http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/960/op13.htm

13 - 19 August 2009
Issue No. 960
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875

What we Palestinians need

Irrespective of what political settlement is ultimately embraced, Palestinians 
need a unified strategy for confronting and overcoming Israeli racism, 
apartheid and oppression. Mustafa Barghouthi* outlines the basis of such a 
strategy 

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Palestinians have only two choices before them, either to continue to evade the 
struggle, as some have been trying to do, or to summon the collective national 
resolve to engage in it.

The latter option does not necessarily entail a call to arms. Clearly Israel 
has the overwhelming advantage in this respect in both conventional and 
unconventional (nuclear) weapons. Just as obviously, neighbouring Arab 
countries have neither the will nor ability to go the military route. However, 
the inability to wage war does not automatically mean surrender and eschewing 
other means to wage struggle. 

As powerful as it is militarily, Israel has two major weak points. Firstly, it 
cannot impose political solutions by force of arms on a people determined to 
sustain a campaign of resistance. This has been amply demonstrated in two 
full-scale wars against Lebanon and, most recently, in the assault against 
Gaza. Secondly, the longer the Palestinians have remained steadfast, and the 
greater the role the demographic factor has come to play in the conflict, the 
more clearly Israel has emerged as an apartheid system hostile to peace. If the 
ethnic cleansing of 1948 and the colonialist expansionism describe the 
circumstances surrounding the birth of the Israeli state, the recent bills 
regarding the declaration of allegiance to a Jewish state and prohibiting the 
Palestinian commemoration of the nakba more explicitly underscore its essential 
racist character.

Ironically, just as Israel has attained the peak in its drive to fragment the 
Palestinian people, with geographical divides between those in Israel and those 
abroad, between Jerusalem and the West Bank and the West Bank and Gaza, and 
between one governorate and the next in the West Bank by means of ring-roads, 
walls and barriers, Palestinians have become reunified in their hardship and in 
the challenges that confront them. Regardless of whether or not they bear 
Israeli citizenship, or whether they are residents of Jerusalem, the West Bank 
or Gaza, they all share the plight of being victims of Israel's systematic 
discrimination and apartheid order.

If the only alternative to evading the struggle is to engage in it in order to 
resolve it, we must affirm that our national liberation movement is still 
alive. We must affirm, secondly, that political and diplomatic action is a 
fundamental part of managing the conflict, as opposed to an alternative to it. 
In fact, we must elevate it to our primary means for exposing the true nature 
of Israel, isolating it politically and pressing for international sanctions 
against it. 

In this context, we must caution against the theory of building state 
institutions under the occupation. An administration whose security services 
would be consuming 35 per cent of the public budget, that would be acting as 
the occupation's policeman while furthering Netanyahu's scheme for economic 
normalisation as a substitute for a political solution, is clearly geared to 
promote the acclimatisation to the status quo, not change. Building Palestinian 
governing institutions and promoting genuine economic development must occur 
within the framework of a philosophy of "resistance development". Such a 
philosophy is founded on the dual principles of supporting the people's power 
to withstand the hardships of the occupation and reducing dependency on foreign 
funding and foreign aid. The strategic aim of the Palestinian struggle, under 
this philosophy, must be to "make the costs of the Israeli occupation and its 
apartheid system so great as to be unsustainable". 

If we agree on this course for conducting the struggle, then the next step is 
to adopt a unified national strategy founded upon four pillars:

1. Resistance. In all its forms, resistance is an internationally sanctioned 
right of the Palestinian people. Under this strategy, however, it must resume a 
peaceful, mass grassroots character that will serve to revive the culture of 
collective activism among all sectors of the Palestinian people and, hence, to 
keep the struggle from becoming the preserve or monopoly of small cliques and 
to promote its growing impetus and momentum. Models for this type of resistance 
already exist. Of particular note is the brave and persistent campaign against 
the Separation Wall, which has spread across several towns and villages, 
offered five lives to the cause, and become increasingly adamant. The 
resistance by the people of East Jerusalem and Silwan against Israeli home 
demolitions and the drive to Judaise the city presents another heroic model. 
Yet a third promising example is to be found it the movement to boycott Israeli 
goods and to encourage the consumption of locally produced products. In 
addition to preventing the occupation power from milking the profits from 
marketing locally produced products, this form of resistance can engage the 
broadest swath of the population, from old to young and men and women, and 
revive the culture and spirit of communal collaboration. The campaigns to break 
the blockade against Gaza, as exemplified by the protest ships, the supply 
caravans and the pressures on Israel to lift its economic stranglehold, are 
another major type of resistance.

2. Supporting national steadfastness. The importance of this pillar is its 
focus on strengthening the demographic power of the Palestinian people so as to 
transform their millions into an effective grassroots force. It entails meeting 
their essential needs to enable them to remain steadfast in their struggle, and 
developing Palestinian human resources as the foundation for a strong and 
independent Palestinian economy. However, in order to achieve these aims the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) economic plan and budget must be altered in a way 
that pits their weight behind development in education, health, agriculture and 
culture, as opposed to squandering a third of the budget on security. 

For example, the passage and immediate implementation of the bill for the 
national higher education fund would serve the educational needs of hundreds of 
thousands of young adults. In addition to elevating and developing the 
standards of university education, it would also work to sustain the impact of 
development aid and eventually reduce reliance on foreign support. The fund 
would also alleviate the school tuition burdens on more than 150,000 families, 
put an end to nepotism in the handling of student study grants and loans, and 
provide equal opportunity for academic advancement to all young men and women 
regardless of their financial circumstances. Equally innovative and dynamic 
ideas could be applied to other areas of education, or to stimulating the 
fields of public health, agriculture and culture with the overall aim of 
developing the educated, innovative and effective modern human resources needed 
to meet Palestinian needs as autonomously as possible and, hence, capable of 
weathering enormous pressures.

3. National unity and a unified national leadership. This strategic aim entails 
restructuring the Palestine Liberation Organisation on a more demographically 
representative basis and putting into effect agreements that have been 
previously reached in the Palestinian national dialogues held in Cairo. Over 
the past few years, the thrust of Israel's greatest advantage and the thrust of 
its assault centred around the Palestinian rift and the weakness of the 
disunited Palestinian leadership. In order to redress this flaw, the 
Palestinians must adopt a new mentality and approach. Specifically, they must: 
relinquish the mentality and practice of vying for power over an illusory 
governing authority that is still under the thumb of the occupation, whether in 
the West Bank or in Gaza; give up the illusion that Palestinian military might, 
however great it might become, is capable of leading the Palestinian struggle 
alone; adopt democracy and pluralistic democratic activities and processes as a 
mode of life, self- government, peaceful decision-making, and the only 
acceptable means to resolve our differences and disputes; resist all outside 
pressures and attempts (particularly on the part of Israel) to intervene in our 
internal affairs and to tamper with the Palestinian popular will. There must be 
a firm and unshakeable conviction in Palestinians' right to independent 
national self- determination.

The most difficult task that we face today is creating a unified leadership and 
strategy binding on all, from which no political or military decisions will 
depart, and within which framework no single group or party has a monopoly on 
the decision-making processes. Only with a unified leadership and strategy will 
we be able to fight the blockade as one, instead of evading unity for fear of 
the blockade. With a unified leadership and strategy we will able to seize the 
reins of initiative from others, as opposed to spinning from one reaction to 
the other, and we will be able to focus our energies on asserting our unified 
will instead of squandering them in internal power struggles in which the 
various parties seek outside assistance to strengthen their hand against their 
opponents on the inside. Only then will we be able to shift the equations that 
subordinated the national liberation movement to the narrow concerns of the PA 
(both in the West Bank and Gaza) and turn the PA into an instrument in the 
service of the national liberation movement. 

4. Building and enhancing an international pro-Palestinian solidarity movement 
combined with a drive to impose sanctions against Israel. That such a movement 
already exists and is steadily growing is heartening. However, it will take 
enormous efforts to organise it and coordinate its activities properly so as to 
ensure it has the greatest possible influence upon decision-makers, especially 
in Europe and the West. Palestinian, Arab and Muslim communities will need to 
be orchestrated towards the realisation of the same goals. If the solidarity 
movement has scored significant successes with the organisation of a boycott of 
Israeli products, the decision by the Federation of British Universities to 
boycott Israeli academics, and the decision taken by Hampshire College and some 
US churches to refuse to invest in Israel, much work has yet to be done to 
expand the scope of such activities and build up the momentum of the solidarity 
movement. 

The Palestinian plight, which Nelson Mandela has described as the foremost 
challenge to the international humanitarian conscience, strongly resembles the 
state of South Africa at the outset to the 1980s. It took years of a concerted 
unified drive before the South African liberation movement finally succeeded in 
bringing around governments to their cause. The tipping point came when major 
companies realised that the economic costs of dealing with the apartheid regime 
in Pretoria were unsustainable. In the Palestinian case, the success of an 
international solidarity movement is contingent upon three major factors. The 
first is careful organisation and detailed planning, a high degree of 
discipline and tight coordination. Second is a rational, civilised rhetoric 
that refuses to play into Israel's tactics of provocation. The third is to 
address and recruit progressive movements and peoples in societies abroad, 
including anti-Zionist Jews and Jews opposed to Israeli policies. 

None of the foregoing is new, by any means. However, these ideas have yet to be 
put into practice. The logical springboard for this is to operate on the 
principle that while the Palestinian cause is a Palestinian, Arab and Muslim 
one, it is above all a humanitarian cause that cries out to all in the world 
who cherish humanitarian principles and values. The success of the freedom 
fighters of South Africa, the anti-Vietnam war movement, and the campaigners 
for the independence of India stemmed primarily from their ability to forge a 
universal appeal. And this is precisely what we must do. Our mottos for the 
solidarity movement with the Palestinian people must be "the fight against the 
new apartheid and systematic racism" and "the fight for justice and the right 
to freedom." The International Court of Justice's ruling on the Separation 
Wall, the illegality of Jewish settlements and altering the face of Jerusalem 
is a valuable legal precedent that official Palestinian governing institutions 
have ignored for four years. This ruling should now become our platform for a 
drive to impose sanctions against Israel, just as the UN resolution against the 
occupation of Namibia proved a platform for mounting a campaign against the 
apartheid system in South Africa. 

The four-pronged strategy outlined above, which is espoused by the Palestinian 
National Initiative Movement, can succeed if it is guided by a clear vision, 
patience, and systematic persistence. I do not expect that it win the approval 
of all. The interests of some combined with their sense of frustration and 
despair have deadened their desire to engage in or to continue the 
confrontation with Israel. We also have to acknowledge that certain sectors of 
Palestinian society have become so dependent upon interim arrangements and 
projects and the attendant finances as to put paid to the possibility of their 
contributing to the fight for real change. Yet, the proposed comprehensive 
strategy does respond to and represent the interests of the vast majority of 
the Palestinian people and holds the promise of a better future. 

The Palestinian national struggle has so far passed through two major phases: 
the first steered by Palestinians abroad while ignoring the role of 
Palestinians at home, and the second steered by Palestinians at home while 
ignoring the role of Palestinians abroad. Today we find ourselves at the 
threshold of a third phase, which should combine the struggle at home and the 
campaign of Palestinians and their sympathisers abroad.

In closing I would like to address the subject of a one-state or a two-state 
solution. It is both theoretically and practically valid to raise this subject 
here for two reasons. First, Israel has consistently tried to undermine the 
prospect of Palestinian statehood by pressing for such formulas as home rule, 
or an interim state, or a state without real sovereignty. Second, the changes 
produced on the ground by Israeli settlements and ring roads have come to 
render the realisation of a viable state unrealisable. To some, especially 
Palestinians in the Diaspora, replacing the call for a one-state solution with 
calling for a "two-state solution" seems to offer a remedy that gives relief. 
It is a better remedy, without a doubt, but it is a long way from offering 
relief. Slogans do not end liberation struggles. Slogans without strategies and 
efforts to back them up remain nothing but idle wishes or, to some, a noble way 
to avoid responsibility and the work that goes with it. 

Now, let us be clear here. Israel has been working around the clock to destroy 
the option of an independent Palestinian state on the ground and, hence, the 
two-state solution. But that does not leave the Palestinian people without an 
alternative, as some Zionist leaders undoubtedly hope. The single democratic 
state (not the single bi-national state) in which all citizens are equal in 
rights and duties regardless of their religious affiliations and their origins 
is an alternative to the attempt to force the Palestinians to accept slavery 
under occupation and an apartheid order in the form of a feeble autonomous 
government that is dubbed a state. 

However, whether the aim is a truly independent sovereign state or a single 
democratic state, both of which Israel dismisses with equal vehemence, neither 
of these aims can be achieved without exposing and destroying the apartheid 
system. This requires a strategy. Therefore, instead of allowing ourselves to 
become divided prematurely over whether to go for the one-state or two-state 
solution, let us unify behind the common aim required to achieve either: the 
formulation and implementation of a strategy to fight the occupation, apartheid 
and racial discrimination. This will lead us to something that is absolutely 
necessary at this stage, which is to move from the world of slogans to the 
world of practical activism in accordance with viable strategic plans that 
mobilise demonstrators against the wall, intellectuals and politicians and 
other sectors of society. It is high time we realise that diplomatic endeavours 
and negotiations do not free us from the nuts and bolts of actual struggle. We 
have one road that leads to a single goal: the freedom of the Palestinian 
people. There is nothing nobler than to follow this road to its end. This is 
not a project for some point in the future; it is one that cannot wait. Indeed, 
we should probably adopt the slogan of the freedom fighters of South Africa: 
"Freedom in our lifetime!"

* The writer is secretary-general of the Palestinian National Initiative 


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