On Sat, 2011-02-19 at 15:43 +0100, Moritz Struebe wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> May I suggest the following:
> First of all: This is only about the SQLite wrapper!
Oops! I didn't realize that. Sorry if I raised a fuss about nothing -
John
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X2go-dev mailing
Hi all,
May I suggest the following:
First of all: This is only about the SQLite wrapper!
Let's get rid of sudo and use suid instead. Add a commented line to the
wrapper that checks whether the current user is in the appropriate group.
Rationale: x2goserver-one, which is responsible for the autom
Hi John, hi list,
Am Freitag, 18. Februar 2011, 22:24:00 schrieb John A. Sullivan III:
> I'm thinking we should err on the side of security and make it secure by
> default with the option to loosen. That said, is there a way to achieve
> all goals? We do need to stop the sudo log spam. We do need
On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 11:04:48 (CET), Mike Gabriel wrote:
> You are not really suggesting that an X2go site administrator should
> customize/tweak permissions on X2go /usr/bin files. This is really
> dirty stuff and not an option to me...
Mike, meet dpkg-statoverride, dpkg-statoverride, meet mik
Hi Alexander,
On Fr 18 Feb 2011 20:14:19 CET Alexander Wuerstlein wrote:
Yes, but in large setups, groups become very hard to manage. Large
groups with thousands of users tend to be an administration burden, also
a large number of additional groups for each user tends to be
problematic with man
Hi Moritz,
On Fr 18 Feb 2011 12:32:20 CET Moritz Struebe wrote:
Hi there,
we already talked to Alex, but maybe it's a good idea to ask a broader
audience: Has anybody got an use case where someone who has ssh access
is not allowed to start x2go?
Yes, I have such use cases. I use X2go for sit
