On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 4:59 PM, Casey Schaufler <ca...@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > v4: Finer granularity in the patches and other > cleanups suggested by Kees Cook. > Removed dead code created by the removal of SELinux > credential blob poisoning.
Thanks for the splitting, this really does make it easier to review (at least for me). I think this looks really good, though obviously I'd like to refactor it slightly on top of my series. :) One additional thought I had was about the blobs allocations: some are separate kmem caches, and some are kmalloc. I'm thinking it might make sense to use separate kmem caches for two reasons: - they're going to always be the same size and are regularly allocated/freed, so it may offer a performance benefit. - they're explicitly not supposed to be exposed to userspace, so hardened usercopy would protect them if they were not kmalloc()ed. I'm excited about getting this landed! -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security _______________________________________________ Selinux mailing list Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov To unsubscribe, send email to selinux-le...@tycho.nsa.gov. To get help, send an email containing "help" to selinux-requ...@tycho.nsa.gov.
