Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-20 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com] > Sent: Monday, February 20, 2017 7:17 PM > To: Tian, Kevin > Cc: Jan Beulich; Suravee Suthikulpanit; Nakajima, Jun; Xen-devel; Boris > Ostrovsky > Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM > guests > > O

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-20 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 14/02/17 10:13, Jan Beulich wrote: On 14.02.17 at 09:40, wrote: >>> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@hermes.cam.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Andrew >>> Cooper >>> Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 4:19 PM >>> >>> On 14/02/2017 08:04, Tian, Kevin wrote: > From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@herm

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-14 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 14.02.17 at 09:40, wrote: >> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@hermes.cam.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Andrew >> Cooper >> Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 4:19 PM >> >> On 14/02/2017 08:04, Tian, Kevin wrote: >> >> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@hermes.cam.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Andrew >> Cooper

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-14 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@hermes.cam.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Andrew Cooper > Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 4:19 PM > > On 14/02/2017 08:04, Tian, Kevin wrote: > >> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@hermes.cam.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Andrew > Cooper > >> Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 3:59 P

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-14 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 14/02/2017 08:04, Tian, Kevin wrote: >> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@hermes.cam.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Andrew >> Cooper >> Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 3:59 PM >> >> On 14/02/2017 02:52, Tian, Kevin wrote: From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com] Sent: Monday, Febr

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-14 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:am...@hermes.cam.ac.uk] On Behalf Of Andrew Cooper > Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 3:59 PM > > On 14/02/2017 02:52, Tian, Kevin wrote: > >> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com] > >> Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 10:32 PM > >> > >> hvm_hw_cpu->ms

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-13 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 14/02/2017 02:52, Tian, Kevin wrote: >> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com] >> Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 10:32 PM >> >> hvm_hw_cpu->msr_flags is in fact the VMX dirty bitmap of MSRs needing to be >> restored when switching into guest context. It should never have been p

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-13 Thread Tian, Kevin
> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.coop...@citrix.com] > Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 10:32 PM > > hvm_hw_cpu->msr_flags is in fact the VMX dirty bitmap of MSRs needing to be > restored when switching into guest context. It should never have been part of > the migration state to start with,

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/4] x86/vmx: Don't leak host syscall MSR state into HVM guests

2017-02-13 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 13.02.17 at 15:32, wrote: > hvm_hw_cpu->msr_flags is in fact the VMX dirty bitmap of MSRs needing to be > restored when switching into guest context. It should never have been part of > the migration state to start with, and Xen must not make any decisions based > on the value seen during