> While that was certainly the goal for the Solaris modules pam_krb5's 
> hardcoded behaviour is equivalent to what you used to get with 
> try_first_pass.  I know we discussed this and I'm pretty sure it is 
> documented why in the PSARC cases that approved the changes; I'll need 
> to look it up though.

        PSARC/2002/469 Kerberos PAM module (pam_krb5) updates
        for Ann-Marie certainly removes all the use/try stuff
        from pam_krb5(5).  It also states:

pam_sm_authenticate() 
=====================

authenticates a user principal though the
Kerberos authentication service by fetching the user's initial credentials
with his/her Kerberos password and verifying them.
These credentials are stored in pam_krb5's internal kmd structure, and not
written to the user's credential cache file.

Old behaviour:
        - authenticates the user with a Kerberos password
        - writes or overwrites the user's credential cache file with the
        new Kerberos credentials

New behaviour:
        - authenticates the user with a Kerberos password, without storing
        the user's credentials in a cache file.
        - does not modify the user's credential cache file
        (ie: does not create, destroy or write to the credential cache file)
        - this is part of the fix to bug 4516537 "pam_krb5 does not conform
        to the PAM standards set forth in pam(3PAM)"

pam_krb5(5):

          pam_sm_authenticate() authenticates a user principal though the
          Kerberos authentication service. If the authentication request is
          successful, the authentication service sends a ticket-granting
          ticket (tgt) back to the pam_krb5.so.1 module, which then verifies
          that the TGT came from a valid KDC by attempting to get a service
          ticket for the local host service. For this to succeed, the local
          host's keytab file (/etc/krb5/krb5.keytab) must contain the entry
          for the local host service (for example, host/hostname.com at REALM
          where hostname.com is the fully qualified local hostname and REALM
          is the default realm of the local host as defined in
          /etc/krb5/krb5.conf).  Once the TGT is verified, these
          initial credentials are stored internally for the pam_sm_setcred()
          function.  If the host entry is not found in the keytab file, the
          authentication fails.


        The way I read both of these extracts from the case, neither imply
        to me any prompting by pam_krb5.so.  We even discussed announcing
        the removal of try/use in a patch so they could get nuked in S10.

        Perhaps I'm misreading them.  If pam_krb5.so should be prompting,
        then pam_authtok_get doesn't belong stacked above it in the
        pam stack.

Gary..

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