The Struggle in Yemen and the Houthis and the Power Shift
[image: Houthi rebels operate in the northern region of Yemen. [3]] [image: <b>Houthis</b> hold their weapons as they gather in Haz, west of the Yemeni ...] [image: The Houthis have made a giant leap on the military level since Saleh ...]The Houthis *The Growth and Expansion of the Houthis* *What happens in Yemen in the nearing period and long term period really does and of importance - both locally and regionally**.* By *Malik Sekou Osei* Looking at Yemen can give a view of a complex Gordian knot of a geostrategic contradiction. As the present predicament in a place call Yemen has been all but ignored in the Western media and Yemen is noted for more than a series of ghetto candy stores of loose cigarettes and cheap ice cream of over loaded sugary artificial cupcakes and pies. At this time Yemen is ablaze within its internal contradictions of a struggle of hegemony and actual development. Nonetheless, with the bigger conflagrations getting more out of control in other parts of the world, the struggle of Yemen it seems to have been reduced in importance to the back page of mainstream media or the vulgar background discussions of the dysfunctional characters of Reality TV, for most of the last few months one of the most important political centers of the so-called Middle East, in terms of imperial geo-strategic interests. But what happens in Yemen in the short term and long term really has an effect that could lead to broader chaos and further instability, both locally and regionally. Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, Yemen has been beleaguered for decades by corrupt and feeble and frail governments, tribal internal strife, resource depletion, a depreciating security situation and sheer poverty. Yemeni the unnecessary poverty [image: Yemen poverty] [image: Yemen poverty] One of the things that has to be addressed in understanding the crisis that is brewing in Yemen is the growth of the Houthis and their political influence in Yemen. To see the larger political consequences of the grown of the Houthis in Yemen and the potential of the political character in Yemen, thus for the larger Middle East. For it would be impossible to understand Yemen without understanding the growth of the Houthis. In September two months ago, Houthi insurgents charging a wave of public restlessness, ran and overflowed into the capital city of Sanaa from the north, and succeeded in bringing the government to its knees in a matter of just under a week. In the eyes of many Yemenis, the Houthis are, at least for now, the leading political force and best hope for change in a country that truly needs it from top to bottom. They are also a substantial military force, having taken control of much of Yemen's security apparatus in the north and central parts of the country. What makes both these points remarkable is that the Houthis are members of the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam, a small minority in an otherwise Sunni majority country. A group called the Zaidis reigned over much of northern Yemen under a system of religious and secular rule known as an imamate for over a thousand years until revolution swept through the country back in 1962. Yemen's nationalist movement eventually led to the establishment of two separate countries: the Yemen Arab Republic or North Yemen and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen or South Yemen. In 1990, North and South Yemen united to become the present day Republic of Yemen. *The Marginalized* However, the Zaidis were to never recover the power and authority they once had previous to 1962, and have been both politically and economically marginalized by each successive government ever since—at least up until currently. And this is a very important point to remember in any examination about the Houthis. [image: Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi] Hussein Badral al al-Houthi Back in 2004, Hussein Badr al Din al-Houthi, a mutineer cleric from northern Yemen and head of the Zaidi clique there, started a revolt and insurrection against the government in Sanaa, insisting a greater autonomy in the north, as well as to protect Zaidi religious and cultural traditions thought to be an impingement by Sunnis. Houthi was killed by government troops just a few months later, but his followers adopted his name and carried on the struggle. Following a series of on again off again periods of bloody fighting, the Houthis agreed to a ceasefire with the government in 2010. However, not much changed for the Houthis in terms of perceived grievances perpetuated by the government, which brings us to the more recent events that resulted in the Houthis' rapid and astonishing rise to power. Ali Abdullah Saleh [image: Ali Abdullah Saleh, presidente do Iêmen, está a quase 33 anos no ...] President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled Yemen with an iron fist for more than 30 years, and although a Zaidi himself, was no ally of the Houthis. In fact, he was their nemesis during and after the six years of rebellion. As the Arab Spring swept through much of the Middle East in 2011, the Houthis took advantage of growing discontent and disappointment throughout Yemen with the Saleh government, and began to establish their control in the north. As part of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative signed later that year, Saleh agreed to step down and pass the reins of power to his deputy, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. But once again, promises of government reform went nowhere and the lives of everyday Yemenis, to include the Houthis, were no better. The Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative [image: Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi 2013.jpg] Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi For the Houthis, the last straw in their fight with the government was the lifting of fuel subsidies in July 2014, which lead to wide scale demonstrations by both Sunni and Shia in Sanaa. By that time, the Houthis had become much more politically wise and militarily skillful. At this point, the Houthis they knew what they wanted and how they were going to accomplish it. After taking control of Sanaa in September, the Houthis forced Yemen’s Prime Minister, Mohammed Basindwa, to resign, and then outright rejected Hadi’s first nomination to replace him. From that point on, the Houthis have more or less been calling the shots in Sanaa, although it’s important to note that what happens there doesn’t necessarily carry weight in much of the rest of the country. [image: Ali al-Sarari, an adviser to Prime Minister Mohammed Salem Basindwa ...] Mohammed Basindwa *Governmental Concessions* So now the question becomes; what do the Houthis want? The short answer is political concessions that give them important impact in the central government and greater regional autonomy throughout the country, mainly for them in the north. And so far, they’ve been very successful in that regard. Since taking control of security functions in and around Sana’a two months ago, the Houthis have proven to be a formidable military force, and have not shied away from flexing their muscle. [image: Fighting resumes between Houthis, pro-Salafi militants] The Houthis “*So what do the Houthis want? The short answer is political concessions that give them significant influence in the central government and greater regional autonomy throughout the country, particularly for them in the north.”* Frustrated and unsatisfied with Hadi's slow pace toward real change reform, the Houthis gave Hadi a 10-day challenge and task at the end of October to form a new government, which he then proclaimed on November 9. The new technocratic reconciliation government incorporates representatives from the time-honored power bases as well as the Houthis, southern secessionists and most every other political party in the country. For now, the Houthis have established themselves as a valid and authentic political party with long-term goals, and an essential part of the security operation. So what stands in the way of the Houthis' plans for greater influence in Yemeni politics? Plenty. In the south, the al-Hirak secessionist movement looks at the Houthis as a direct threat to their long sought after aim of independence, especially if the Houthis begin to move in that direction. What has to be considered is the Islah Party, which is Yemen's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Houthis' biggest political enemy. They both have a history of doing whatever it takes each to destabilize and weaken the one another. And then there is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based primarily in central Yemen, where the Houthis have already begun to extend their influence. Daily clashes between the Houthis and AQAP are taking a deadly toll on both sides, with no sign of letting up. AQAP will forge whatever relations they can with the Sunni tribes in central Yemen to exploit in their favor the Sunni-Shia struggles seen throughout much of the Middle East. And speaking of Sunni-Shia struggles, don't discount Saudi Arabia either, which looks at the Houthis as nothing more than an Iranian tool to undermine them. The Houthis' rise to power and influence was as sudden as it was unexpected, and for now at least, they have brought about political change that may not have occurred otherwise for many years. Change that for the first time in Yemen's history is set to be truly representative of all the disparate political factions. Only time will tell whether the new government can effectively control a country as complex and diverse as Yemen. But the Houthis' best chance at helping it to succeed is to maintain their role as a legitimate long-term political party with limited goals and a short-term guarantor of security. What they don't want to do is become another divisive political or military element with a grand scheme for power and influence, something Yemen has proven to have no shortage of in the past and it seems it has a vast fuel for this type endeavor in its future. For the people of Yemen, they have a crisis of lacking real and radical leadership with everyday people could united around a real program of development that is truly and vastly anti-imperialist that hark back to ethnic religious superstitions that needs imperialist proxies to rationalize their political subterfuge of social distraction of religious utopias. For the real contradiction in the crisis of Yemen is not ethnic strife, but its imperialism and its proxies. 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