Hi,
Spencer:
I am forced to update [0]
And to use third-parties for a native functionality ):
Wordlife,
Spencer
[0]: http://fr.tinypic.com/r/2qk5gtw/9
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Hi,
Thank you for your thoughtful response (:
Paul Syverson:
diversity of trust
This has no definition that I could quickly find. It is an
anthropological area of research, though, such as inquiring into how
trust works in diverse communities, with more research needed.
this does not
On Mon, 25 Jan 2016 10:25:20 -0500
Paul Syverson wrote:
> "20,000 In League Under the Sea: Anonymous Communication, Trust,
> MLATs, and Undersea Cables" available at
> http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.1.issue-1/popets-2015-0002/popets-2015-0002.xml?format=INT
As far as I can
On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 04:13:18PM -0800, Spencer wrote:
> >
> >leave the route selection to Tor
> >
>
> Is this that trust thing people are always talking about?
>
A little terse to know, but onion routing is designed around diversity
of trust. Just to be clear, this does not mean 'let the Tor
On 01/24/2016 09:38 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 11:04:30AM +, Oskar Wendel wrote:
>> Attacker could easily tap into major VPN providers traffic and try to
>> correlate their traffic with hidden service traffic. And there are fewer
>> VPN providers than Tor entry guar
Hi,
Nobody [quoted and I snipped regarding Tor over Tor]:
undefined and potentially unsafe behavior ... it is not clear
if this is safe ... it has never been discussed ... we don't
understand.
These seem to be the valuable parts.
leave the route selection to Tor
Is this that trust th
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Flipchan :
> Instead of goin vpn->tor You could go i2p->tor
It's a bit offtopic, but still interesting. So you mean routing i2p
through Tor?
I conducted some experiments some time ago (I don't trust i2p enough to
run it through the clearnet and I
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Flipchan :
> Well i never liked vpn , like for example in the US the police can force
> the vpn provider to give out info without the vpn provider telling the
> client/customer about it, so u need to put alot of trust in these vpn
> providers,
Tha
aka :
> Why not Tor over Tor? Using a Tor exit to connect to the first hop.
> Would require traffic correlating twice.
It wouldn't. Traffic correlation doesn't care of the traffic content
itself. It doesn't break the traffic anonymity, it just correlates your
traffic with the traffic on the sit
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Roger Dingledine :
> It's a tradeoff -- if somebody somehow breaks the anonymity of your Tor
> circuit, it's nice to have another layer behind that. But if somebody
> guesses that you're using a particular VPN, or you pick a VPN that they're
> already
Instead of goin vpn->tor You could go i2p->tor
nobody skrev: (24 januari 2016 21:25:38 CET)
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>
>
>
>On 01/24/2016 03:22 PM, aka wrote:
>> Oskar Wendel:
>>> Today I thought about something...
>>>
>>> Let's assume that attacker (government) seizes t
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On 01/24/2016 03:22 PM, aka wrote:
> Oskar Wendel:
>> Today I thought about something...
>>
>> Let's assume that attacker (government) seizes the hidden service
>> and wants to run it and deanonymize its users with traffic
>> correlation.
>>
>> A
Oskar Wendel:
> Today I thought about something...
>
> Let's assume that attacker (government) seizes the hidden service and
> wants to run it and deanonymize its users with traffic correlation.
>
> Attacker could easily tap into major VPN providers traffic and try to
> correlate their traffic
On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 11:04:30AM +, Oskar Wendel wrote:
> Attacker could easily tap into major VPN providers traffic and try to
> correlate their traffic with hidden service traffic. And there are fewer
> VPN providers than Tor entry guards (and much less than home connections
> around the
Well i never liked vpn , like for example in the US the police can force the
vpn provider to give out info without the vpn provider telling the
client/customer about it, so u need to put alot of trust in these vpn
providers, i am acctually developing a better solution but its only in beta and
i
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Flipchan :
> Do u mean a vpn to tor? Or first tor then a vpn?
Tor over VPN. So we first purchase a VPN and then make Tor use it to
connect to the first hop.
- --
Oskar Wendel, o.wen...@wp.pl.remove.this
Pubkey: https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?searc
Do u mean a vpn to tor? Or first tor then a vpn?
Oskar Wendel skrev: (24 januari 2016 12:04:30 CET)
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>
>Today I thought about something...
>
>Let's assume that attacker (government) seizes the hidden service and
>wants to run it and deanonymize its
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Today I thought about something...
Let's assume that attacker (government) seizes the hidden service and
wants to run it and deanonymize its users with traffic correlation.
Attacker could easily tap into major VPN providers traffic and try to
corre
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