Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-12-02 Thread Dario Faggioli
On Mon, 2021-11-29 at 15:44 +0100, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: > > > > Andrew Cooper (63): > >   x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT > >   x86/hypercall: Annotate fnptr targets > >   xen: Annotate fnptr targets from custom_param() > >   xen: Annotate fnptr targets

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-29 Thread Jan Beulich
On 29.11.2021 16:09, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 29/11/2021 14:44, Jan Beulich wrote: >> One question though: With the large number of __init functions gaining >> cf_check, wouldn't it be possible to turn on CET-IBT only when we're >> done using .init.text? > > 233 to be precise. > > GCC can't dist

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-29 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 29/11/2021 14:44, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> CET Indirect Branch Tracking is a hardware feature designed to protect >> against >> forward-edge control flow hijacking (Call/Jump oriented programming), and is >> a >> companion feature to CET Shadow Stacks a

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-29 Thread Jan Beulich
On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: > CET Indirect Branch Tracking is a hardware feature designed to protect against > forward-edge control flow hijacking (Call/Jump oriented programming), and is a > companion feature to CET Shadow Stacks added in Xen 4.14. > > This series depends on lots of

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-29 Thread Jan Beulich
On 27.11.2021 00:49, Andrew Cooper wrote: > Given that Marek has kindly hacked us up a check which should find any > arbitrary violations, and on a small sample of builds, there are no > violations, I suggest that we clean it up and put it as a check in the > real build and enable it by default see

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-26 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 26/11/2021 13:22, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 26.11.2021 14:13, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 26/11/2021 12:48, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: * I have not checked for misaligned endbr64's, and I'm not sure there is anything useful we could do upon disc

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-26 Thread Jan Beulich
On 26.11.2021 14:13, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 26/11/2021 12:48, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> * I have not checked for misaligned endbr64's, and I'm not sure there is >>> anything useful we could do upon discovering that there were any. >>> Naively,

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-26 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 26/11/2021 13:13, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 26/11/2021 12:48, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> Various note accumulated through the work: >>> * I have already posted patches fixing some of the most egregious >>> (ab)uses of >>> function pointers. There

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-26 Thread Andrew Cooper
On 26/11/2021 12:48, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> CET Indirect Branch Tracking is a hardware feature designed to protect >> against >> forward-edge control flow hijacking (Call/Jump oriented programming), and is >> a >> companion feature to CET Shadow Stacks a

Re: [PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-26 Thread Jan Beulich
On 26.11.2021 13:33, Andrew Cooper wrote: > CET Indirect Branch Tracking is a hardware feature designed to protect against > forward-edge control flow hijacking (Call/Jump oriented programming), and is a > companion feature to CET Shadow Stacks added in Xen 4.14. > > This series depends on lots of

[PATCH 00/65] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking

2021-11-26 Thread Andrew Cooper
CET Indirect Branch Tracking is a hardware feature designed to protect against forward-edge control flow hijacking (Call/Jump oriented programming), and is a companion feature to CET Shadow Stacks added in Xen 4.14. This series depends on lots of previously posted patches. See xenbits/xen-cet-ibt