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Brandon Wiley wrote:
> This is
> an interesting method of obfuscation as it seems like it would interfere to
> some extent with the three most popular DPI techniques: string matching,
> packet lengths, and packet timings. However, like most obfuscation
Sniffjoke looks interesting. I'm having trouble finding a clear description
of what it actually does to the packets to get them past DPI filters. The
best description I could find mentions insertion of fake packets which will
be discarded by the receiver but which will confuse the filter. [1] This
On 5/17/11 11:12 AM, vecna wrote:
> Hi tor guys,
>
> encrypted traffic analysis is an analysis apply to an encrypted session
> in order not to disclose the protected data, but to detect the protocol
> protected.
COOL
> 1) try a blocked TOR version in IRAN, to verify if the session is
> protec
Hi tor guys,
encrypted traffic analysis is an analysis apply to an encrypted session
in order not to disclose the protected data, but to detect the protocol
protected.
the IRAN attack in TOR was, more or less, an attack like them. (more or
less because was based on the HTTPS pattern, not in an an
