All the recommendations on moving the web root to another drive are
valid and correct.  In fact, as Stefan Osterlitz points out, changing
the default names and locations for as much of the system hierarchy as
possible will enhance security.

In particular, if the utmost security is necessary, I recommend (among
other things):

  Create a 5MB DOS partition at the front of your disk as the C: drive.

  Install Windows/NT/2k to the next partition, which will become D:
  (it will still write the boot sector to C:).

  Call the WinNT/2k root directory on D: anything EXCEPT winnt.

  Convert C: to NTFS after installing NT/2K, and allow only
  ADMINISTRATOR (the user, not group) and SYSTEM to access.

  Create an E: drive for your Inetpub stuff.  Make the Inetpub
  location a subdirectory of another directory (say webdata or some
  such) on E:, and name it anything but Inetpub.

  If you need it, don't call scripts SCRIPTS.  Likewise for CGIBIN
  and the like.  If you don't needs these directories, get rid of them.

  Make sure that you change the properties for each of your websites
  so that PARENT PATHS are *NOT* enabled (you'll be surprised what
  breaks after doing this).

  Use CALCS to change the permissions of all the .EXE, .COM, .DLL,
  .CMD, .BAT, and anything else that's possibly executable so that
  only ADMINISTRATOR (the user) can write or modify them.

  Use CALCS to change the permissions on things useful to an intruder
  so that only ADMINISTRATOR (the user) can read or execute them, such
  as CMD.EXE, EDLIN.EXE, FINGER.EXE, FTP.EXE, PING.EXE, TFTP.EXE,
  ROUTE.EXE, et cetera.

  Change the ADMINISTRATOR username to something else that resembles
  the rest of your standard user names, and set a very strong
  password.

  Create a dummy ADMINISTRATOR user with no privs, with a very strong
  password and audit logons (check the logs!).

However, and unfortunately, the above will break some web applications
and will make your web developer's lives a living hell.  

In regards to known vulnerabilities, if you are up-to-date on 
hotfixes, properly ACL your files and directories (and registry), 
have strong passwords, audit everything and check your logs, I don't
believe that using the default paths is a SIGNIFICANT risk for most
applications.  On the other hand, if this is for an on-line financial
application or something likewise sensitive, pull out all the stops.

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