Re: [tor-talk] insufficient hidden service performance is potential de-anonymizing DoS [was Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here]

2014-11-09 Thread coderman
On 11/9/14, grarpamp wrote: > ... > HS operators banding together to compare the above logs is one > of them. You could conceivably throw the logs/pcaps from many > relays and onions into a splunk.onion instance and try to mine some > knowledge out of them that way. Tor is a jointly owned wide are

Re: [tor-talk] insufficient hidden service performance is potential de-anonymizing DoS [was Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here]

2014-11-09 Thread grarpamp
On Sun, Nov 9, 2014 at 11:08 AM, Andrea Shepard wrote: > Yes, and that is what it looks like. The strings 'code', 'old' and 'fail' in > the URLs seen in nachash's logs were also present as top-level directories on > his site, and he apparently had a 404 redirect to his index page - so a > buggy c

Re: [tor-talk] insufficient hidden service performance is potential de-anonymizing DoS [was Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here]

2014-11-09 Thread Andrea Shepard
On Sun, Nov 09, 2014 at 05:31:47AM -0800, coderman wrote: > On 11/9/14, coderman wrote: > > ... > > your ConstrainedSockets experiments are exactly what i would expect to > > see if this technique were used, since reducing socket buffers would > > allow you to have more concurrent connections open

Re: [tor-talk] insufficient hidden service performance is potential de-anonymizing DoS [was Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here]

2014-11-09 Thread coderman
On 11/9/14, coderman wrote: > ... > your ConstrainedSockets experiments are exactly what i would expect to > see if this technique were used, since reducing socket buffers would > allow you to have more concurrent connections open (and thus thwart a > DoS at lower limits). someone asked, "then wh

Re: [tor-talk] insufficient hidden service performance is potential de-anonymizing DoS [was Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here]

2014-11-09 Thread coderman
On 11/9/14, coderman wrote: > ... > Andrea's distribution shows this type of behavior, as i would expect it: > https://people.torproject.org/~andrea/loldoxbin-logs/analysis/length_distribution.txt > e.g. send small bits to keep connection active and not closed by > server side client send timeouts

[tor-talk] insufficient hidden service performance is potential de-anonymizing DoS [was Re: [tor-dev] yes hello, internet supervillain here]

2014-11-09 Thread coderman
thanks for the transparency, nachash! i am putting this conversation on tor-talk, since my replies are more noise and less dev, and the details seem to be around Tor use and configuration. On 11/8/14, Fears No One wrote: > ... Another regret is that pcaps weren't taken, but we both made > the mi