On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 9:42 AM, Casey Schaufler <ca...@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > Two proposed security modules require the ability to > share security blobs with existing "major" security modules. > These modules, S.A.R.A and LandLock, provide significantly > different services than SELinux, Smack or AppArmor. Using > either in conjunction with the existing modules is quite > reasonable. S.A.R.A requires access to the cred blob, while > LandLock uses the cred, file and inode blobs. > > The use of the cred, file and inode blobs has been > abstracted in preceding patches in the series. This > patch teaches the affected security modules how to access > the part of the blob set aside for their use in the case > where blobs are shared. The configuration option > CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING identifies systems where the > blobs may be shared. > > The mechanism for selecting which security modules are > active has been changed to allow non-conflicting "major" > security modules to be used together. At this time the > TOMOYO module can safely be used with any of the others. > The two new modules would be non-conflicting as well. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <ca...@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 14 +++-- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +- > security/Kconfig | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 8 +++ > security/apparmor/include/file.h | 9 ++- > security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 4 ++ > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++- > security/security.c | 30 ++++++++- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +- > security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 18 +++++- > security/smack/smack.h | 19 +++++- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 17 +++--- > security/tomoyo/common.h | 12 +++- > security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 3 +- > 14 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > index 9842e21afd4a..d3d8af174042 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst > @@ -17,10 +17,16 @@ MAC extensions, other extensions can be built using the > LSM to provide > specific changes to system operation when these tweaks are not available > in the core functionality of Linux itself. > > -The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. This may be > -followed by any number of "minor" modules and at most one "major" module. > -For more details on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux > -man-pages project. > +The Linux capabilities modules will always be included. For more details > +on capabilities, see ``capabilities(7)`` in the Linux man-pages project. > + > +Security modules that do not use the security data blobs maintained > +by the LSM infrastructure are considered "minor" modules. These may be > +included at compile time and stacked explicitly. Security modules that > +use the LSM maintained security blobs are considered "major" modules. > +These may only be stacked if the CONFIG_LSM_STACKED configuration > +option is used. If this is chosen all of the security modules selected > +will be used. > > A list of the active security modules can be found by reading > ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm``. This is a comma separated list, and > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index 416b20c3795b..dddcced54fea 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -2079,7 +2079,7 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct > security_hook_list *hooks, > #define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init > #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */ > > -extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module); > +extern bool __init security_module_enable(const char *lsm, const bool > stacked); > extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void); > #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA > extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void); > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > index 22f7664c4977..ed48025ae9e0 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig > +++ b/security/Kconfig > @@ -36,6 +36,28 @@ config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS > bool > default n > > +config SECURITY_STACKING > + bool "Security module stacking" > + depends on SECURITY > + help > + Allows multiple major security modules to be stacked. > + Modules are invoked in the order registered with a > + "bail on fail" policy, in which the infrastructure > + will stop processing once a denial is detected. Not > + all modules can be stacked. SELinux, Smack and AppArmor are > + known to be incompatible. User space components may > + have trouble identifying the security module providing > + data in some cases. > + > + If you select this option you will have to select which > + of the stackable modules you wish to be active. The > + "Default security module" will be ignored. The boot line > + "security=" option can be used to specify that one of > + the modules identifed for stacking should be used instead > + of the entire stack. > + > + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
I don't see a good reason to make this a config. Why shouldn't this always be enabled? > + > config SECURITY_LSM_DEBUG > bool "Enable debugging of the LSM infrastructure" > depends on SECURITY > @@ -250,6 +272,9 @@ source security/yama/Kconfig > > source security/integrity/Kconfig > > +menu "Security Module Selection" > + visible if !SECURITY_STACKING > + > choice > prompt "Default security module" > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX > @@ -289,3 +314,59 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY > > endmenu > > +menu "Security Module Stack" > + visible if SECURITY_STACKING > + > +choice > + prompt "Stacked 'extreme' security module" > + default SECURITY_SELINUX_STACKED if SECURITY_SELINUX > + default SECURITY_SMACK_STACKED if SECURITY_SMACK > + default SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED if SECURITY_APPARMOR I don't think any of this is needed either: we already have the CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* choice. > [...] > diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h > b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h > index a90eae76d7c1..be7575adf6f0 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h > +++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h > @@ -25,7 +25,11 @@ > > static inline struct aa_label *cred_label(const struct cred *cred) > { > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING > + struct aa_label **blob = cred->security + > apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_cred; > +#else > struct aa_label **blob = cred->security; > +#endif Without the config, then there's no need for all these #ifdefs. > -#define file_ctx(X) ((struct aa_file_ctx *)(X)->f_security) > +static inline struct aa_file_ctx *file_ctx(struct file *file) > +{ > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING > + return file->f_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_file; > +#else > + return file->f_security; > +#endif > +} This define->inline should have been part of an earlier patch. > /* struct aa_file_ctx - the AppArmor context the file was opened in > * @lock: lock to update the ctx > diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h > index 6505e1ad9e23..bbe9b384d71d 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h > +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ > > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/fs.h> > +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > > #include "match.h" > > @@ -55,6 +56,9 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, > const char **ns_name, > size_t *ns_len); > void aa_info_message(const char *str); > > +/* Security blob offsets */ > +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes; > + > /** > * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated > substring > * @str: a null terminated string > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index 15716b6ff860..36d8386170e8 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -1553,7 +1553,9 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) > int error; > > if (!finish) { > - if (apparmor_enabled && security_module_enable("apparmor")) > + if (apparmor_enabled && > + security_module_enable("apparmor", > + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED))) > security_add_blobs(&apparmor_blob_sizes); > else > apparmor_enabled = false; > @@ -1561,7 +1563,9 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) > return 0; > } > > - if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) { > + if (!apparmor_enabled || > + !security_module_enable("apparmor", > + > IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_STACKED))) { > aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); > apparmor_enabled = false; > return 0; I don't think any of these changes are needed either with the loss of the config. > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 2501cdcbebff..06bed74d1ed0 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ > > /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ > #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 > +#define MODULE_STACK "(stacking)" > > struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; > static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain); > @@ -48,7 +49,11 @@ static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes; > > /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ > static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] = > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING > + MODULE_STACK; > +#else > CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY; > +#endif > > static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) > { > @@ -169,6 +174,7 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result) > /** > * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ? > * @module: the name of the module > + * @stacked: indicates that the module wants to be stacked > * > * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations > * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used > @@ -184,9 +190,29 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result) > * > * Otherwise, return false. > */ > -int __init security_module_enable(const char *module) > +bool __init security_module_enable(const char *lsm, const bool stacked) > { > - return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm); > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING > + /* > + * Module defined on the command line security=XXXX > + */ > + if (strcmp(chosen_lsm, MODULE_STACK)) { > + if (!strcmp(lsm, chosen_lsm)) { > + pr_info("Command line sets the %s security module.\n", > + lsm); > + return true; > + } > + return false; > + } > + /* > + * Module configured as stacked. > + */ > + return stacked; > +#else > + if (strcmp(lsm, chosen_lsm) == 0) > + return true; > + return false; > +#endif > } I don't see the need for this? security_module_enable() will already specify if it's been selected as the "primary" LSM. The only change I think is needed here is to treat tomoyo differently. It can now operate independently, like the "minor" LSMs. So we have three types of LSMs now: "conflicting", "non-conflicting", and "minor". The only differences are how they get initialized. Major use security_initcall() and minor use explicit calls to $lsm_add_hooks(). Yama is always enabled if built in. Loadpin uses a module parameter ("loadpin.enabled") and checks it when loadpin_add_hooks() is called. To split tomoyo away from the other security modules, we need to track its enablement _separately_ from the conflicting LSMs. i.e. choose_lsm() needs to change, or tomoyo needs to use a module parameter ("tomoyo.enabled"), or a __setup() call like apparmor and selinux do for enablement. (Note that apparmor and selinux check _both_ their __setup() and security_module_enable() values...) For example (untested, likely whitespace damaged): diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig index 404dce66952a..4edc8e733245 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig +++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig @@ -14,6 +14,14 @@ config SECURITY_TOMOYO found at <http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/>. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_TOMOYO_ENABLED + bool "Enable TOMOYO at boot" + depends on SECURITY_TOMOYO + default SECURITY_TOMOYO + help + If selected, TOMOYO will be enabled at boot. If not selected, it + can be enabled at boot with the kernel parameter "tomoyo.enabled=1". + config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY int "Default maximal count for learning mode" default 2048 diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 9f932e2d6852..8dc9ef2096ab 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -531,6 +531,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { /* Lock for GC. */ DEFINE_SRCU(tomoyo_ss); +static int enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO_ENABLED); + /** * tomoyo_init - Register TOMOYO Linux as a LSM module. * @@ -540,7 +542,7 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) { struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred(); - if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo")) + if (!enabled) return 0; /* register ourselves with the security framework */ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks), "tomoyo"); @@ -550,4 +552,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) return 0; } +/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */ +module_param(enabled, int, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enabled, "Tomoyo enabled at boot"); + security_initcall(tomoyo_init); (I prefer LSMs do enablement with module params so that they leave their namespace open for other runtime configuration. I think "apparmor=" and "selinux=" for enable/disable isn't good to replicate.) We will quickly encounter "LSM ordering" as an issue, but not in this case yet: there's no new LSM. Ordering is preserved even with my suggestion: major order is controlled by Makefile link ordering, and minor is controlled by explicit ordering in security/security.c's add_hooks() calls. > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 6617abb51732..be14540ce09c 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -3493,18 +3493,16 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, > char *name, char **value) > { > struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); > char *cp; > - int slen; > > - if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) > + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { > + cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (cp == NULL) > + return -ENOMEM; > + } else > return -EINVAL; > > - cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); > - if (cp == NULL) > - return -ENOMEM; > - > - slen = strlen(cp); > *value = cp; > - return slen; > + return strlen(cp); > } This refactoring seems out of place? -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov To unsubscribe, send email to selinux-le...@tycho.nsa.gov. 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