Hi Bill,
This is perhaps going off on something of a tangent, but I’m curious where you
see this work fitting with the “Digital Geneva Convention” barrow that
Microsoft have been pushing for the past few months (since February, I think?).
From your description it sounds like it’s at least very
Malcolm Hutty wrote:
> I'm not going to judge the specific work Bill's Working Group is doing,
> as I'm not sufficiently sighted. But on the broader issue of whether
> this /type/ of engagement is advisable, and Nick's challenge to it, I
> would give a qualified "Yes": of course I recognise the ris
On 16/11/2017 12:27, Sascha Luck [ml] wrote:
> Perhaps, but international law of this type usually speaks to
> behaviour in *international* conflicts and completely ignores
> 'internal' matters (cf the Hague and Geneva treaties).
Oh absolutely. It would have had absolutely zero legal weight in the
On Thu, Nov 16, 2017 at 12:04:31PM +, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On Nov 15, 2017, at 12:33, Mark Blackman
Had there been an international agreement or declaration, of the type
that Bill is negotiating, to which the UK was signed up, I would
certainly have used it when lobbying that point, and it m
> On Nov 15, 2017, at 12:33, Mark Blackman > Are the sort of people who would consider attacking private-sector
>> infrastructure the sort of people who will pay any attention to any
>> form of globally managed legislation, policy or regulation? Maybe
>> you’re proposing this would be a mechanism
On 15/11/2017 12:18, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> - regarding IXPs specifically, there is little to no basis for
> categorising them the vast majority of them as "critical" on the basis
> that if you turn an IXP off, or if it fails due to technical or
> administrative reasons, traffic will generally re-r
ssage-
From: uknof [mailto:uknof-boun...@lists.uknof.org.uk] On Behalf Of Kurt Erik
Lindqvist
Sent: 16 November 2017 08:05
To: Bill Woodcock
Cc: uknof@lists.uknof.org.uk; Nick Hilliard
Subject: Re: [uknof] GCSC critical infrastructure protection questions: your
input needed.
> On 15 Nov 2017,
> On 15 Nov 2017, at 12:22, Bill Woodcock wrote:
>
> Uh, none of that is relevant to the discussion. Call it pretty
> infrastructure or tasty infrastructure or whatever pleases you.
>
> The question is what types of private-sector infrastructure you most strongly
> feel should not be subjec
> On 15 Nov 2017, at 20:03, Mark Blackman wrote:
>> On 15 Nov 2017, at 17:10, Bill Woodcock wrote:
>>> On Nov 15, 2017, at 1:34 PM, Mark Blackman wrote:
>>> Would you say that the current administrations of China, the US and Russia
>>> observe diplomatic norms in general?
>> Yes, certainly. I
> On 15 Nov 2017, at 17:10, Bill Woodcock wrote:
>
>
>
>> On Nov 15, 2017, at 1:34 PM, Mark Blackman wrote:
>> Would you say that the current administrations of China, the US and Russia
>> observe diplomatic norms in general?
>
> Yes, certainly. It’s the exceptions that draw attention. W
> On Nov 15, 2017, at 1:34 PM, Mark Blackman wrote:
> Would you say that the current administrations of China, the US and Russia
> observe diplomatic norms in general?
Yes, certainly. It’s the exceptions that draw attention. Which is exactly the
purpose of the norm: to make exceptions notab
> On 15 Nov 2017, at 12:51, Bill Woodcock wrote:
>
> Not exactly... a diplomatic norm is a commonly-accepted agreement as to
> expected behavior. It’s essentially a step short of a treaty.
>
> The problem here is that the US, Russia, and China all want to preserve their
> “right” to cond
Not exactly... a diplomatic norm is a commonly-accepted agreement as to
expected behavior. It’s essentially a step short of a treaty.
The problem here is that the US, Russia, and China all want to preserve their
“right” to conduct offensive cyber operations against anyone they want, any
tim
On 15 November 2017 at 12:32, Mark Blackman wrote:
>
> Are the sort of people who would consider attacking private-sector
> infrastructure the sort of people who will pay any attention to any form of
> globally managed legislation, policy or regulation? Maybe you’re proposing
> this would be a
> On 15 Nov 2017, at 12:22, Bill Woodcock wrote:
>
> Uh, none of that is relevant to the discussion. Call it pretty
> infrastructure or tasty infrastructure or whatever pleases you.
>
> The question is what types of private-sector infrastructure you most strongly
> feel should not be subje
Uh, none of that is relevant to the discussion. Call it pretty infrastructure
or tasty infrastructure or whatever pleases you.
The question is what types of private-sector infrastructure you most strongly
feel should not be subject to governmental cyber attacks.
-Bill
>
Bill Woodcock wrote:
> One of PCH’s long-term efforts has been to encourage governments to
> restrict their use of offensive cyber attacks against civilian
> networks. We've successfully gotten that effort out of the U.N.,
> where it was floundering, and into a well-supported stand-alone
> comm
The norm would say, for instance, “hospitals.” It would be up to the parties
involved whether they wanted to try to avail themselves of protection.
But that’s a distraction from the issue: do we think [hospitals|schools|the
power grid|IXPs|root servers|whatever] should not be cyber-attacked by
> On Nov 14, 2017, at 10:22 PM, Matthew Ford wrote:
>
> Bill,
>
> Presumably the results of this survey will show that, depending on the
> ‘sector’ or ‘system’, the degree to which respondents believe they should be
> protected varies. How does that help those who might prefer a simpler
> a
Matthew Ford said:
> Presumably the results of this survey will show that, depending on the
> ???sector??? or ???system???, the degree to which respondents believe they
> should be protected varies. How does that help those who might prefer a
> simpler approach that says that civilian infrastruc
Bill,
Presumably the results of this survey will show that, depending on the ‘sector’
or ‘system’, the degree to which respondents believe they should be protected
varies. How does that help those who might prefer a simpler approach that says
that civilian infrastructure should be protected ful
One of PCH’s long-term efforts has been to encourage governments to restrict
their use of offensive cyber attacks against civilian networks. We've
successfully gotten that effort out of the U.N., where it was floundering, and
into a well-supported stand-alone commission. It’s being taken seriou
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