I’d like to get your thoughts on adding LSM permission checks on BPF
objects.

By default, the ability to create and use eBPF maps/programs requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]. Alternatively, all processes can be granted access to
bpf() functions. This seems like poor granularity. [2]

Like files and sockets, eBPF maps and programs can be passed between
processes by FD and have a number of functions that map cleanly to
permissions.

Let me know what you think. Are there simpler alternative approaches that
we haven’t considered?

Thanks!
Jeff

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/bpf.2.html NOTES section
[2] We are considering eBPF for network filtering by netd. Giving netd
CAP_SYS_ADMIN would considerably increase netd’s privileges. Alternatively
allowing all processes permission to use bpf() goes against the principle
of least privilege exposing a lot of kernel attack surface to processes
that do not actually need it.

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