Both len and off are frontend specified values, so we need to make sure there's no overflow when adding the two for the bounds check. We also want to avoid undefined behavior and hence use off to index into ->hash.mapping[] only after bounds checking. This at the same time allows to take care of not applying off twice for the bounds checking against vif->num_queues.
It is also insufficient to bounds check copy_op.len, as this is len truncated to 16 bits. This is XSA-270 / CVE-2018-15471. Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilh...@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeul...@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durr...@citrix.com> Tested-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durr...@citrix.com> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org [4.7 onwards] --- drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- 4.19-rc1-xen-netback-set-hash-mapping.orig/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c +++ 4.19-rc1-xen-netback-set-hash-mapping/drivers/net/xen-netback/hash.c @@ -332,20 +332,22 @@ u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping_size(struct u32 xenvif_set_hash_mapping(struct xenvif *vif, u32 gref, u32 len, u32 off) { - u32 *mapping = &vif->hash.mapping[off]; + u32 *mapping = vif->hash.mapping; struct gnttab_copy copy_op = { .source.u.ref = gref, .source.domid = vif->domid, - .dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping), .dest.domid = DOMID_SELF, - .dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping), - .len = len * sizeof(u32), + .len = len * sizeof(*mapping), .flags = GNTCOPY_source_gref }; - if ((off + len > vif->hash.size) || copy_op.len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE) + if ((off + len < off) || (off + len > vif->hash.size) || + len > XEN_PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(*mapping)) return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + copy_op.dest.u.gmfn = virt_to_gfn(mapping + off); + copy_op.dest.offset = xen_offset_in_page(mapping + off); + while (len-- != 0) if (mapping[off++] >= vif->num_queues) return XEN_NETIF_CTRL_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel