on its own, as stated business
> practice. Also, I'm pretty sure if another Manning-like case
> appears, NSA would immediately command Facebook to offer the
> related user identification.
Not everyone's adversary is the NSA.
str4d
>
> If there's cheering about Facebook hid
spamalot.com and shortly after multiple requests come in on
slstatic.com, it should mark those as the same session, somehow
(whether by adding a query parameter or header to the static requests,
or being more intelligent on the server side).
str4d
>
> best, Griffin
>
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Seth David Schoen wrote:
str4d writes:
* No replay detection - packet replay is ignored within the
lifetime of a session. They suggest that adversaries would be
deterred by the risk of being detected by
volunteers/organizations/ASs
a HORNET-based routing
overlay using server-side software instead of network hardware,
similar to Tor and I2P. Such a scheme would however not be as
efficient as one based on deployed network hardware.
str4d
-- Seth Schoen sch...@eff.org Senior Staff Technologist
https://www.eff.org/ Electronic
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str4d wrote:
* Stateless data transmission (as they say on the box) - the
routing info is replicated in every data packet, removing the need
for local lookups. This increases the data packet header size (7
hops requires 344 bytes for HORNET, c/f
a tab (or pop-up
window) for each through the same circuit. That would allow users to
authenticate that site's Tor circuit with CloudFlare for all domains
the site uses. But this would probably need to be repeated each time
the circuit changes (like the CAPTCHAs already need to be).
str4d
ever sees them. It also includes a unique local address per
client feature like [0] for use with off-the-shelf applications, but
this is open to collisions (because the client hash space does not fit
into the IPv4 or IPv6 localhost address space).
str4d
[0] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
without permission, but then a
malicious exit provider would have even less motivation to set it up.
str4d
Or is the requirement to flag them as badexit to catch them red
handed?
The case that one took over legit relays is unlikely since many are
rather 'fresh' ones.
Or: Are they still
):
alias git='TZ=UTC git'
If you only want to force UTC for occasional commands then just add
TZ=UTC in front of the command, but I personally prefer redefining
the git command like above, to prevent accidentally forgetting.
str4d
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 12:24 AM, meejah mee...@meejah.ca wrote
above. It's worth looking at.
It is an interesting protocol. I am reviewing the whitepapers, and
intend to publish a comparison page on the I2P website[1] once I have
a good understanding of the differences.
str4d
[0] http://www.magnusbrading.com/phantom/phantom-design-paper.pdf
[1] https
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I use Polly on my laptop with no lock-out yet. I do regularly get
Unable to connect to Twitter error messages, from the exit node my
circuit has switched to being blocked by Twitter (I assume).
str4d
Brian Kroll wrote:
I use Twidere (loaded from
. Disabling I2P by
default was done to reduce the potential attack surface; I2P itself is
no longer vulnerable to that attack.
str4d
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compatibility for
applications that support hostnames.
As an aside, most of the applications that you mention generally use
UDP packets, which Tor does not yet support (AFAIK). I2P does support
datagrams.
str4d
[0] https://www.onioncat.org/
[1]
https://www.cypherpunk.at/onioncat_trac/browser/trunk/i2p
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On 07/05/2014 11:13 AM, grarpamp wrote:
On Fri, Jul 4, 2014 at 6:02 PM, Paweł Zegartowski
pze...@gmail.com wrote: i2p does have 'exits' you can compare to
tor as well. Anyone can run an exit. But users have first find one
on a wiki list or
] - distributed encrypted email. Can be configured so that
emails are stored via relays which delay before passing on packets, so
the visible store of an encrypted email packet in the DHT can occur
hours after it was sent and the original Bote node disconnected.
str4d
[0] http://syndie.i2p2.de/
[1
-October/001242.html
str4d
On 10/07/2013 08:11 PM, Jerzy Łogiewa wrote:
Do you mean if Tor wold have distributed data store like freenet?
Nice idea, please implement this. :~
-- Jerzy Łogiewa -- jerz...@interia.eu
On Oct 6, 2013, at 3:26 AM, It's Good to be Alive wrote:
Hi, I'm fairly new
postman's mail system has been
running since 2004, so he could be a useful source of info for you.
And I think that having the operators of two similar mail systems
talking with each other would be beneficial to the development of
these systems :)
str4d
On 09/18/2013 12:41 PM, Conrad Rockenhaus wrote
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