[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Hi, Georg Koppen: Yes. We (and Mozilla) are working on that. Is there documentation on this? Wordlife, Spencer -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

aka: > Wasn't Mozilla working on a Firefox which uses Tor for "Private Browsing"? > https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Roadmap/Tor > If millions of people would use the same Firefox on the same version > with mostly the same browser/javascript behaviour, it would make TBB > obsolete. Wouldn't it

[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Hi, Spencer: You should draft this into a proposal... behnaz Shirazi: if you write it for me i appreciate that :) I will write it with you. Hit me up. Yes, but discrimination is unsupported and avoidable. sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de: Discrimination happens between you and

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 10:40:06PM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote: > why you think we are limited to less than ~999 possible proxy? Sorry, I simply stop here, since we are not talking discussing TBB or Tor anymore. > 1-as I said UnidentifiableMode is not made for everyday life, we only > use it for

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 03:47:35PM -0700, Spencer wrote: > Yes, but discrimination is unsupported and avoidable. Discrimination happens between you and your endpoint, not between you and Tor. It may be that a exit discriminates, if you request a destination port that isn't available on some

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 03:22:03PM +0200, aka wrote: > If millions of people would use the same Firefox on the same version > with mostly the same browser/javascript behaviour, it would make TBB > obsolete. Wouldn't it make more sense to include those anonymity patches > into the mainline Firefox

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

oh god On 10/3/15, sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de wrote: > On Sat, Oct 03, 2015 at 09:16:50AM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote: >> If we use a socks proxy server to talk with destination instead of a >> private Tor exit node then such an attack becomes as dangerous as when >> you are using a

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On 10/3/15, sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de wrote: > On Sat, Oct 03, 2015 at 09:16:50AM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote: >> If we use a socks proxy server to talk with destination instead of a >> private Tor exit node then such an attack becomes as dangerous

[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Wasn't Mozilla working on a Firefox which uses Tor for "Private Browsing"? https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Roadmap/Tor If millions of people would use the same Firefox on the same version with mostly the same browser/javascript behaviour, it would make TBB obsolete. Wouldn't it make more sense to

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 02:14:11AM -0700, Spencer wrote: > The various bits that define your fingerprint. That makes only sense if you sync your clients requests to TrackHostExitsExpire, the effect on CDNs that stick lots of cookies to you, is that what happens to the folks in the cloudflare

[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Hi, Spencer: Is a 'Natural Fingerprint' like a clearnet fingerprint, in that it identifies you as a regular, >non-tor, internet user, making you part of the larger herd? behnaz Shirazi: I don't understand what do you mean by “clearnet fingerprint” ? I have been defining fingerprint as

[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Hi, Ben Tasker: The problem you have there, is what to randomize, The various bits that define your fingerprint. but natural's hard to fake No need to spoof traffic if using real fingerprint variables. When we're talking about making the browser unidentifiable as TBB, the very

[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Hi, Spencer: The various bits that define your fingerprint. sh-expires-12-2...@quantentunnel.de: Basically, the countermeasure against such behavior is to stick a cookie with an hash of your fingerprint to your browser and deny you, as soon as it no longer matches. Yes, but

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

>Since TBB uses the consensus this discussion is quite nonsensical, >you can't hide the fact that you use tor from the site you visit, >not with an addon or a bridge, while using tor. > >Since the consensus data is available, I do >grep "^r " /var/lib/tor/cached-consensus | cut -d \ -f 7 >and

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On Sat, Oct 03, 2015 at 09:16:50AM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote: > If we use a socks proxy server to talk with destination instead of a > private Tor exit node then such an attack becomes as dangerous as when > you are using a detectable TBB over a public Tor exit node because the > number of socks

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

> but if attacker detect that someone is trying to hide > it's identity when entering a powerful vile's email account or when > trying to contact a high risk journalist, that might cost lives. But if you're doing something (in the adversary's eyes) that serious, it probably doesn't matter whether

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On 10/1/15, Ben Tasker wrote: >> False! A unique Tor exit IP that visits site1.com then site2.com won't >> compromise same person visited those sites or tow different person who >> used same Tor exit IP at the same time did that, thus anonymity >> remains true. > > But if

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 04:58:12PM +, behnaz Shirazi wrote: > As I said it won't happen. It doesn't make sense to use > undetectableizer when using a public Tor exit node because that will > compromise you are using Tor thereby minority of undetectable users > won't hurt anonymity of major

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

On Sat, Sep 26, 2015 at 7:44 PM, Jeremy Rand wrote: >Maybe I'm not understanding you, but given that all TBB users are >already distinguishable from other users since their IP address is a >Tor exit, I'm not seeing how TorBrowser having a different fingerprint >from other

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

> False! A unique Tor exit IP that visits site1.com then site2.com won't > compromise same person visited those sites or tow different person who > used same Tor exit IP at the same time did that, thus anonymity > remains true. But if one has one fingerprint (the default TBB) and the other an

[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Hi, behnaz Shirazi: a Tor user who temporarily use a natural fingerprint to become undetectable for a while won't deanonymize itself nor the rest of other Tor users who use a detectable version of TBB because when a natural fingerprint is used once then there will be no enough information

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

> Randomization, or some one click equivalent, is the only real option here when usability is considered; the manual effort each session is undesirable at the very least :) The problem you have there, is what to randomize, and how to do it in such a way that it does not itself become

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Having a unique, or unique enough browser fingerprint would allow website owners and content network providers to track a TOR user across nodes and/or sessions. With a large enough CDN (facebook, etc) you could reasonably de-anonymize a user. On 2015-09-26 12:44, Jeremy Rand wrote: >

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

No, you can't just patch in a hardcoded window and screen size unless it reflects the actual viewport size. JavaScript is often used to position elements using relatively absolute positioning based on the viewport that it understands is correct, this will fail if the viewport vs reported size

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

Can't TBB devs just patch in a hardcoded 1366x768 window and screen size in the javascript handler? Also, if you want true undetectability you need to install a Tor instance and your OS for TBB in seperate VMs and setup the Tor VM to be a transparent router for your OS, so even if

[tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

In many different cases TBB users have to be undetectable (bypassing flags, escaping from deep investigations, confusing malicious iframes etc etc) when traffic flows through custom Tor exite nodes or even when traffic flows directly just for the privacy TBB offers at client side compared to plain

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

>Can't TBB devs just patch in a hardcoded 1366x768 window and screen size >in the javascript handler? Anonymity for Tor devs is a priority and they don't like give different browser fingerprints to their users because that plan makes Tor users in each web service more unique as very few people

Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 09/26/2015 06:38 PM, behnaz Shirazi wrote: >> Also, if you want true undetectability you need to install a Tor >> instance and your OS for TBB in seperate VMs and setup the Tor VM >> to be a transparent router for your OS, so even if >>