in the future.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
CC: Corneliu ZUZU <cz...@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 7 ++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
On 2/2/2016 12:52 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
NULLing the pointers would cause things like rtc_deinit() to always blow
up when it followed the NULL pointer.
IMO, we should unconditionally always NULL pointers when freeing a
pointer which isn't in local scope. It would make issues such as these
On 2/2/2016 2:05 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
Xen and PV guests share the virtual address space, in exactly the same
way as a native kernel and its userspace. PV guests can map pages at
0. Therefore, if Xen were to accidentally follow a NULL pointer, it
may not result in a pagefault. (Hardware
/xfree it @ hvm_domain_initialise/hvm_domain_destroy.
After this change, the domain structure shrunk w/ 1152 bytes (>1K!).
Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <cz...@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com>
albeit ...
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vpt.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/v
On 2/1/2016 1:07 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 01/02/16 07:42, Corneliu ZUZU wrote:
The X86 domain structure already occupied PAGE_SIZE (4096).
Looking @ the memory layout of the structure, we could see that
overall most was occupied by (used the pahole tool on domain.o):
* sizeof(domain.arch
;1K!).
Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <cz...@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hpet.c | 5 ++---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 9 -
xen/arch/x86/hvm/pmtimer.c | 18 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/rtc.c | 5 ++---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vpt.c
I'm trying to refactor some arch-specific code into common code and was
surprised to find out that the x86 domain structure already occupies
PAGE_SIZE bytes, couldn't even add an unsigned short field in it w/o
causing a compile-time error.
I'm using the master branch of
On 1/29/2016 6:47 PM, Lengyel, Tamas wrote:
by leaving there only the x86-specific part, i.e.:
struct {
uint8_t mov_to_msr_enabled : 1;
uint8_t mov_to_msr_extended : 1;
} monitor;
and moving the rest directly into the domain
On 1/29/2016 7:09 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 29.01.16 at 17:24, wrote:
One could shrink the domain structure by transforming some of its fields
to pointers, e.g. I could transform the pl_time field into a pointer and
dynamically allocate its data when domain_create is
On 1/28/2016 2:45 PM, Ian Campbell wrote:
On Thu, 2016-01-28 at 14:36 +0200, CORNELIU ZUZU wrote:
On 1/28/2016 1:23 PM, Ian Campbell wrote:
On Thu, 2016-01-28 at 13:17 +0200, Corneliu ZUZU wrote:
This patch implements ARM support for guest-request vm-events.
The code has been ported from x86
On 1/28/2016 1:23 PM, Ian Campbell wrote:
On Thu, 2016-01-28 at 13:17 +0200, Corneliu ZUZU wrote:
This patch implements ARM support for guest-request vm-events.
The code has been ported from x86 side w/ minor adjustments.
I've not looked at the patch yet, but if it only involves minor
This patch implements ARM support for guest-request vm-events.
The code has been ported from x86 side w/ minor adjustments.
Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <cz...@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/arch/arm/Makefile | 2 +
xen/arch/arm/event.c| 86 +++
ookup call from __p2m_get_mem_access
with a call to __p2m_lookup.
Following Ian's suggestion, we also add an ASSERT to ensure that
the p2m lock is taken upon __p2m_get_mem_access entry.
Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <cz...@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 inse
ookup call from __p2m_get_mem_access
with a call to __p2m_lookup.
Signed-off-by: Corneliu ZUZU <cz...@bitdefender.com>
---
xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
index 2190908..a9157e5 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm
301 - 314 of 314 matches
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