On 08.12.14 at 07:17, tiejun.c...@intel.com wrote:
On 2014/12/3 3:47, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:21PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
@@ -1101,6 +1129,29 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd,
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
break;
}
+#ifdef
On 12/08/2014 05:00 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 08.12.14 at 07:17, tiejun.c...@intel.com wrote:
On 2014/12/3 3:47, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:21PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
@@ -1101,6 +1129,29 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd,
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void)
On 08.12.14 at 17:45, dgde...@tycho.nsa.gov wrote:
If a guest who has control of a passthrough device can cause these
reserved ranges to change, then there may be reason to prevent others
from querying them, but that doesn't appear to be the case here.
Right, in that case we definitely would
On 2014/12/3 3:47, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
On Mon, Dec 01, 2014 at 05:24:21PM +0800, Tiejun Chen wrote:
From: Jan Beulich jbeul...@suse.com
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
From: Jan Beulich jbeul...@suse.com
This is a prerequisite for punching holes into HVM and PVH guests' P2M
to allow passing through devices that are associated with (on VT-d)
RMRRs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich jbeul...@suse.com
Acked-by: Kevin Tian kevin.t...@intel.com
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