Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-31 Thread bancfc
Thanks Ethan for your research. We've been discussing which mitigation technique to use. In a virtualized context disabling c-states is only possible from the host. Thats ok since all it means is we need to package it for users to install it there. We prefer the idea of not using the kernel

Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-31 Thread Spencer
Hi, Ethan White: Ping latency decreases when CPU usage is high an adversary can influence CPU usage to transmit data I can confirm that disabling c-states does completely prevent this attack. Dope. providing an option in Tails to disable c-states, perhaps in the form of a GRUB entry

Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-30 Thread Ethan White
A recap (since this thread is about 2 weeks old): Ping latency decreases when CPU usage is high. If an adversary can influence CPU usage (i.e. JavaScript, GZIP decompression, expensive public-key crypto), then they can use this as a covert channel to transmit data. (Imagine: someone

Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-16 Thread some_guy123
> With two computers connected via Ethernet through a switch, I would > normally get ping timings of around 250 microseconds. > However, when the computer being pinged was pegged at 100% CPU on all > cores, _ping latency would drop to about 170 microseconds._ This is probably caused by power

Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-15 Thread bancfc
Hi. Whonix collaborator here. We've given a lot of thought to many types of clock based attacks including the one you are researching so we are interested to know more about how this applies to our platform. To run Whonix in KVM please see the relevant steps here [0]. Let me know if you have

Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-15 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 11:18:38AM -0400, Ethan White wrote: > Also, unfortunately, I'm going to be away from all things internet > for the next week or so, and thus unable to answer many > questions. Sorry for essentially commiting and leaving. Neat! Hopefully that away-from-the-net part means

Re: [tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-15 Thread Ethan White
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Also, forgot to add: I also posted this on my blog [1]. As well, PGP signature so I can properly claim this later. 1. https://ethanwhite.xyz/cpu-correlation -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1

[tor-talk] Practical deanonymization using CPU load covert channels

2016-07-15 Thread Ethan White
I recently had an idea for using CPU load covert channels for practical deanonymization attacks. After using them to deanonymize myself multiple times, I conferred with some Tor Project people, and they recommended I post it here. *# Covert Channels* A _covert channel_ is any technique that