On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 8:10 AM, Fabian Keil
wrote:
> Robert Ransom wrote:
>
>> On 2012-03-02, Andrew Lewman wrote:
>>
>> > The trick is, I like to think I know what I'm doing and that I'll
>> > notice if apt-get or my VM image fails to transfer untouched. Whether
>> > I'll actually notice a soph
> It's my impression that signed packages aren't a priority
> for the BSDs in general.
It will happen when one of their mirrors gets rooted, or one of
their devs gets their machine, and thus their dev account, rooted.
The kernel.org, gnu/fsf and debian[?] incidents all come to mind.
Too bad it see
> On Sat, 03 Mar 2012 15:00:51 +, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> > On Sat, Mar
> 3, 2012 at 10:33, wrote:
> > > The transparently
> proxied operating system does not know it's real external IP, only it's Tor
> exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external IP.
> >
> > I
> see this claim ma
On Sat, 03 Mar 2012 15:00:51 +, Maxim Kammerer wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 10:33, wrote:
> > The transparently proxied operating system does not know it's real external
> > IP, only it's Tor exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external
> > IP.
>
> I see this claim made all
On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 10:33, wrote:
> The transparently proxied operating system does not know it's real external
> IP, only it's Tor exit IP. And can therefore never leak it's real external IP.
I see this claim made all the time — is it actually true? Is Tor
designed to withstand active attac
Robert Ransom wrote:
> On 2012-03-02, Andrew Lewman wrote:
>
> > The trick is, I like to think I know what I'm doing and that I'll
> > notice if apt-get or my VM image fails to transfer untouched. Whether
> > I'll actually notice a sophisticated exploit in deb packages or my vm
> > image modifi
> It's lame so or so. The exit node admins will have to deal with
> copyright infringement complaints.
'All bulk data' was the intended meaning. Assuming copyright is not
going away, certainly operators would want to see the complaint
generating portion of bulk move solely and natively to the unde
--- Ursprüngliche Nachricht ---
Von: grarpamp
Datum: 02.03.2012 07:45:20
An: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Betreff: Re: [tor-talk] Operating system updates / software installation
behind Tor Transparent Proxy
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 11:31 PM, Andrew Lewman
> wrote:
> > bittorr
>
> I'm more
> worried about the risks to user anonymity. It sucks to be
> the user reading
> about some sensitive subject when your apt cron job
> decides to poke every
> package source you install from. “Oh, that guy
> who keeps reading about Foozer's
> Disease must be in the
> Antarctica/McMu
> But apt uses GPG
> (run with (necessarily) root privileges) to verify
> the files it downloads.
> Sucks to be a Debian user when someone finds
> another code-exec bug in GPG's
> parsing code.
Indeed. Encrypted updates would be handy. I support
http://brainstorm.ubuntu.com/idea/26541/.
> > Or
>rransom said:
>I'm more worried about the risks to user anonymity. It sucks to be
>the user reading about some sensitive subject when your apt cron job
>decides to poke every package source you install from. “Oh, that guy
>who keeps reading about Foozer's Disease must be in the
>Antarctica/McMur
On 02.03.2012 02:39, proper proper wrote:
>> I don't see a difference between regular downloads
>> and operating system
>> updates. (I am speaking of Debian here, I don't know
>> how other
>> operating system or distributions handle package installation and
>> updates.) Are regular downloads of '
Hi,
Moritz Bartl wrote (02 Mar 2012 00:27:58 GMT) :
> The second reason to avoid Bittorrent over Tor is that there is no
> audited torrent client. There is none because of the first reason.
In case someone wants to do this audit, they should get in touch with
Jacob Appelbaum who offered Tails dev
> Robert Ransom wrote:
> FreeBSD, apt, GPG, [etc]
Unfortunately, I know of none that do OpenPGP right. Such as signing
their git (sha-1 tree strength) repos upon init and each release tag,
distributing keys with said releases/announcements, and integrating
that so on down the chain, into updates,
On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 11:31 PM, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> bittorrent trackers are fine, it's the bulk download of GB of data 7x24
> that loads up the network.
Wanted to add a bit here from another view.
I see no issue with bulk data transfer, so long as you give
back empty bandwidth equal to your
> Robert Ransom wrote:
> Use Tor 0.2.3.x-alpha, give the user 10 or more SocksPorts and 10 or
> more DNSPorts to point things which really need to be anonymous at,
> and no TransPort.
I think both are useful. Using TransPort as a safety packet log
and proxy catchall for whatever apps might defy So
On 2012-03-01, proper proper wrote:
> I was told, to ask this question here. [3]
>
> Tor's transparent proxy feature is at the moment a bit complicated to take
> advantage off and therefore unpopular. That might change in the future,
> because a) documentation improves [1]; b) in the future (depen
Ok, thanks for your reply!
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On 2012-03-02, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> The trick is, I like to think I know what I'm doing and that I'll
> notice if apt-get or my VM image fails to transfer untouched. Whether
> I'll actually notice a sophisticated exploit in deb packages or my vm
> image modified in perfect way that gpg or sha25
On Fri, 02 Mar 2012 00:12:44 +0100
"proper proper" wrote:
> You ask the user not to use Bittorrent over Tor, as the network can
> not handle the load.
bittorrent trackers are fine, it's the bulk download of GB of data 7x24
that loads up the network.
> What about operating system updates behind
> "proper proper" writes:
>
> [...]
>
> >>
> You can easily do so by separating traffic at user level (root vs. regular
> users). Why do we need a special package for such a simple task?
> >
> >
> That's not possible. Everything behind the transparent proxy, root or regular
> user, has only two o
--- Ursprüngliche Nachricht ---
Von: Moritz Bartl
Datum: 02.03.2012 01:27:58
An: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Betreff: Re: [tor-talk] Operating system updates / software installation
behind Tor Transparent Proxy
> On 02.03.2012 00:12, proper proper wrote:
> > You ask the user n
"proper proper" writes:
[...]
>> You can easily do so by separating traffic at user level (root vs. regular
>> users). Why do we need a special package for such a simple task?
>
> That's not possible. Everything behind the transparent proxy, root or regular
> user, has only two options, use T
> "proper proper" writes:
>
> > I
> was told, to ask this question here. [3]
> >
> > Tor's transparent proxy
> feature is at the moment a bit complicated to take
> > advantage off and
> therefore unpopular. That might change in the future, because
> > a) documentation
> improves [1]; b) in the fut
"proper proper" writes:
> I was told, to ask this question here. [3]
>
> Tor's transparent proxy feature is at the moment a bit complicated to take
> advantage off and therefore unpopular. That might change in the future,
> because
> a) documentation improves [1]; b) in the future (depending on
On 02.03.2012 00:12, proper proper wrote:
> You ask the user not to use Bittorrent over Tor, as the network can not
> handle the load.
The problem is that Bittorrent opens a lot of concurrent connections to
download many pieces at once. And all those "Tweak your Torrent client
and get mighty migh
I was told, to ask this question here. [3]
Tor's transparent proxy feature is at the moment a bit complicated to take
advantage off and therefore unpopular. That might change in the future, because
a) documentation improves [1]; b) in the future (depending on the outcome of
this bug) there migh
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