelli writes:
>> Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 16:50:36 -0700
>> From: da...@bamsoftware.com
>> To: meyer...@live.com
>> CC: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
>> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Meek bridges request
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 10:29:05PM +, МΞYΞЯ - Meyer wrote:
>> > Thanks f
andr...@fastmail.fm writes:
> I'm not sure if I'm setting up Network Settings correctly.
>
> I got the Obfs3 Bridges from the BridgeDB site and added them to Network
> Settings under "Enter Custom Bridges".
>
> Is that all that's needed to add and use the Obfs3 bridges or must the
> "Connect with
saurav dahal writes:
> Hello,
>
> While choosing a possible guard, a client multiplies Wgg with the bandwidth
> weight of a possible relay having guard flag.
>
> But if a client wants to choose a relay, for guard position, having both
> Guard and Exit flag (EE), then will it multiply bandwidth we
saurav dahal writes:
> Under which condition, the client will choose Guard flagged node and
> Guard+Exit flagged node for guard position?
>
Tor will consider any node with the Guard flag during guard selection
(this also includes Guard+Exit nodes). As you noticed, it will apply
different weights
Mike Fikuart writes:
> Hi Tor-Talk,
>
> I am interested in the scaling limits to Tor and what present the
> bottlenecks to Tor’s future expansion. I have looked into the
> documentation available and see that Tor has far exceeded initial
> projections through structural changes to the relationsh
Dmitry Alexandrov writes:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_DNS
>
> The goal is to place Hidden Service in multiple data centers to prevent
> single point of failure.
It's not so easy (to implement something like Round Robin DNS for
HSes). It requires complicated protocol modifications.
Virgil Griffith writes:
> I present:
>
> http://onion.city
>
> currently searching ~348,000 pages according to site:onion.city on GOOG.
>
> -V
Ah, exciting!
The use of a custom google search is an interesting idea. I also like
the motto and the logo! (although search engine logos are supposed t
MegaBrutal writes:
> Could someone please help me with this?
>
I think ticket #11211 might be related to what you want. It's still
open. As a start, the wanted behavior should be specified and we
should update the PT spec accordingly.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11211
>
>
Hello Virgil,
I have received mails from a few people who are feeling bad about the
disallowed.html list of onioncity. Some of them are afraid that it
might list their private hidden service, just because an inexperienced
user accidentally tried to access it over tor2web.
I find their concern ver
grarpamp writes:
> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 12:16 PM, George Kadianakis
> wrote:
>> I find their concern very valid
>
> Respectfully... invalid. Onions are going to be mined, shared, leaked,
> indexed, and copied anyways. And most certainly by your adversaries.
> Do we
MacLemon writes:
> Hoi!
>
> I'm looking into ideas for creating “load balanced” or “high availability”
> hidden services. Mostly pertaining to web servers serving large-ish static
> files. (Let's say 5-100MB each.)
>
> Load balanced as in not all requests end up at the same box to speed up
> d
Donncha O'Cearbhaill writes:
> On 11/03/15 17:40, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> MacLemon writes:
>>
>>> Hoi!
>>>
>>> I'm looking into ideas for creating “load balanced” or “high availability”
>>> hidden services. Mostly pertaining to
Greetings,
I'm a Tor GSoC student and I'll be working on pluggable transports
this summer.
What are these so called pluggable transports you might be wondering...
Well, imagine a user in an under-censorship country who wants to
communicate with the rest of the world. Imagine him trying to use th
tl;dr Did you by any chance compile tor with bufferevents enabled
(--enable-bufferevents)?
Let's see the path of the sent bytes string:
The heartbeat code (src/or/status.c) receives the bytes sent in
log_heartbeat() using 'uint64_t get_bytes_written(void)' and stores it
into a uint64_t.
Then it
Sebastian Lechte wrote:
> > tl;dr Did you by any chance compile tor with bufferevents enabled
> > (--enable-bufferevents)?
>
> Yes, I did.
>
I see.
We've noticed this issue some months ago with bufferevents enabled,
but it's not easy to reproduce or track down [0].
I left a note on the bug r
sy00963-gen at yahoo.fr wrote:
> I have a question about Obfsproxy...
>
> If I correctly understood the function of this package, I tried to use
> it
> in Blocked HTTPS network... but when I try to put the proxy of the
> network I got "You have configured more than one proxy type" and
> return
> Hi,
>
> would it be possible to have metrics for pluggable transports?
>
Sure. However, much of the work in pluggable transport metrics is
currently under development and not ready for end-users.
I will answer the general pluggable transport questions and leave the
flashproxy stuff for David.
> The Parrot is Dead:
>
> Observing Unobservable Network Communications
>
> http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/abstracts.html
>
> http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/2010/anon/papers/parrot-abs
>
That paper made me even more doubtful that we can emulate a popular
implementation of a non-trivial protocol with
Hi lee,
it seems like you are using an old version of obfsproxy which does not
support obfs3. obfsproxy was recently rewritten in Python and that's
the version you want to use (the version you are currently using is
written in C). That is, you are currently using obfsproxy-0.1.4 but
you should be
==tldr (Too Long, Didn't Read)
Where will Tor's bandwidth come from in 20 years? Will solo volunteers
still exist, or will all the bandwidth come from Tor-friendly
organizations?
Tor incentive schemes are interesting. There are many proposed schemes
but their crypto needs to be reviewed and lots
Adrelanos said:
> Overall I like the idea, since it forces no one to participate. Nodes
> not interested in getting bitcoin donations, just don't get any.
>
> What about bridges? Any way to reward them as well?
>
> George Kadianakis:
> > As a simplified example, if
bm-2d8jtri23dyth7whmaldhsvhdfwp91z...@bitmessage.ch writes:
> Hi,
>
> I'm wondering how safe is it to use custom hidden service names (.onion).
> I'm not asking this for public hidden services but for private ones (only
> for myself or for friends). Using an easy to remember address just for
> usi
Philipp Winter writes:
> Over the past months, we have been working on the ScrambleSuit pluggable
> transport protocol [1]. The code has now reached some maturity and it's time
> to test it! I set up a dedicated bridge and compiled a set of installation
> instructions listed below. You get bon
Qingping Hou writes:
> On 12/28/2013 06:46 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
>> One of the current unfortunate properties of hidden services is that
>> the identity of the hidden service is its public key (or the
>> equivalent hash, in the current setup), and this key must always be
>> available for sig
TheMindwareGroup writes:
> Bypassing DPI filters is a constantly evolving art form and entire
> field of research all on its own, and just like encryption extremely
> difficult to do well (check out bit torrent and emule obfuscation for
> example, a nice effort but when scrutinized not particular
Patrick ZAJDA writes:
> Le 11/02/2014 15:56, Lunar a écrit :
>> Patrick ZAJDA:
>>> I want to set an obfuscated bridge on my Raspberry Pi.
>>>
>>> When I do sudo apt-get source obfsproxy apt notices me it needs
>>> python-pyptlib which cannot be found.
>>>
>>> How can I install python-pyptlib o
Jeremy Rand writes:
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA512
>
> My understanding is that the communication between circuit hops has
> forward secrecy, but I've been unable to find any documentation on
> whether forward secrecy exists for traffic sent between a Tor client
> and a Tor o
x9p writes:
> Hi,
>
> I believe you should not trust just 1 .onion address, there are latency
> problems, AS problems, circuit congestion, I believe much more.
>
> You should compile a list of different public .onion addresses hosted in
> different AS/countries and try them in a round robin way
bob1983 writes:
> Hi.
>
> I'm the sysadmin of an unnamed computer club, we support online security and
> privacy, so our website is available via a Tor hidden service. Recently, we
> found a surge of CPU and RAM usage as soon as Tor has been started. A closer
> look
> showed it was the result of
bob1983 writes:
>>> Is there a way to limit resource usage originated from a single Tor circuit?
>
>> There is no such functionality right now I'm afraid. People have been
>> wanting some sort of functionality like that for a while:
>> https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/777-Sto
Cyberpotato writes:
> Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the
> number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate
> and/or use to access a single hidden service? The use case would be to
> generate a unique .onion address/descriptor for e
Fabio Pietrosanti - Lists writes:
> On 29/11/2017 19:30, Allen wrote:
>>> On 17/11/2017 05:51, Cyberpotato wrote:
Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the
number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate
and/or use to access
Ben Tasker writes:
> [ text/plain ]
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Andreas Krey wrote:
>
>> Hi everyone,
>>
>> I keep noticing a phenomenon regarding onion sites reachability.
>> Every now and then some onion site becomes unreachable from
>> a given tor browser instance while continuing to be
hi...@safe-mail.net writes:
> I run both a V2 and V3 service on my Linux server. I'm using the same Tor
> process with both. The torrc file is fairly standard, except I'm forcing
> some custom entry nodes, and I compile Tor from source on Debian Stretch.
>
> The V2 service has worked flawlessly,
Patrick Schleizer writes:
> Hi,
>
> is it possible to derive an hidden service onion v3 private key from a
> mnemonic seed [1]?
>
> Cheers,
> Patrick
>
> [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Seed_phrase
I think that should be possible reading
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediaw
bo0od writes:
> I see that from a safe hosting perspective to Tor Hidden services, That
> Tor should maintain and ship onion balance by default.
>
> Which is sadly last ever maintained before more than 1 year or so, and
> also it lacks the support of onion v3.
>
> This is really useful and needed
Lars Noodén writes:
> The log messages "Your Guard" make produce confusion, Looking at the
> latest code base I see the string "Your Guard" recurring.
>
> Does this string actually refer to a Guard the user is responsible for
> operating and maintaining? Or does it refer to the guard the Tor cl
Memory Vandal writes:
> Hi,
>
> Are client connections to a hidden service .onion address that do not
> disconnect for hours safe?
>
> It may be a big file download or multiple keep-alive transactions that uses
> the established connection over and over for lets say few hours.
>
> If its not safe
"Bernhard R. Fischer" writes:
> On 02.12.19 09:55, grarpamp wrote:
>>
>> Either HSv2 support must not be allowed to go away,
>> or onioncat must be made to work with HSv3.
>> Otherwise tor permanently loses a major onionland capability.
>>
>
> Definitely.
>
> For v3 to integrate smoothly into Oni
Forst writes:
> Dear list subscribers,
>
> Which ports are required for Tor and Tor hidden services though the
> firewall if goal is to only allow traffic though Tor?
>
Hello,
Tor hidden services are Tor clients and hence you don't need to forward
any ports for them to work. They punch through
Hello list,
I'm glad to announce that onionbalance for v3 onions is now ready for
preliminary testing.
Please see
https://github.com/asn-d6/onionbalance/blob/master/docs/alpha-testing-v3.txt
for more details, and don't hesitate to ask questions.
I'm looking forward to your testing!
Thanks a lo
Matthew Finkel writes:
> Hello everyone,
>
> I'm curious if anyone has recently experienced issues with websites
> offering .onion alternative services. We have a slightly old Tor Browser
> ticket for "prioritizing" .onion alt-svc entries over non-.onions, but
> in my testing I could not reproduc
George Kadianakis writes:
> Hello list,
>
> I'm glad to announce that onionbalance for v3 onions is now ready for
> preliminary testing.
>
> Please see
> https://github.com/asn-d6/onionbalance/blob/master/docs/alpha-testing-v3.txt
> for more details, and don't
Hello,
we would like to inform you of [tor-onions], a new mailing list that we just
launched: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-onions
The idea is that it will become a place to discuss anything about operating and
administrating hidden services. We figured that with all t
Spencer writes:
> Hi,
>
>>
>> Roger Dingledine:
>> more improvements in the field of
>> privacy-preserving statistics and
>> measurements
>>
>
> Like what?
>
Potentially systems using Multi-Party Computation, or maybe approaches similar
to PrivEx. For example see:
http://www0.cs.ucl.a
Alec Muffett writes:
> I would post this to the tor-onions list, but it might be more generally
> interesting to folk, so I'm posting here and will shift it if it gets too
> technical.
>
>
> I'm working on load-balanced, high-availability Tor deployment
> architectures, and on that basis I am run
Hello list,
in this email we will present you the current state of bad relays on the Tor
network.
It should be no surprise that the Tor network is under constant attack. As part
of critical Internet infrastructure, people have been attacking our network in
various ways and for multiple reasons.
Lolint writes:
> Hi,
>
> I just thought about a possible (partial) solution to solve the "UX disaster"
> of next-gen onion services, namely the very long addresses. Tor Browser
> already ships with HTTPS
> Everywhere, and one can easily write rules that redirect from http or https
> to onion s
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