[Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] xen: support enabling SMEP/SMAP for HVM only

2016-08-19 Thread He Chen
SMEP/SMAP is a security feature to prevent kernel executing/accessing user address involuntarily, any such behavior will lead to a page fault. SMEP/SMAP is open (in CR4) for both Xen and HVM guest in earlier code. A 32-bit PV guest will suffer unknown SMEP/SMAP page fault when guest kernel attempt

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] xen: support enabling SMEP/SMAP for HVM only

2016-08-24 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 19.08.16 at 12:20, wrote: > Changes in v3: > * Fix boot options. > * Fix CR4 & mmu_cr4_features operations. > * Disable SMEP/SMAP for Dom0. > * Commit message refinement. Several of my comments on v3 did not get taken care of (neither in code nor verbally). I'm not going to repeat them her

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] xen: support enabling SMEP/SMAP for HVM only

2016-08-28 Thread He Chen
On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 04:01:53AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: > >>> On 19.08.16 at 12:20, wrote: > > Changes in v3: > > * Fix boot options. > > * Fix CR4 & mmu_cr4_features operations. > > * Disable SMEP/SMAP for Dom0. > > * Commit message refinement. > > Several of my comments on v3 did not get t

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3] xen: support enabling SMEP/SMAP for HVM only

2016-08-29 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 29.08.16 at 04:47, wrote: > On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 04:01:53AM -0600, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >>> On 19.08.16 at 12:20, wrote: >> > @@ -1403,12 +1437,12 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long >> > mbi_p) >> > >> > if ( !opt_smep ) >> > setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEAT