:
If you limit the the `circ_max_megabytes` option in the Bandguards module,
will that work as some kind of DoS protection?
Question 3:
When, approximately, will we see the Vanguards add-on in the Tor source?
Thanks in advance,
Hikki
Greetings from Finland!
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I’ve got a technical question: How dangerous are malicious entry guards?
I’ve seen very little info on this subject. Some state that there’s no
immediate danger, while others state that you’ll “die on arrival”, especially
if you’re operating a high risk onion service that falls into the Snowden/
They're basically talking about eliminating criminal activities facilitated
online by the darknet, by making Tor and the dark web illegal and inaccessible
in Europe. It was also stated that most of those who access the dark web are
actual or potential criminals who need to be stopped before they
ence v3 services not working for a
longer period of time, but v2 services come right back up with no problems.
--Hikki, Finland
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Tor versions. I tried to clear the /var/lib/tor/ folder, tried on
a different computer running a different Linux version. Also tried a
different ISP. Think I've tried about everything, I like to believe I have
some competence.
-Hikki-
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Will the next gen hidden services be more at risk of deanonymization during
this transition period?
Original Message
From: David Goulet
Apparently from: tor-talk-boun...@lists.torproject.org
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Questions on the coming next-
How long does Tor keep entry nodes before switching to another set?
And are there any safety precautions you can make in regards to entry nodes?
Thanks!
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https://duckduckgo.com has become increasingly better lately. Only during
the past 6 months or so, their search results have become almost on par
with the big ones, like Google, Bing, etc.
In regards to Google, it all comes down to censorship and anti-privacy.
Just like Microsoft and Windows 10
There's a program out there that utilizes the GPU in your system to create a
custom, kind of, onion address. At least the few first characters at the
beginning of the address. So you can create an onion address like
googleja6vbnyma6.onion. I've seen people being able to create a 7 character
lon
know that my hidden service is really running anonymously, and not
with just 1-hop, besides just trusting the config defaults?
Please prove me wrong. I'm just concerned here, and just want some feedback.
Thanks for understanding!
-Hikki
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I was just wondering if you compile Tor on a 64 bit Linux distro, will it
make a 64 bit executable? Or is it 32 bit only? Would be nice if it had
supported 64 bit processing.
-Hikki
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even strong encryption, by today's standard on regular computers,
will be effortlessly broken within reasonable time.
So, where does this put Tor, encryption and general privacy? Shouldn't we
start preparing ourselves for the inevitable privacy apocalypse?
- Hikki
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rch matches. But they have become much better, thankfully!
- Hikki
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When I enable a hidden service, I get this error message repeatedly in my Tor
log:
"[warn] connection_edge_process_relay_cell (at origin) failed."
When I disable the hidden service and use Tor normally, it doesn't show up
anymore.
What is this error message? Bad configuration/firewall? Bad ent
A new Tor source package is released, but does it fix the Black Hat Bug?
Any news on this issue BTW?
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Original Message
From: Nicolas Vigier
Apparently from: tor-talk-boun...@lists.torproject.org
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Does Tor need to be recompiled *after* the
opensslupdate?
Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2014 17:51:46 +0200
> On Sat, 12 Apr 2014, Matthew
For those of us who compile Tor from source, does Tor need to be recompiled
*after* the openssl update from our OS vendors?
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It says in the blog:
"Hidden services: Tor hidden services might leak their long-term hidden service
identity keys to their guard relays.
Like the last big OpenSSL bug, this shouldn't allow an attacker to identify the
location of the hidden service,
but an attacker who knows the hidden service i
Since Tor uses only 3 entry nodes as default, it's often the entry nodes that
are DDOSed, not the server.
Will increasing the amount of entry nodes for the hidden service make it
available to more users during DDOS attacks, if you've got a very powerful
server?
But more entry nodes equals less
Today I discovered that wiki.debian.org blocks Tor exit nodes. There are
many other sites doing the same thing, and this is an increasing trend
among website admins.
If this trend continues, Tor will sooner or later become close to useless
for regular clearnet surfing. And we'll be left with hi
It's not like I blew off my chair in surprise:
"U.S. and British intelligence agencies have cracked the encryption designed to
provide online privacy and security, documents leaked by former intelligence
analyst Edward Snowden show."
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/05/nsa-snow
The US feds did actually take down FH, which was a HIDDEN SERVICE! They
found it and arrested the admin! Period!
Hidden services vaporize like water in death valley these days. And don't
you guys want answers?? It's time to take off the blinders and take a look
around!!
If they can find hidden
Google is notorious at banning Tor exit nodes from using its search
services. Either you're prompted with a phrase of words to enter into a
form, requiring you to have cookies enabled, or you can't search at all.
Yahoo is partially blocking Tor exits, and is becoming more like Google by
each da
When someone wants to DDoS attack a hidden service, he needs to do this trough
his entry nodes.
Would it be possible to add prevention of such attacks on all entry nodes in
the code? If a guy sends an unormal amount of requests to his entry nodes, the
entry nodes halt his connection for like 10
I've heard from several places that Tor's encryption is pretty weak for the
recent standard.
I don't know much about the encryption Tor uses, hence why I ask: Is Tor's
encryption weak?
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Original Message
From: "Geoff Down"
Apparently from: tor-talk-boun...@lists.torproject.org
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: [tor-talk] Hoax?
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2012 19:24:56 +
>
> Let's try that again...
> http://pastebin.com/jBPFsUSg
> "We did crack Tor's encrypti
Privoxy and Polipo has caused more problems than good, so I tried to connect
Firefox trough socks v5 with success. All problems gone and increased speed
on all Tor usage. But is this safe? My Tor client is firewalled, so it
cannot leak DNS or Java traffic.
TorStatus gives us an estimate of how many nodes there are.
How about how many clients there are?
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According to their latest blog, they've found the Freedom Hosting admin. And
even Mike Perry seems to be involved in their claims.
http://pastebin.com/qWHDWCre
This is starting to get utterly interesting. Is the whole Tor network being
owned and cracked by the Anonymous hackers?
___
Original Message
From: Roger Dingledine
> Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha includes the fix from 0.2.2.34 for a critical
> anonymity vulnerability where an attacker can deanonymize Tor users:
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2011-October/82.html
> Everybody should upg
Original Message
From: Moritz Bartl
> So far, there is no sign of them using a "weakness" in Tor. If people
> run unsecure software behind Tor hidden services, there is NOTHING Tor
> can do about it. Judging from your quotes, they opened the boxes and
> found documents allegedly
Original Message
> Read here for Anonymous to explain attacks and post username of pedofiles
> from some HS called L*city
> "#OpDarknet - Lolita City user dump" http://pastebin.com/88Lzs1XR. I say good
> for thems to attack
> phedo, but bad for Tor people to attack all of Hidden
Original Message
From: Sebastian Hahn
Apparently from: tor-talk-boun...@lists.torproject.org
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Suggestion: make _hidden services_ choose randomentry
nodes often!
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2011 14:54:29 +0200
> Unfortunately, you g
All standard clients have the same entry nodes on a permanent basis or as
long as the entry nodes are up, while the middle and exit nodes changes
all the time. This is to reduce the chance of choosing an accidental path
that is end-to-end supervised when browsing the WWW.
With hidden services,
I just heard that if the private_key file of your hidden service would have
gotten in the hands of an attacker, he could have located your hidden
service just like that. I just wonder how that can be done, since it's just
a file with encrypted code in it.
What are those nodes listed as "guards" at the tor status pages?
What does it take to get that status?
I have heard that it has something to do with entry nodes, but a thoroughly
explanation would be nice thanks.
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I don't like these log messages:
"[Warn] possible replay detected..."
I get about 5-10 a day. Usually several in a row. Got 9 yesterday and have 6
today so far.
Have tried about 100 different and random entry guards, Running latest stable
on Linux.
Some help from the experts would be nice, th
I've read a lot about it, but I'm hoping for a simplified explanation for a
simplified guy. ;)
If my hidden service server has a clock that is 5 minutes wrong, how can
anyone use that to locate me?
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Original Message
From: "Jack Waugh"
> I want to run Polipo on a "server" machine and Firefox with Torbutton
> on distinct client machines not having Polipo or Tor loaded on them.
> How do I set it up?
>
> I tried it with Polipo listening on its default port of 8123. I set
Original Message
From: tagnaq
> This was recently discussed:
> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2011-June/020755.html
Oh, I didn't see that. Thanks.
It's a relief to finally get confirmed that it uses SHA256 checking, because
I've downloaded and updated add-ons
Original Message
From: William Wrightman
> [...]
> If anyone has had positive experiences with any web-based chat /
> messengering services combined with Tor then please let me know.
I think you can use tor for anything, unless you're using a tor exit that's
banned.
The prob
Original Message
From: Lalle Bralle
> I'm trying to get countermail working with my TOR bundle I use on a USB
> stick for added security and anomity when I feel I need it. However, I
> believe Java has some security holes that's why it's not accepted. While
> that's good I nee
Original Message
From: Justin Aplin
> I honestly don't know, but if you're *that* paranoid about your downloads
> being tampered with, navigating to https://addons.mozilla.org and looking
> up the add-ons manually is only a few extra clicks.
I think it only checks the version
Original Message
From: Justin Aplin
> HTTPS transport should prevent the type of modification you're talking
> about, so just double-check your URIs before downloading anything.
> For example,
I was thinking more about using Firefox's built-in add-on installer and
updater. You
I'm having a laptop that is Tor only, so it never connects to the internet
without going trough Tor.
Someone wrote that malicious Tor exit nodes may modify your downloads. So when
I need to install the recommended plug-ins for Firefox, like TorButton and
NoScript, and I do that trough the Tor n
Questions:
#1 If you are using a custom list of entry guards, why?
#2 If you are using a custom list of entry guards, what criteria do you follow
when choosing them?
#3 If you are using a custom list of entry guards, how many do you set up?
#4 If you aren't using a custom list of entry guards,
I decided to check if the StrictEntryNodes and EntryNodes functions worked,
so I started to log my TOR connections.
They did work, and TOR connects to the entry nodes specified, but TOR also
connects to other nodes now and then while running. If you specify your own
entry nodes, shouldn't TOR o
>From this illustration:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
Tor creates several circuits while operating as a hidden service. Does it
connect to several entry points at the same time while doing all this, or
does it create all these circuits trough one selected entry for a
Sometimes I get this error message in the logs when I start my Tor program:
"Error launching circuit to node xxx for service xxx"
And it lists a huge amount of nodes down in the log file with my hidden service
address in plain text.
Has my hidden service address been revealed to these nodes, or
I mean _really_ work.
(I already know how it protects your anonymity.)
What happens from the moment you start the Tor program? What's the first
thing it does, the next thing, and so forth? I've never seen a detailed
technical illustration of how it works on a technical level.
__
Is it even possible? Since everyone is your entry node's IP, if you block it,
no one will be able to connect to your service.
Some people DoS hidden services to moderate you, making them unreadable.
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