CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA:
> Seeking technical information on how hidden services were de anonymized
> and what updates to HS protocol was applied as a mitigation.
> Thanks,
A protocol flaw allowed Guard-node and Exit-node (or that thing that
does rendezvous, forgot the name) to talk to each other ov
CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA cannon-ciota.info> writes:
>
> Seeking technical information on how hidden services were de anonymized
> and what updates to HS protocol was applied as a mitigation.
> Thanks,
If the attacker can take control of both the guard node of a
hidden service and it's rendezvo
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On 2016-03-28 16:13, Flipchan wrote:
" What i have heard was that it was alot of bad opsec and also some
pma-exploits"
Or maybe the 'bad opsec' claim is actually a case of parallel
reconstruction in which the excuse of bad opsec is to cover the
What i have heard was that it was alot of bad opsec and also some pma-exploits
CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA skrev: (26 mars 2016 12:32:21
CET)
>Seeking technical information on how hidden services were de anonymized
>
>and what updates to HS protocol was applied as a mitigation.
>Thanks,
>--
>Cannon
On 03/26/2016 07:32 AM, CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA wrote:
> Seeking technical information on how hidden services were de anonymized
> and what updates to HS protocol was applied as a mitigation.
> Thanks,
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/thoughts-and-concerns-about-operation-onymous
--
tor-talk mail
Seeking technical information on how hidden services were de anonymized
and what updates to HS protocol was applied as a mitigation.
Thanks,
--
Cannon N. Ciota
Digital Identity (namecoin): id/cannon
Website: www.cannon-ciota.info
Email: can...@cannon-ciota.info
PGP Fingerprint: E7FB 0605 1BD4 8B8
