A Review Article Sowing of the Mustard Seed by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Macmillian
Publishers Ltd, London, 1997.
In Bethwell A. Ogot, Building on the Indigenous: Selected Essays 1981 - 1998 (Kisumu:
Anyange Press Ltd., 1999), pp. 223-232.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines narcissism as a "tendency to
self-worship, absorption in one's own personal perfections." It is derived from the
name of a Greek youth Narkissos, who fell in love with his reflection in water.
Museveni's autobiography shows him as the Ugandan Narkissos who has fallen in love
with his reflection in Uganda's muddy political waters. He has turned Uganda's
historical record into a narrative of self-justification. And although all
autobiographies are narcissistic to some degree the careful shaping of a public
self-image, monuments to self-love built for posterity - not all are as trapped in
narcissism as this book is. For Museveni, it is not so much how the past dictates the
present that is important, but rather how the present manipulates the past.
The book is the story of his own personal role "in the struggle for freedom and
democracy in Uganda over the past 30 years." It took sixteen years to write. He
believes that it is he and his colleagues who finally sowed the "mustard seed" of
freedom and democracy in Uganda in the 1980s, after first clearing the land of the
rocks and weeds of a corrupt system. In other words, he gives no credit to Uganda
nationalism in the attainment of the country's political independence. Indeed, he
doubts whether there was any Uganda nationalism before him. In other words, all was
darkness in Uganda until God willed that there shall be Museveni, and then all was
light!
The book is also a record of Museveni's ideological development from youth to the
present. As a secondary school boy in the 1960s, he was a Democratic Party (D.P.)
sympathizer - a kind of D.P. 'youth winger' - largely because the Bahima Chiefs and
the Catholic leaders in Ankole were members of the party.
At the University of Dar-es-Salaam (1967-70), he developed a coherent ideological
outlook which was largely Marxist. In 1970, he joined Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC),
while he was working in the Office of the President, in 223 Obote's office, as a
Research Assistant. He did this, he explains, not out of conviction, but rather for
convenience. This was pure opportunism! It is true Museveni has written a revealing
and, in its way, a candid book. But the book has many flaws, of both style and
substance: the tone of self-satisfaction and self-congratulation and it is partial and
glosses over some complex episodes. And besides his close comrades - most of them from
South-West Uganda, he is personally harsh on everybody else. He had low opinion of
practically all his teachers at the University of Dar-es-Salaam; he condemns all D.P.
leaders as lacking "a dynamic leadership", "conservative men", with "limited
perspective"; and the "UPC leadership were generally an uncouth breed, anxi
ous to get rich as quickly as possible using state apparatus" (p. 45); and Y.K. Lule
had "aversion to democracy". He however, reserves much of the venom for Obote who is
demonized throughout the book as the major cause of all problems in Uganda since
independence.
It is evident that Museveni's main motive for writing this book - apart from the one
already referred to of portraying himself as the saviour of Uganda - was to erase
completely the figure of Obote from the history of Uganda. Unfortunately for him,
Obote is a much more substantial figure than Museveni implies and his contribution
deserves a critical and serious appreciation which would go beyond the sympathetic
political biography that has been written by Professor Kenneth Ingaham,1 the first
Professor of History at Makerere University and a former Nominated Member of the
Uganda Legislative Council where he first met Obote.
Museveni writes, for example, that as school boys in Westem Uganda between 1965 and
1966, he and his friends - Martin Mwesiga, Mwesigwa Black, Valeviano Rwaheru and Eriya
Kategaya - were "staunchly anti-Obote." (p. 19) He himself hated Obote at that time
because he frustrated the East African Federation idea against the support of Nyerere
and Kenyatta (p. 18). This is far from the truth. In January 1963, for instance, Prime
Minister Obote accompanied Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa of Tanganyika to England to
discuss independence for Kenya, because the East Afncan Common Services could not
function properly while Kenya remained a colony. As Harold Macmillan, the then Prime
Minister of Britain has recorded in his memoirs, At the End of the Day 1961 - 1963,2
Duncan Sandys, the Colonial Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs, spent several hours on
January 28, 1963, "being reproached (and almost insulted) by Mr. Kawawa and Mr.
Obote." Kenya became independent on 12 December, 1963 and
early in 1964, a meeting was held in Uganda, which led to the signing of the Kampala
Agreement which created the East African Common Market. It was this agreement which
was revised in 1966 to create the East African Community which functioned fairly 224
well until it collapsed in 1977. But until Obote was overthrown in 1971, he and the
Uganda government supported the regional grouping. Hence, Museveni's schoolboy hatred
for Obote for opposing the idea of the East African Federation is one of the many
distortions and fabrications in the book aimed at demonizing Obote.
Furthermore, Museveni asserts that Obote would rather support Nkrumah's notion of a
continental union because he knew it was impractical. "In the case of an East African
Union which was feasible, opportunists such as Obote, who were also political dwarfs,
feared its realisation because they wanted to remain big fish in small ponds." (p.
18). The historical facts do not support Museveni's strictures. During the meeting of
African Heads of States and Governments, Addis Ababa in May 1963, at which the
Organisation of African Unity was formed, Nkrumah made a passionate speech in support
of union government. It is on record that Milton Obote was one of the African leaders
at the conference who strongly argued in favour of regional groupings.
There is also the need to critically assess the Obote I period, 1962-1971. Museveni
characterizes it as a time of intrigues and corruption, with no meaningful
development. But any objective evaluation of the whole period would show it as the
greatest era of prosperity in Uganda. The economy was kept on a sound and expanding
basis and much of the money generated was used to expand education and health
facilities throughout the country.
Politically, Museveni accuses Obote of being unscrupulous and cites the way in which
he misled the traditionalists in Buganda and then, after some years, "made an
about-turn over the same issues." (p. 19). He, however, does not discuss the issues.
For instance, the independence constitution, which established Buganda in a federal
relationship with the rest of Uganda, created more problems than it set to solve. Both
Obote and Kabaka of Buganda believed that they could establish a working relationship
between UPC and Kabaka Yeka. Museveni condemns this alliance as opportunistic and
sectarian, but he does tell us what could have been done, given the independent
constitution, which attempted to marry a monarchical and authoritarian regime with a
parliamentary system.
Moreover, the same independence constitution had provided for the holding of a
referendum in the Lost Counties - a disputed area between Buganda and Bunyoro. This
area had been excised from Bunyoro and given to the Baganda at the close of the
nineteenth century as a reward for their loyalty. For sixty years the Banyoro demanded
their counties back but the British were not able to make amends. Buganda had become
too powerful for any ruler to offend it. During the constitutional conference in
London, it had been resolved that within two years of independence a plebiscite should
be taken in the Lost Counties. 225 Nobody thought that Obote would have the courage to
implement that resolution. But he did and forever incurred the wrath of the Baganda.
The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants voted to return to Bunyoro. This is what
ruptured the UPC/KY alliance, and not Obote's unscrupulousness. The Kabaka, as
President of Uganda, refused to sign the Bill transfering the Lost Cou
nties to Bunyoro - this in itself was unconstitutional.
Buganda leaders then engaged in a series of maneuvers intended to engineer the
overthrow of Obote. The election of Grace Ibingira from Ankole as UPC Secretary
General to replace John Kakonge, was part of the conspiracy supported by Buganda
leaders, to oust Obote, with the help of the Americans and the British who were made
to believe that Obote was a communist. Hence, the split in the UPC at this time was
not between the left (Kakonge) and the right (Ibingira) a Museveni would like us to
believe. It was a split between the pro and anti-Obote forces.
Then there was the motion moved in parliament by David Ocheng, an Acholi friend of the
Kabaka who had been elected as Kabaka Yekka Member of Parliament. It accused Obote and
Idi Amin of theft of gold, ivory and coffee from Congo. Parliament voted that a
Commission of Inquiry should be set up.
Museveni claims that no Commission of Inquiry was set up (p. 38). This is a strange
claim, for it is on record that on 27th February, 1968, the Minister for Internal
Affairs, Basil K. Bataringaya, appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the allegations
made by David Ocheng. He appointed Justice Sir Clement Negeon de L'Estang, of the
Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, Justice Henry Ethlewood Miller, a Judge of the
High Court of the Republic of Kenya, and Justice Augustine Saidi, a Judge of the High
Court of the United Republic of Tanzania. L'Estang was to be Chairman of the
Commission and Samuel William Wako Wambuzi of the Uganda Ministry of Justice was to be
Secretary. This was obviously a high powered Commission.
Ocheng's allegations were found to be baseless, and Obote, Amin and Minister Onama
were found to be innocent.3 But as the English Guardian commented at the time, the
allegations were made "to create optimum conditions for a coup." Indeed, without
consulting the Prime Minister, President Mutesa had, unconstitutionally requested the
British Government for troops and arms, and Brigadier Shaban Opolot, then army
commander, who was closely associated with Buganda, was to carry out the coup on 22nd
February, 1966. Three battalions of troops had been sent to Ankole and Bunyoro for
training on 21st February. And as Obote stated in parliament:
"I would not have minded if in their plots they were using political tactics alone.
But immediately they began to interfere with the armed 226 forces, I was concerned,
and it is because of their interference with the armed forces that I and my colleagues
decided that we must act to save the country from chaos and bloodshed."
Instead of a small section of the army staging a coup in the name of one man, Milton
Obote acted. What happened is now history. And it is that history that Museveni has
distorted to suit his goal of demonizing Obote.
The Role of the Army
Museveni regards the army as having been the main political problem in Uganda in the
1960s and 70s. During the colonial period, British military recruitment favoured the
North and West Nile, especially the Acholi, Langi and Teso. The southern and western
peoples were trained to serve in the Public Service, in schools and churches, in large
scale farming and in small scale businesses. This kind of ethnic division of labour
was not peculiar to Uganda. The British practised it in all their colonies. For
instance, in India, the army and the police were reserved for Sikhs and Gukkas. In
Kenya, most of the recruits into the army came from the Kamba and Kalenjin. Museveni
accepts this, but blames Obote for not changing it. Instead, he expanded it and used
it for sectarian aims.
While there is some truth in this accusation, the subsequent history of Uganda saw the
intensification of the military factor and its sectarian nature. Idi Amin was a
military dictator who recruited largely his own West Nile people, especially the Kakwa
and the Nubi from the Sudan, into the anny. In fact, it can be said that Amin created
for himself a private army within the national army. And according to Museveni, by the
end of Amin's rule in 1979, about 500,000 Ugandans had died, many of them Acholi and
Langi. (p. 45) He concludes that this is the "high price Uganda paid for a corrupt,
mismanaged and secretarian army." (p. 41).
What about Museveni himself? He admits that he was possessed, since his college days
at Dar-es-Salaam, with the control of the army as a solution to political and economic
power. He unashamedly admits that his principal aim was to create "a non-Nilotic armed
group" in Uganda (p. 98) Towards the achievement of that goal, he and his colleagues
who were largely westerners formed the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) in 1971
in Dar-es-Salaam. They received arms from FRELIMO and the Tanzania government and
later from Gaddafi and infiltrated these into Uganda in order to end what he calls
"the monopoly of arms by the northerners." By the time of the collapse of Amin's
regime, on 11 April, 1979, the Fronasa force (largely Museveni's personal army) 227
had grown to 9000 while Obote's Kikoosi Maalum numbered only 1500. Under both
Presidents Y. K. Lule and Godfrey Binaisa, Oyite Ojok for Obote and Museveni continued
to recruit their kinsmen into the army with the latter accusing t
he former of recruiting only the northerners and the former accusing Museveni of
recruiting only the Banyarwanda. By the time they took over in 1986, the National
Resistance Army had 20,000 soldiers under its command. The few northerners remaining
in the army were either eliminated or forced into exile.
Museveni's prejudice and hatred against the northerners is further revealed in his
assertion that "the whole community in Acholi and Lango had become involved in the
plundering of Uganda for themselves." (p. 178). Some of the northerners might have
been corrupt, but to condemn whole communities indiscriminately as Museveni does is
merely to express some deep-seated hatred. He uses this condemnation to justify his
punitive measures against the northerners probably in search of a "final solution." As
Museveni continues, with the help of the Americans, to hunt for "bandits" - as he
calls northern leaders who are fighting for human dignity - thousands are dying in the
unending civil war while others are herded into "protected camps." Is this not
genocide?
Recently, Museveni has even defended the activities of his eldest son, Mohoozi
Kainerugaba, who was accused by several Uganda M.P.s of recruiting 200 fresh graduates
from Makerere University to serve in the army's Presidential Protection Unit (PPU)
that protects his father.
His son has no right to carry out army recruitment, and many of these recruits were,
in the father's words - "his friends" (read Westerners).4 Can one be more secretarian
and authoritarian than this?
It is easy, in retrospect, to demonize Obote and the "northerners" and make it appear
as if he was merely responding to the ethnic paranoia of his people. The reality,
however, was much more complicated as we have tried to suggest.
Looking at the evidence presented in this book, it is obvious that Museveni sees
himself as the Earnest "Che" Guevara (the legendary South American guerrilla leader)
of Africa. He gives details of war strategies, plans and battles, ending up with a
kind of guerrilla warfare manual which he expects other progressive African leaders to
adopt in order to "Sow the Mustard Seed" in their countries. Is it any wonder that
since he came to power in Uganda, he has used people like Paul Kagame in Rwanda and
Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to apply the teachings of his
manual in their countries. Kagame was of course, an officer in the National Resistance
Army of Uganda, and many of the so-called Kabila Tutsi death squads operating in Congo
where they have been accused of killing scores of Hutu children and women refugees,
228 as well as innocent Congolese civilians, are actually Ugandans or Rwandese trained
by Museveni. No wonder the New York Times of June 15, 1997 w
as so lavish in its praise of Museveni. It wrote: Yoweri Museveni is a "leader secure
in his power and his vision. The recent victory of Laurent Kabila's troops over Mobutu
Sese Seko's government army in Congo marked perhaps the most impressive of Museveni's
moves in the international area." Obviously the United States and other European
powers, seem to see the role of Museveni in the Eastern and Central Africa as that of
removing certain regimes from power and replacing them with those that will put the
interests of foreign business before the needs of their people. This is tantamount to
recolonisation of Africa with the collaboration of native guerrilla leaders!
External Factors
One of the weaknesses of this autobiography is its attempt to play down or ignore
external factors that have influenced the history of Uganda. For instance, the
involvement of Obote in the internal affairs of the former Zaire, Rwanda and Sudan
gave much political ammunition to his enemies at home. For instance, Obote's hatred of
Moise Tshombe, the then Zairian Prime Minister, whom he regarded as an agent of
neocolonialism, made him support the National Liberation Committee, located in
north-eastern Zaire, which opposed Tshombe's government. Buganda was sympathetic to
Tshombe, and this explains the genesis of the "gold scandal" allegations which almost
brought the government of Obote down. Also, the immediate cause of the overthrow of
Obote's government in 1971, was the discovery of a conspiracy between the Israeli
government and Uganda Defense Minister, Felix Onama and Idi Amin., Army Commander, to
support the rebels in Southern Sudan. At the request of Israel, the two had be
en channeling large amounts of funds from the defense budget and arms from Uganda's
reserves to the southern Sudanese rebels. When the deficit in the defence budget was
discovered, Obote demanded explanation, on his return from Commonwealth Conference in
Singapore, from Amin and Onama. Threatened with discovery in the act of deflecting
public funds into the wrong channels, Amin and Onama, encouraged by the Israeli
government whose role in the Sudan was bound to be exposed, decided to stage a coup to
save themselves.
In the case of Museveni himself, he has said almost nothing about his involvement in
the Rwandese revolution which installed the Tutsi-dominated regime. To what extent was
Uganda involved in this war? What about America and other European Countries? What
about Southern Sudan? Is Museveni supporting the Southerners? Is America playing the
role formerly played by 229 Israel of using Uganda to contain Arab nationalism and
Islamic fundamentalism? These are important foreign policy issues which affect not
only Eastern Africa, but Africa, and indeed, the whole world, and Museveni should have
shared his knowledge and insights with us.
One country whole role in the history of independent Uganda is discussed extensively
by Museveni is Tanzania. In particular, the significant contribution of her former
President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who is greatly admired by both Obote and Museveni,
is highly appreciated in the book. But even in this case, Museveni failed to
understand why the Tanzanians in general, and Nyerere in particular, had a high regard
for Obote as a nationalist and pan-Africanist. He complains that the Tanzanians had
"tended to overestimate Obote whom they regarded as a socialist, a nationalist and a
patriot and therefore, as a positive force in politics not only of Uganda, but of
Africa as a whole. The reality, however, was the opposite. The fact of the matter was
that not only was Obote useless as far as the pan-African struggle for liberation was
concerned, he was actually a very negative force whose sectarianism further aggravated
Uganda's problems." (p. 103).
Unfortunately for Museveni, many African leaders, including Nyerere and Kaunda,
recognised Obote's contribution to the liberation struggle, especially his firm stand
on Rhodesia and South Africa.
His lack of appreciation of external factors is particularly revealed in his account
of the origin of the Moshi Conference called by Nyerere in March, 1979 to form a new,
broad-based movement, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). Museveni gives
himself much of the credit in persuading Nyerere to convene it because the latter had
lost confidence in Obote. He writes: "the Tanzanians were anxious to put together a
Ugandan front, other than Obote, whom they now knew was a liability both inside and
outside Uganda." (p. 105) The truth is quite different. As the Tanzanian invading
forces proceeded apace from South-western Uganda towards Kampala, Nyerere decided that
Obote and Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa should fly to Masaka to be ready to move into
Kampala with the victorious invaders. Obote and Kawawa actually went as far as Bukoba,
before they were recalled to Dar-es-Salaam by Nyerere. The reason was not because
Nyerere had changed his mind about Obote: The reason was th
at the British intervened. As David Owen, who was Foreign Secretary m James
Callaghan's Labour Government has revealed in his autobiography,5 the Tanzanian
government had approached Britain for logistical help in the war with Uganda. But the
Buganda lobby in London succeeded in convincing the British government that Obote
would be totally unacceptable in Buganda as president of Uganda. They, instead,
suggested Yusufu Lule. Hence, the British government offered military assistance to
Tanzania on condition that Obote 230 played no part in the scheme of things. This then
is the origin of the hurriedly convened Moshi Conference from which Obote was
excluded, and hence, the appointment of Y.K. Lule, my old teacher of education
psychology, as chairman of UNLF. He was not elected by the conference as Museveni
writes: the British directed Nyerere to nominate Lule. It is interesting to speculate
what might have happened if Nyerere's original plan had been put into effect. Suffice
it
to say that the powerful intervention of one external player significantly changed
the course of Uganda history.
Building of a Democratic Future
Museveni has blamed the civil war in Uganda on Obote's refusal or failure to allow the
emergence of civil - rather than ethnic-based party competition. He argues that had
Obote allowed a citizen's politics in the 1960s, a non-ethnic principle of political
affiliation might have taken root. This is partly correct and it applies to most of
Africa not only at that time but even now. Museveni himself has not allowed a
civic-based party competition. The Uganda constitution of 1995 allows no political
party activities "because they would bring political polarization" (p. 195). For
political parties to function properly, there must be social classes and Ugandans,
according to Museveni, are "overwhelming of one class, peasants" (p. 195). He
concludes: "what is crucial for Uganda now is for us to have a system that ensures
democratic participation until such time as we get, through economic development,
especially industrialization, the crystallization of socio-economic groups upon wh
ich we can then base healthy political parties." (p. 195).
This is one of the arguments that the advocates of one-party states used to invoke. On
10 July, 1997, the Uganda parliament passed a Bill making the National Resistance
Movement the sole political party of Uganda. The aim is to consolidate power in the
hands of one group indefinitely at the expense of those who have refused to join the
movement. It is also a violation of the constitution as it violates the fundamental
freedoms of association and assembly. Thus the no-party movement is now compelling
everyone to be a member by law. And as was the case with the one-party system, the
movement government in Uganda is gradually substituting the rule of many tribes with
the rule of one tribe. Unlike Obote who championed multi-partism, Museveni has instead
imposed a no-party personal dictatorship, buttressed by the army, on the country. In
the end, his regime will be no different from other autocracies and he is simply
delaying its collapse. 231
Conclusion
Freud once argued that the smaller the difference between two people the larger it was
bound to loom in their imaginations. This effect, which he called the narcissism of
minor difference, is especially visible in Uganda. The conflicts in Uganda about which
Museveni has pontificated at length in his autobiography were not driven by
irreducible historical or ethnic differences. Rather, they were ignited by nationalist
ideologues like Museveni who turned narcissism of minor differences into the monstrous
fable that the people on the other side (read Obote) were genocidal killers (see
skulls in Luwero triangle), while they themselves were blameless victims, despite acts
of cruelty and vandalism meted out to Acholi, Lango and Teso districts by the national
Resistance Army. At the moment only one side of the story is being heard thanks to the
powerful propaganda of Western media that hail Yoweri Museveni as a shinning example
of the new leadership in Africa. I hope the story of th
e other side will one day be told so that this narcissism of minor difference in the
history of Uganda can be exorcised.
Endnotes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Kenneth Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography (London: Routledge, 1994).
2 Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961 - 1963 (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.
292-93.
3 S. M. Mpambara, The Gold Allegations in Uganda (Kampala: Milton Obote Foundation,
1967).
4 Daily Nation, Nairobi, August 26 1997.
5 James Callaghan, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), p. 274.
The Mulindwas Communication Group
"With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy"
Groupe de communication Mulindwas
"avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie"
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