Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH L1TF v10 2/8] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec

2019-03-14 Thread Norbert Manthey
On 3/14/19 14:19, Jan Beulich wrote: On 14.03.19 at 13:50, wrote: >> Since the L1TF vulnerability of Intel CPUs, loading hypervisor data into >> L1 cache is problematic, because when hyperthreading is used as well, a >> guest running on the sibling core can leak this potentially secret data.

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH L1TF v10 2/8] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec

2019-03-14 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 14.03.19 at 13:50, wrote: > Since the L1TF vulnerability of Intel CPUs, loading hypervisor data into > L1 cache is problematic, because when hyperthreading is used as well, a > guest running on the sibling core can leak this potentially secret data. > > To prevent these speculative accesse

[Xen-devel] [PATCH L1TF v10 2/8] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec

2019-03-14 Thread Norbert Manthey
Since the L1TF vulnerability of Intel CPUs, loading hypervisor data into L1 cache is problematic, because when hyperthreading is used as well, a guest running on the sibling core can leak this potentially secret data. To prevent these speculative accesses, we block speculation after accessing the