Subject: Museveni - The Ugandan Narkisses (4)
Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2003 12:56:36 EDT
External Factors
One of the weaknesses of this autobiography is its attempt to play down or
ignore external factors that have influenced the history of Uganda. For
instance, the involvement of Obote in the internal affairs of the former Zaire, Rwanda
and Sudan gave much political ammunition to his enemies at home. For
instance, Obote's hatred of Moise Tshombe, the then Zairian Prime Minister, whom he
regarded as an agent of neocolonialism, made him support the National Liberation
Committee, located in north-eastern Zaire, which opposed Tshombe's
government. Buganda was sympathetic to Tshombe, and this explains the genesis of the
"gold scandal" allegations which almost brought the government of Obote down.
Also, the immediate cause of the overthrow of Obote's government in 1971, was the
discovery of a conspiracy between the Israeli government and Uganda Defense
Minister, Felix Onama and Idi Amin., Army Commander, to support the rebels in
Southern Sudan. At the request of Israel, the two had been channeling large
amounts of funds from the defense budget and arms from Uganda's reserves to the
southern Sudanese rebels. When the deficit in the defence budget was
discovered, Obote demanded explanation, on his return from Commonwealth Conference in
Singapore, from Amin and Onama. Threatened with discovery in the act of
deflecting public funds into the wrong channels, Amin and Onama, encouraged by the
Israeli government whose role in the Sudan was bound to be exposed, decided to
stage a coup to save themselves.
In the case of Museveni himself, he has said almost nothing about his
involvement in the Rwandese revolution which installed the Tutsi-dominated regime. To
what extent was Uganda involved in this war? What about America and other
European Countries? What about Southern Sudan? Is Museveni supporting the
Southerners? Is America playing the role formerly played by 229 Israel of using
Uganda to contain Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism? These are important
foreign policy issues which affect not only Eastern Africa, but Africa, and
indeed, the whole world, and Museveni should have shared his knowledge and
insights with us.
One country whole role in the history of independent Uganda is discussed
extensively by Museveni is Tanzania. In particular, the significant contribution
of her former President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who is greatly admired by both
Obote and Museveni, is highly appreciated in the book. But even in this case,
Museveni failed to understand why the Tanzanians in general, and Nyerere in
particular, had a high regard for Obote as a nationalist and pan-Africanist. He
complains that the Tanzanians had "tended to overestimate Obote whom they
regarded as a socialist, a nationalist and a patriot and therefore, as a positive
force in politics not only of Uganda, but of Africa as a whole. The reality,
however, was the opposite. The fact of the matter was that not only was Obote
useless as far as the pan-African struggle for liberation was concerned, he was
actually a very negative force whose sectarianism further aggravated Uganda's
problems." (p. 103).
Unfortunately for Museveni, many African leaders, including Nyerere and
Kaunda, recognised Obote's contribution to the liberation struggle, especially his
firm stand on Rhodesia and South Africa.
His lack of appreciation of external factors is particularly revealed in his
account of the origin of the Moshi Conference called by Nyerere in March, 1979
to form a new, broad-based movement, the Uganda National Liberation Front
(UNLF). Museveni gives himself much of the credit in persuading Nyerere to
convene it because the latter had lost confidence in Obote. He writes: "the
Tanzanians were anxious to put together a Ugandan front, other than Obote, whom they
now knew was a liability both inside and outside Uganda." (p. 105) The truth is
quite different. As the Tanzanian invading forces proceeded apace from
South-western Uganda towards Kampala, Nyerere decided that Obote and Vice-President
Rashidi Kawawa should fly to Masaka to be ready to move into Kampala with the
victorious invaders. Obote and Kawawa actually went as far as Bukoba, before
they were recalled to Dar-es-Salaam by Nyerere. The reason was not because
Nyerere had changed his mind about Obote: The reason was that the British
intervened. As David Owen, who was Foreign Secretary m James Callaghan's Labour
Government has revealed in his autobiography,5 the Tanzanian government had
approached Britain for logistical help in the war with Uganda. But the Buganda lobby
in London succeeded in convincing the British government that Obote would be
totally unacceptable in Buganda as president of Uganda. They, instead, suggested
Yusufu Lule. Hence, the British government offered military assistance to
Tanzania on condition that Obote 230 played no part in the scheme of things. This
then is the origin of the hurriedly convened Moshi Conference from which
Obote was excluded, and hence, the appointment of Y.K. Lule, my old teacher of
education psychology, as chairman of UNLF. He was not elected by the conference
as Museveni writes: the British directed Nyerere to nominate Lule. It is
interesting to speculate what might have happened if Nyerere's original plan had
been put into effect. Suffice it to say that the powerful intervention of one
external player significantly changed the course of Uganda history.
Building of a Democratic Future
Museveni has blamed the civil war in Uganda on Obote's refusal or failure to
allow the emergence of civil - rather than ethnic-based party competition. He
argues that had Obote allowed a citizen's politics in the 1960s, a non-ethnic
principle of political affiliation might have taken root. This is partly
correct and it applies to most of Africa not only at that time but even now.
Museveni himself has not allowed a civic-based party competition. The Uganda
constitution of 1995 allows no political party activities "because they would bring
political polarization" (p. 195). For political parties to function properly,
there must be social classes and Ugandans, according to Museveni, are
"overwhelming of one class, peasants" (p. 195). He concludes: "what is crucial for
Uganda now is for us to have a system that ensures democratic participation until
such time as we get, through economic development, especially
industrialization, the crystallization of socio-economic groups upon which we can then base
healthy political parties." (p. 195).
This is one of the arguments that the advocates of one-party states used to
invoke. On 10 July, 1997, the Uganda parliament passed a Bill making the
National Resistance Movement the sole political party of Uganda. The aim is to
consolidate power in the hands of one group indefinitely at the expense of those
who have refused to join the movement. It is also a violation of the
constitution as it violates the fundamental freedoms of association and assembly. Thus
the no-party movement is now compelling everyone to be a member by law. And as
was the case with the one-party system, the movement government in Uganda is
gradually substituting the rule of many tribes with the rule of one tribe.
Unlike Obote who championed multi-partism, Museveni has instead imposed a no-party
personal dictatorship, buttressed by the army, on the country. In the end, his
regime will be no different from other autocracies and he is simply delaying
its collapse. 231
Conclusion
Freud once argued that the smaller the difference between two people the
larger it was bound to loom in their imaginations. This effect, which he called
the narcissism of minor difference, is especially visible in Uganda. The
conflicts in Uganda about which Museveni has pontificated at length in his
autobiography were not driven by irreducible historical or ethnic differences. Rather,
they were ignited by nationalist ideologues like Museveni who turned narcissism
of minor differences into the monstrous fable that the people on the other
side (read Obote) were genocidal killers (see skulls in Luwero triangle), while
they themselves were blameless victims, despite acts of cruelty and vandalism
meted out to Acholi, Lango and Teso districts by the national Resistance Army.
At the moment only one side of the story is being heard thanks to the
powerful propaganda of Western
ENDNOTES
1 Kenneth Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography (London: Routledge, 1994).
2 Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961 - 1963 (London: Macmillan,
1973), pp. 292-93.
3 S. M. Mpambara, The Gold Allegations in Uganda (Kampala: Milton Obote
Foundation, 1967).
4 Daily Nation, Nairobi, August 26 1997.
5 James Callaghan, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), p. 274.
Get 2 months FREE*.
--------------------------------------------
This service is hosted on the Infocom network
http://www.infocom.co.ug
