By Prof dani w. nabudere
August 11, 2003
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Because the NRM has never agreed to hand over power to those they removed, it is probable that the only way for the it to continue on its "mission," which has never been clear, is to "continue fighting" Kony. Listening to President Museveni speaking at the one-day public dialogue on "Conflict Management and Resolution in Northern Uganda" held on July 22 convinced me that he is the real hindrance to peace in the north. I had hitherto bought the argument that the real problem was Mr Joseph Kony and his rebels, but I am becoming convinced that Kony is a product of the kind of militaristic politics that the president spewed out. I came out feeling we had never moved very far from the Luwero Triangle and that the whole Luwero Triangle scenario was about "chasing the 'northerners'" out of government and the army so that they would never threaten the NRM's hold onto power. For long the whole purpose of Luwero was misunderstood and it can now be seen in proper context. The skulls of Luwero were necessary to achieve that objective. The president was clear he is not ready to negotiate with the "terrorists" until they surrender or agree to negotiate on his terms. I could see that played out in his references to the "peace talks" and "peace agreements" with Moses Ali's Uganda National Rescue Front I (UNRF) and Ali Bamuze's UNRF II, who were referred to in such a condescending manner. I now could see why Kony existed on the other side of the logic. You need a Kony to maintain a permanent basis for war and maintenance of power. The Acholi and all Ugandans become the victims of permanent war. The president argued that Kony is a murderer with whom he could not negotiate. He derided those who tried to convince him to negotiate and came near to calling them collaborators. While disagreeing with those people who say that the war in Acholi is not ending because the people of Acholi support Kony, he nevertheless singled out an unspecified "bunch" of Acholi leaders for not unequivocally denouncing the rebel atrocities. One got the feeling that even the minister of state for Sports, Okello Oryem, was reacting to this kind of pressure when in his brief remarks in the chair he said that he too was "traumatised" by being called upon to denounce Kony when he had done so on several times before. He said he felt like the enemy and a foreigner in Katakwi when some leaders were calling on the population of Katakwi to "kill all the Acholis." Indeed, the issue for the president was how Kony could be defeated and not how we could find a peaceful end to the war. He said that whoever kills must be killed and used Moses' law of 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for tooth' to justify his case. But Africans have long rejected the idea of killing the killers because, in their wisdom, they knew that if we were all to do so, we would all end up being blind and toothless. Africans have embraced the idea of reconciliation through forgiveness and reincorporating those who accept responsibility for their crime back into society. This was the very idea behind the African National Congress of South Africa under the wise and able leadership of Mzee Nelson Mandela to forgive the killers of the apartheid regime. This did not mean that Mandela condoned the killers. It is that society agreed to reconcile in order to stop greater evil from happening if the Africans who had won had continued with revenge. When Ugandans, therefore, call on the government to find a peaceful way of ending the conflict in Acholi, they do so because they want to stop a bigger evil from happening. But the president prefers the archaic law of Moses, which the Africans had long rejected as "primitive" and "backward". The president attacked, in an indirect reference to Archbishop John Baptist Odama, those who spoke of "both sides to the conflict" committing mistakes. He could not understand how Kony's Lord's Resistance Army could be compared with the government's forces. "We are not committing crimes," he said. But one such report, which was released at Africana Hotel by the Human Rights Watch on July 25 entitled: "Abducted and Abused," pointed to the impunity of the security and armed forces, including activities of illegal militia and vigilante groups such as the Kalangala Action Plan. The president advanced five reasons for the persistence of the Acholi conflict. The "Sudan factor;" road infrastructure; under-spending on defence; "weaknesses" in the army such as drunkardness, corruption and HIV/Aids; and "cover-up" of Kony atrocities by Acholi leaders. He railed at these leaders who spoke of "another way" to ending the war. By this, the president was condemning those who have been calling for amnesty to the rebels. For him, this law was pressed on him because in his opinion "it has never worked anywhere." But before this was done, there were the same voices calling for "high level team" to make "high level contacts." This is what led him to appoint a Presidential Peace Team, which he did not have much faith in. These kinds of approaches, had led people committing mistakes so he had decided to write a confidential memo to some friends entitled: "From Mistakes to Mistakes" to show the futility of s uch approaches. To achieve total victory over Kony, and to some extent Sudan, the government was determined to improve the infrastructure by building roads in the region. He was also advocating the mechanisation of production around the camps, which in effect meant turning these camps into socio-economic and security encampments "as a temporary measure." He forgot that when these camps were forcibly created in 1996 they were supposed to be "temporary." It is now seven years since they were created and a new phase of "temporary" years is being argued. The investment envisaged under the scheme is Shs 4 billion in the first three years. This is why the president called for more "relief" from donors while his plan takes shape and not to be "confused by those who visit embassies" because they do not "understand Africans." The other most important requirement to finish Kony was for all of us to "support the army." The president was sure that the money budgeted, although small would do the job "unless" the security situation in eastern DR. Congo worsened or if Sudan escalated its support for Kony. If that happened, then more money would be required, but such a situation could lead to a "partial mobilisation" of all resources, including manpower to face Sudan. If I understood the president properly, Uganda would be forced to wage war against Sudan, which would end the Acholi conflict once for all. But that cannot be done in time for the NRM and Museveni to hand over power through a general election in 2006. With the Kony rebellion spreading eastwards and since the NRM and some parliamentarians want a "third term" for the president or three years for him and themselves, it seems that war would be the best way of achieving this objective. This is because since the changing of the constitution so that the president can have a time less term limit cannot be achieved at present, the three-year extension is feasible, but only if there is a declaration of a state of war under Article 124 of the constitution. From what the president said, one could construe such a scenario as being a realistic one so that those concentrating on the Constitutional Review Commission could miss the point and that side of the argument. A continuation of war by these means could be the only way of continuing political power by other means - namely war. Because the NRM has never agreed to hand over power to those they removed, it is probable that the only way for the it to continue on its "mission," which has never been clear, is to "continue fighting" Kony. Any possible threat to that prospect must be resisted and the continued marginalisation of the people of Acholi is the only way for maintaining power through the "Act of Luwero 1981" when the "programme" begun. Those who think otherwise are daydreamers. |
© 2003 The Monitor Publications
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