Sure, did not want to cause work. it is just a minor thing, I guess most people would read "weak" as "short" (even when weak key has another meaning in cryptography). It is good to have those warnings.
Gruss Bernd -- http://bernd.eckenfels.net ________________________________ From: security-dev <security-dev-boun...@openjdk.java.net> on behalf of Weijun Wang <weijun.w...@oracle.com> Sent: Saturday, March 25, 2017 1:46:03 AM To: security-dev@openjdk.java.net Subject: Re: RFR: 3 security-libs release notes on keytool/krb5/etc After I said I would use short key I was also wondering how I should describe this in the keytool and jarsigner output. Now I think "weak" is more general and it covers the short length. I'll stick with it. Bernd, hopefully you find this OK. When one see "512-bit key (weak)", it means some quality test is already done. Thanks Max On 03/25/2017 04:06 AM, Anthony Scarpino wrote: > I'd agree with Sean, "weak" implies anything risk, the weakness isn't > necessarily key length related. > > Tony > > On 03/24/2017 11:56 AM, Sean Mullan wrote: >> On 3/24/17 7:01 AM, Weijun Wang wrote: >>> I'll use "short key". >> >> I prefer the term "weak" which implies it is a risk. We already use that >> term in jarsigner so I think we should keep it consistent. You also >> print the size of the key so that describes what is wrong with it. >> >> --Sean >> >>> >>> Thanks >>> Max >>> >>> On 03/24/2017 06:26 PM, Bernd Eckenfels wrote: >>>> I wonder if "weak key" should be replaced by "weak key length" or >>>> "short >>>> key". It might otherwise imply key quality tests which are not carried >>>> out. >>>> >>>> Gruss >>>> Bernd >>>> -- >>>> http://bernd.eckenfels.net >>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__bernd.eckenfels.net&d=DwMFAg&c=RoP1YumCXCgaWHvlZYR8PQcxBKCX5YTpkKY057SbK10&r=L95YSg0eIcTu_shXWyN3XgC5kRlt5xJJuqogC6Ulqlk&m=nQPaZ9oNisvgXYmsVbzFkcB0qjPKYWTsWh0IIQtt1nw&s=yLFl1pk3TBMwqMqZMDE2e4d8rt9AVyNfUaC84QV3Lr0&e=> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> *From:* security-dev <security-dev-boun...@openjdk.java.net> on behalf >>>> of Weijun Wang <weijun.w...@oracle.com> >>>> *Sent:* Friday, March 24, 2017 2:12:01 AM >>>> *To:* Security Dev OpenJDK >>>> *Subject:* RFR: 3 security-libs release notes on keytool/krb5/etc >>>> >>>> Hi All >>>> >>>> Please take a review on 3 release notes. The content itself is >>>> pasted as >>>> quotation below. >>>> >>>> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8176087 >>>> keytool now prints warnings when reading or generating cert/cert req >>>> using weak algorithms >>>> >>>>> In all keytool functions, if the certificate/certificate request/CRL >>>>> that is working on (whether it be the input, the output, or an >>>>> existing object) is using a weak algorithm or key, a warning will be >>>>> printed out. >>>>> >>>>> Precisely, an algorithm or a key is weak if it matches the value of >>>>> the jdk.certpath.disabledAlgorithms security property defined in >>>>> conf/security/java.security. >>>> >>>> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8174143 >>>> Deprecate security APIs that have been superseded >>>> >>>>> The classes and interfaces in the `java.security.acl` and >>>>> `javax.security.cert` packages have been superseded by replacements >>>>> for a long time and are deprecated in JDK 9. Two methods >>>>> `javax.net.ssl.HandshakeCompletedEvent.getPeerCertificateChain()` and >>>>> `javax.net.ssl.SSLSession.getPeerCertificateChain()` are also >>>>> deprecated since they return the >>>>> `javax.security.cert.X509Certificate` type. >>>> >>>> https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8168635 >>>> rcache interop with krb5-1.15 >>>> >>>>> The hash algorithm used in the Kerberos 5 replay cache file (rcache) >>>>> is updated from MD5 to SHA256 with this change. This is also the >>>>> algorithm used by MIT krb5-1.15. This change is interoperable with >>>>> earlier releases of MIT krb5, which means Kerberos 5 acceptors from >>>>> JDK 9 and MIT krb5-1.14 can share the same rcache file. >>>>> >>>>> A new system property named jdk.krb5.rcache.useMD5 is introduced. If >>>>> the system property is set to "true", JDK 9 will still use the MD5 >>>>> hash algorithm in rcache. This is useful when both of the following >>>>> conditions are true: 1) the system has a very coarse clock and has to >>>>> depend on hash values in replay attack detection, and 2) >>>>> interoperability with earlier versions of JDK or MIT krb5 for rcache >>>>> files is required. The default value of this system property is >>>>> "false". >>>> >>>> Thanks >>>> Max >>>> >>>> >>>> >
