Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier

2019-02-15 Thread Norbert Manthey
On 2/12/19 14:44, Jan Beulich wrote: On 08.02.19 at 14:44, wrote: >> To control the runtime behavior on L1TF vulnerable platforms better, the >> command line option l1tf-barrier is introduced. This option controls >> whether on vulnerable x86 platforms the lfence instruction is used to >> pre

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier

2019-02-12 Thread Jan Beulich
>>> On 08.02.19 at 14:44, wrote: > To control the runtime behavior on L1TF vulnerable platforms better, the > command line option l1tf-barrier is introduced. This option controls > whether on vulnerable x86 platforms the lfence instruction is used to > prevent speculative execution from bypassing

[Xen-devel] [PATCH SpectreV1+L1TF v6 4/9] spec: add l1tf-barrier

2019-02-08 Thread Norbert Manthey
To control the runtime behavior on L1TF vulnerable platforms better, the command line option l1tf-barrier is introduced. This option controls whether on vulnerable x86 platforms the lfence instruction is used to prevent speculative execution from bypassing the evaluation of conditionals that are pr