Hi Hannes, thank you for the comments. With respect to the requirements for end-to-end encryption, I think they are very well explained in this draft:
"Requirements for End-to-End Encryption in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)". http://xmpp.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-xmpp-e2e-requirements-01.html I didn't want to go to the requirements level of the proposal until I knew that someone on the XSF is interested. My original intention was to ask you all (the XMPP community) before writing a serious proposal. However, as you pointed, in order to make an appropriate proposal, the requirements have to be studied thoroughly. And, of course, also a mentor and the support from the XSF are needed :) Best regards, David. El 16/03/2011, a las 07:39, Hannes Tschofenig escribió: > Hi Brian, > > I am not sure I fully understand the process & background here but David had > asked for comments on an idea he had. > > I was in the assumption that he wanted to get feedback from others on the > usage of IBE for e2e security. > > Having worked with researchers a lot it is not uncommon to look at all the > different solution mechanisms out there and to apply them. > Regardless which communication protocol you look at you will for sure see > proposals that use CGAs, IBE, apply security at all layers, etc. > > My believe is that it helps to determine what the problem actually is, and > figure out what requirements for the specific problem arise. > Not having seen any problem analysis nor requirements list (yet) I was only > able to share my limited view of what I would do. > > Ciao > Hannes > > PS: Regarding the analysis of existing mechanisms and some requirements other > folks had looked at you might want to read through: > http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5479 > > On Mar 16, 2011, at 1:17 AM, Brian Spector wrote: > >> This ignorance on this board is truly stunning. It's actually hard to >> argue with the logic presented here. >> >>>> The primary advantage of an IBE system is that you can encrypt to >>>> people whose credentials you don't have (and may not even have any >>>> yet). However, since this is a real-time exchange, that benefit does >>>> not applyhere. >> >> Anyone with a cursory knowledge of crypto knows the issues in scaling PKI >> are immense. >> Identity based cryptosystems come in all shapes and sizes, not just >> identity based encryption, but identity based key agreements, hierarchical >> key systems, etc. >> And there are PLENTY of well-known IBCs that are IPR free (well, at least >> to anyone who isn't lazy enough to look beyond Boneh-Franklin). >> >> Further, I think there are some people on this list that are also on the >> IETF draft bodies, and they know the proposals coming down the river, and >> WHY they are coming down the river, and no one has spoken up yet for this >> guy and his idea. If that's the case, that's shameful. >> >> David, it's a great idea, it's important, and I'll find a way to rustle up >> the resources to sponsor you. >> >> I think I can relegate this board to a Google archive rather than have it >> pollute my inbox anymore. >> >> FAIL. >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On >> Behalf Of Eric Rescorla >> Sent: 15 March 2011 15:32 >> To: XMPP Security >> Subject: Re: [Security] GSoC proposal: Identity-based end-to-end >> encryption for XMPP >> >> On Tue, Mar 15, 2011 at 8:20 AM, David Núñez <[email protected]> wrote: >>> The idea is to use the XMPP servers as Key Generation Centers (KGC), >> since they already provide procedures for user authentication. Thus, the >> project would have to develop the server components required to issue >> private keys to users, among others. I think that the fact that the JID of >> the user you want to securely communicate could act as a public key is >> interesting to the XMPP protocol. >> >> Yes, this does not add any value over a standard PKI system. >> >> -Ekr >> >>> However, I am aware that there have been several responses to my >> proposal, and it seems that it is not very interesting to XMPP. I would >> like to thank you for your thoughtful insights. As one of you suggested in >> a previous response, I will study in more depth the current problems in >> end-to-end communication in XMPP and try to propose something else. I was >> hoping to participate in this Google Summer of Code edition. Any ideas >> that could be arranged as a proposal? >>> >>> Best regards, >>> David. >>> >>> El 15/03/2011, a las 15:47, Eric Rescorla escribió: >>> >>>> On Tue, Mar 15, 2011 at 7:14 AM, David Núñez <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> Thank you for your response. Respect to your first point, one >> advantage of the proposed scheme is that it is an alternative to digital >> certificates and its associated distribution infrastructure, as it relies >> on the identity of the users as public keys. >>>> >>>> I don't know what this means. An IBE system requires a central key >>>> generation server which needs to verify users identities and only >>>> issue keys when appropriate. The processing done by the KGS looks >>>> very much like that done by a CA. >>>> >>>> The primary advantage of an IBE system is that you can encrypt to >>>> people whose credentials you don't have (and may not even have any >>>> yet). However, since this is a real-time exchange, that benefit does >>>> not applyhere. >>>> >>>> -Ekr >>> >>> >> ***** Email confidentiality notice ***** >> >> This message is private and confidential. 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