Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-09-04 Thread Daniel Veditz
Ian Hickson wrote: > Note that the problems you raise also exist (and have long existed) with > cookies; at least the storage APIs default to a safe state in the general > case instead of defaulting to an unsafe state. In what way do the storage API's default to a "safe state"? What "unsafe stat

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-29 Thread Shannon Baker
Ian Hickson said (among other things): It seems that what you are suggesting is that foo.example.com cannot trust example.com, because example.com could then steal data from foo.example.com. But there's a much simpler attack scenario for example.com: it can just take over foo.example.com direct

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-28 Thread Ian Hickson
On Mon, 28 Aug 2006, Shannon Baker wrote: > > > > This is mentioned in the "Security and privacy" section; the third > > bullet point here for example suggests blocking access to "public" > > storage areas: > > > > http://whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/#user-tracking > > I did read t

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-28 Thread Martijn
On 8/28/06, Jim Ley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On 28/08/06, Shannon Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I accept tracking is inevitable but we > shouldn't be making it easier either. You have to remember that the WHAT-WG individual is a Google employee, a company that now relies on accurate track

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-28 Thread Jim Ley
On 28/08/06, Shannon Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: I accept tracking is inevitable but we shouldn't be making it easier either. You have to remember that the WHAT-WG individual is a Google employee, a company that now relies on accurate tracking of details, so don't be surprised that any pro

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-27 Thread Shannon Baker
Ian Hickson wrote: This is mentioned in the "Security and privacy" section; the third bullet point here for example suggests blocking access to "public" storage areas: http://whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/#user-tracking I did read the suggestions and I know the authors have given th

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-27 Thread Ian Hickson
On 8/27/06, Shannon Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: == 1: Authors failure to handle the implications of "global" storage. == First lets talk about the global store (|globalStorage['']) which is accessible from ALL domains. This is mentioned in the "Security and privacy" section; the third bul

Re: [whatwg] Persistent storage is critically flawed.

2006-08-27 Thread Alexey Feldgendler
On Sun, 27 Aug 2006 19:11:17 +0700, Shannon Baker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > But why bother? This whole problem is easily solved by allowing data to > be stored with an access control list (ACL). For example the site > developer should be able to specify that a data object be available to > '*.e