Should someone mention the IPR issues with SRP that prevented widespread
usage?
Eric Rescorla wrote:
On Sat, Aug 23, 2008 at 5:46 AM, Pedro Melo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Hi,
On Aug 23, 2008, at 1:18 PM, Jonathan Schleifer wrote:
Am 23.08.2008 um 11:04 schrieb Dirk Meyer:
SAS does not work for me when I use bots. It also reduces it to one
way removing the option of X.509 certificates which is something I
need.
I never said SAS should be the only way, we need multiple ways. I suggest
those:
* SAS with mnemonics
* Fingerprint verification
* CA, but no CA added in the client by default (so the user has to trust
the CA manually, for example useful in a company so you don't have to verify
every co-worker)
Exactly. For bots, I personally would create my own CA and tell those pesky
little devils just to trust certificates signed by that.
Profit!.
Having a 32-bit SAS encoded with Mnemonics (like already suggested
here) really sounds like a great idea.
Why not encode a key fingerprint with Mnemonics? Looks like the same
to the user.
Only taking 32 bit of the fingerprint and using Mnemonics is insecure as
this is easy to forge - we already discussed it here.
BTW: It was argued a lot that ESessions misses a cryptanalysis, but if we
are going to do extensions to TLS, we might need a cryptanalysis for this
stuff too. TLS is useless if we add a verification method that is insecure.
Well, SAS and SRP are IETF (draft?) extensions. SRP has more than 10 years
of field tests and debate (up to current SRP-6, I believe).
SRP isn't a draft. It's an RFC.
I agree we would need to do an SAS extension to TLS if we wanted SAS
and yes, that would need analysis. However, it's a relatively small
piece of work compared to a whole new protocol.
-Ekr
