Re: Issue, WireGuard on a PaX kernel

2017-04-23 Thread Samuel Holland
Hello, On 04/23/17 09:53, saeidscorp wrote: I've been having troubles using WireGuard on Gentoo hardened/PaX kernel. I have set up WireGuard on regular kernels several times, but on a PaX kernel it causes the kernel to panic. All steps of interface addition and configuration using wg tool work

Re: potential preshared-key changes

2017-04-23 Thread crasm
On Sun, Apr 23, 2017, at 06:49 AM, Fredrik Strömberg wrote: > [...] > Furthermore, consider that the IP addresses of the peers will most > likely be available to the attacker. > [...] > 2. The attacker gains an advantage by knowing S(pub,i) which is not > gained by already available metadata (such

Issue, WireGuard on a PaX kernel

2017-04-23 Thread saeidscorp
Hi everybody, I've been having troubles using WireGuard on Gentoo hardened/PaX kernel. I have set up WireGuard on regular kernels several times, but on a PaX kernel it causes the kernel to panic. All steps of inetrface addition and configuration using wg tool work well, but as soon as the first

Re: potential preshared-key changes

2017-04-23 Thread Fredrik Strömberg
Hi! :) On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 9:05 AM, wrote: > Forgive me in advance if this is a horrible or misinformed idea, but why > not blake2s the preshared-key with each peer's public key and distribute > that as a per-peer "preshared" key, mixing it in last? That would reduce > the risk of key compro

Re: potential preshared-key changes

2017-04-23 Thread Fredrik Strömberg
Hi everyone, Jason, you already know my opinion on this, but I will restate it here for the sake of discussion. Summary: Yes, we should make the change so that Pre-Shared Keys are per-peer. The benefits of per-peer PSKs vastly outweigh the disadvantages. Premises: A. The current (or proposed) im

Re: potential preshared-key changes

2017-04-23 Thread crasm
Forgive me in advance if this is a horrible or misinformed idea, but why not blake2s the preshared-key with each peer's public key and distribute that as a per-peer "preshared" key, mixing it in last? That would reduce the risk of key compromise, since each peer would have a unique key and the real