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Indonesia's Jihadi Threat Evolves
      Written by Our Correspondent     
      Sunday, 26 July 2009  
      New radical stars rise to the surface 


      The simultaneous suicide attacks on two of Jakarta's most exclusive 
hotels on July 17, which killed nine and injured 50, are part of Indonesia's 
continually evolving jihadi threat, according to the Brussels-based 
International Crisis Group, which monitors conflicts worldwide.

      The radical Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah, which gets much of the blame 
from the press and governments, still exists as an organisation, although it 
seems to have lost its sense of direction, the crisis group said in an 
extensive policy briefing produced last week. JI, the policy paper said, "has 
gone from being a hierarchical structure with cells in five countries 
(Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia) to a largely 
Indonesian grouping with a loose system of territorial coordinators and some 
individual members elsewhere -- especially the Philippines." 

      The rising star is instead Noordin Mohammad Top, formerly a Malaysian bit 
player who fled to Indonesia in the wake of the exposure of a plot to attack 
Singaporean targets in 2001, which led government agents to separate JI cells 
in Malaysia. Little is known of his group, although it is believed to number 
dozens rather than hundreds. The inner circle may include no more than seven or 
eight men, who escaped capture in earlier dragnets. 

      One of those associates, named Achmady, was arrested in the Central Java 
community of Solo last Thursday in possession of a live bomb and admitted plans 
to carry out a suicide attack as a follow-up to the Jakarta bombings. A woman 
suspected of being Noordin's wife was also arrested. Her father, Bahrudin 
Latif, is also wanted by police. He is the founder of an Islamic boarding 
school where police found bomb-making materials during a raid on July 14.

      It is possible, the crisis group said, that the jihadi organization has 
no clear structure beyond Noordin and his inner circle and consists only of ad 
hoc cells put together for specific operations. One document found in the 
possession of men that Noordin brought into the second plot to bomb Bali 
nightclubs in 2005 was called Sel Tauhid, translated from the Arabic. It states 
that small jihadist cells, working autonomously but toward the same goal, can 
be as or more effective than a larger organisation like al-Qaeda.

      Among the close associates are a bomb-maker from Central Java named Reno 
alias Tedi, but there are a number of others, including two linked to a safe 
house in Central Java, set up for Noordin's operatives in early 2006 after the 
Bali II bombing. One, Nur Said Abdurrohman, was originally thought to be the 
suicide bomber for the Marriott but DNA tests on the body showed he was not. 

      Indonesia's serious brush with the jihadi threat began when communal 
violence broke out in the Indonesian province of Maluku in 1999, according to 
the policy briefing, Jemaah Islamiyah sent "Afghan alumni" - men who had gone 
through military training in camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border - to the area 
to train new recruits. Ultimately, after Singapore police uncovered a bomb plot 
in 2001 which led to the discovery of several JI cells in Malaysia, Malaysian 
radicals fled to Indonesia.

      Two of the Malaysian nationals, Noordin Azhari Husin, were among them. 
Azhari was already part of a group headed by Riduan Isamuddin, who took the nom 
de guerre Hambali, and who is now said to be in prison in Guantanamo Bay. 
Although Noordin was regarded as a bit player at the time, he would ultimately 
rise to split off from the main JI contingent and is now considered the most 
troublesome of the players in Indonesia's jihadi game.
      Noordin and Azhari planned from start to finish the 2003 bombing of the 
JW Marriott Hotel, which took the lives of 12 people and injured 150, almost 
all of them Indonesians. Although he was in touch with the JI leadership, the 
crisis group said, Noordin apparently didn't have its endorsement, with many JI 
leaders regarding Al Qaeda-style attacks as counterproductive. He would go on 
to direct the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta although, the policy 
paper said, "he was very clearly operating a splinter group."

      "Of the several violent extremist groups operating in Indonesia, only the 
network around Noordin Top has both an interest in attacking Western targets 
and the proven capacity to do so," the heavily footnoted policy review said. 
      "He has shown an ability to recruit new operatives with no previous 
history of violence, although he has always relied on an inner circle of JI 
members committed to the same extreme interpretation of jihad." 

      Noordin, the crisis group said, "is believed to have around him a few 
other fugitives with bomb-making expertise, most notably Reno...who attended 
the JI school Mahad Aly. Reno studied bomb-making with Azhari but he escaped 
when police surrounded Azhari's hideout in Batu, Malang, East Java and shot 
him. Police suspect he may be the man known as "Aji", sent by Noordin to 
instruct the Palembang group in bomb-making in mid-2007."

      Noordin's group, the crisis group emphasized, is not the same as JI. It 
is a splinter group that includes some JI members but others as well. In at 
least two of his earlier operations, he has included in the team people newly 
recruited with no previous experience in JI or any other group. However, he 
continues to operate under the protection of individual JI members who are 
reluctant to turn him in even when they don't agree with his actions.

      As for JI itself, the policy paper said, no one is sure who the commander 
is today. 

      While some sources point to a Semarang-based religious teacher, 
information from some JI members suggest that Zuhroni alias Zarkasih, the 
acting amir arrested in June 2007, continues to sign off on key decisions from 
prison. The organization continues to have a military wing and seeks to provide 
military training. Some 25 to 30 are believed to be in Mindanao, some of them 
in a camp called Jabal Quba in an area controlled by the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) in Maguindanao. Others are believed to be working with 
the Abu Sayaf Group in Jolo and several other Southeast Asian jihadis 
affiliated to JI or other like-minded organisations such as KOMPAK. 

      In September 2008, many JI members joined spiritual leader Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir's new organisation Jamaah Ansharud Tauhid (JAT), a radical but 
above-ground and non-violent group that rejects democracy and seeks the 
immediate application of Islamic law, the paper said, with a focus on religious 
outreach rather than violence. 

      Part of the organization's dilemma relates to released prisoners, many of 
whom have actively cooperated with police and "are considered tainted by their 
colleagues and have been marginalised within the organization. This has 
generated resentment, but it is unlikely that Noordin would exploit it to draw 
more men into his circle, if only because it would not be in his interests to 
make use of people who are already well-known to the police and perhaps under 
surveillance. 

      Many Indonesians and others were lulled into a sense of security because 
after annual bombings between 2002 and 2005, foreigners had not been targeted 
again until now. That appears partly to be because Noordin lost key members of 
his team after 2005, including his Malaysian comrade Azhari, the major 
operational planner and master bomb-maker, who was killed in a police raid. 
Also, it appeared that after the second Bali bombings, Noordin was protected by 
JI on the condition that he forsake attacks. 

      Having blown up legions of young tourists in Bali, the bombers now have 
changed their tactics to deliberately seek out venues where the business 
community gathers, the report says. 

      "The global profile of these attacks had the potential to be much larger 
as they came two days before the Manchester United football team was due to 
stay in the Ritz-Carlton. The club quickly cancelled the Indonesian leg of its 
Asian tour. It is highly unlikely that the bombers knew where the team would be 
staying when planning for this operation began. If they found out when the 
plans were near fruition, they may have decided that attacking the business 
executives, who regularly met on Fridays at the Marriott, was still more 
important. 

      There is increasing speculation in the Indonesian media that the bombers 
inserted one of their members into the hotel staff long before the bombing took 
place. "Whether that is confirmed, what we know is that in every previous 
operation, the bombers have carried out a meticulous survey of the intended 
target looking for weak points in the security system..They also would have 
studied the behaviour of Indonesian guests staying at the hotel, noting the 
clothes they wore and their style of walking, talking and interacting. This we 
know from the Bali document, where the bombers were not only told to study how 
Indonesian tourists there looked but to report back to the field coordinator, 
including such details as the trademarks of shoes commonly worn.

      Despite the bombings, the report gives considerable praise to Indonesian 
police, who it says have working closely with prisoners and former prisoners 
involved in terrorism, as well as with some "Afghan alumni" who were never 
arrested. In the wake of previous bombings, they have acted quickly and 
effectively and arrests have come quickly. Their efforts, which are more 
economic than ideological in focus, have been widely praised.

      The critical question is where the money is coming from. The earlier 
bombings haven't been particularly expensive, with financing for the 2003 
Marriott bombing arranged by Hambali through al-Qaeda contacts in Pakistan. 
Some $50,000 was transferred from Pakistan to Thailand, of which $30,000 was 
then carried to Indonesia by a Malaysian courier. Of this, $15,000 was to be 
used for "operations" and the Marriott bombing cost less, because there was 
some left over for the Australian embassy attack. 

      This operation could have been more expensive, because it involved two 
hotels, a stay in the hotel, sophisticated planning, and likely rental of a 
house in Jakarta, although no purchase of a car was necessary since a car bomb 
was not used. It is possible that the team could have raised the funds needed 
through robberies, the report continues. Although relationships between jihadi 
groups inside and outside Indonesia would raise serious concerns about future 
attacks. 

      Tragic as these attacks are, the report continues, there is no indication 
that they will have any impact on political stability. Noordin has never been 
particularly interested in Indonesian politics, and in the past, when elections 
have factored into his scheduling, it was not the political aspect that 
concerned him but rather tightened security resulting from electoral politics. 
This time, the attack might have been timed for just after the 8 July 2009 
elections, when security might have been more relaxed.

      The report cautions against overreaction by rushing to strengthen 
anti-terrorism legislation. "It is too easy to change the laws without 
understanding why some terrorist cells have taken root. Indonesia has rightly 
taken pride in its decision to bring terrorism suspects to trial quickly in 
open trials that are fully covered by the media and to release them when their 
terms are completed," it continues. "Police efforts to work with prisoners 
after their release have provided a useful way of ensuring ongoing 
communication and information about radical networks. There were always 
ideologues who refused to work with police, but the fact that these attacks 
took place does not mean the programs were a failure. They should be expanded, 
but with ongoing evaluation of the results achieved."

      Beyond law enforcement, the Crisis Group says, "the government needs to 
understand why and how fugitives as dangerous as Noordin Top continue to find 
shelter in Indonesian villages. There needs to be far more attention to a 
network of JI-affiliated schools, not to close them but to design programs that 
will entail more interaction with and observation by the Indonesian government."
     


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