Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-07 Thread StarBrilliant
On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 1:20 AM Fredrik Strömberg wrote: > Using Pluggable Transports seem like a good solution. Simply divert > WireGuard traffic to a local UDP port, which then sends it using a > Pluggable Transport over the Internet to the other WireGuard peer. > > StarBrilliant: You indicated t

Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-06 Thread James Cloos
> "BC" == Brian Candler writes: BC> OK, so what about changing wireguard to use TCP and TLS on port 443? Using udp/443 for one end could allow making it look like quic. You'd need non-wg traffic on the port to reply like a quic server would. -JimC -- James Cloos OpenPGP: 0x997A9F

Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-06 Thread Jason A. Donenfeld
Hey SB, Thanks for the detailed post and insights. Indeed obfuscation is an extremely useful tool. WireGuard itself is derived from an exfiltration mechanism of mine, and so I've written quite a few different obfuscation modules for that. When the core WireGuard engineering becomes a bit more rel

Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-06 Thread Dennis Jackson
On Thu, 6 Sep 2018 17:19:57 +0200 Fredrik Strömberg wrote: >> First of all, censorship circumvention is an important societal >> problem to solve. It is also clearly outside of the scope of >> WireGuard. Any suggested protocol change with that motive will >> increase the complexity of the code ba

Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-06 Thread Brian Candler
Domain fronting seems like the stealthiest option to me (and if anyone has a reliable way to detect domain fronting, I would love to hear about it!). But that doesn?t get you UDP (and NAT traversal); perhaps VOIP/WebRTC mimicry could work? I think this is a game you can't win against a suitabl

Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-06 Thread Fredrik Strömberg
Hi everyone, First of all, censorship circumvention is an important societal problem to solve. It is also clearly outside of the scope of WireGuard. Any suggested protocol change with that motive will increase the complexity of the code base, which increases the risk of vulnerabilities. This would

Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-06 Thread George Walker
> The userspace daemon would: >- 'Clean' Wireguard [handshake/data] packets The objective of cleaning as described seems to be to make the protocol indistinguishable from exchanging random payloads. But are there any common protocols of commercial importance that are so inscrutable? If I saw

Re: Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-06 Thread Dennis Jackson
Hi, I've been thinking about this issue as well and I agree it's an important one to solve. However, Wireguard's key selling points are its performance, simple configuration and minimal code size and I don't think we can compromise this. So I was wondering if a userspace program which obfuscates

Let's talk about obfuscation again

2018-09-05 Thread StarBrilliant
Hi, (TL;DR: Please seriously consider preventing WG from being blocked, for 2/3 of the world's Internet users. No need to break compatibility, be friendly to PT plugins is a possible solution.) I have been using WG for months. I understand the fact that Wireguard wants to keep its protocol simple