>>> On 24.01.19 at 20:50, wrote:
> On 1/24/19 17:56, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 23.01.19 at 12:57, wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
>>> +++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
>>> @@ -368,8 +368,14 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind,
>>> evtchn_port_t port)
>>> if ( virq_
On 1/24/19 17:56, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 23.01.19 at 12:57, wrote:
>> --- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
>> +++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
>> @@ -368,8 +368,14 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind,
>> evtchn_port_t port)
>> if ( virq_is_global(virq) && (vcpu != 0) )
>>
>>> On 23.01.19 at 12:57, wrote:
> --- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
> +++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
> @@ -368,8 +368,14 @@ int evtchn_bind_virq(evtchn_bind_virq_t *bind,
> evtchn_port_t port)
> if ( virq_is_global(virq) && (vcpu != 0) )
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /*
> +* Mak
Guests can issue event channel interaction with guest specified data.
To avoid speculative out-of-bound accesses, we use the nospec macros.
This commit is part of the SpectreV1+L1TF mitigation patch series.
Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey
---
xen/common/event_channel.c | 25
