On Wed, Dec 31, 2008 at 9:52 AM, Jonathan Schleifer <[email protected]> wrote: > "Eric Rescorla" <[email protected]> wrote: > >> It seems to me that this goes to the heart of whether this is a >> serious threat or >> just a demonstration. So, again: are you aware of a CA which is >> widely trusted and is actually vulnerable to this form of collision >> attack? > > As said before, that doesn't even matter much whether they fixed it or > now, as the old root CAs are still out there and there are not working > revocation lists.
You've said that repeatedly, but I don't think it's convincing. Again, we know that two invalid certificates issued: one for mozilla.org and one CA certificate. Please explain how this turns into a generalized MITM attack by anybody *but* the people who hold those private keys. -Ekr
