Without making any comment on the patent itself, I can confirm that Let's Encrypt's implementation of multi-perspective validation has existed and been public since June 2017: https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/pull/2802
Aaron On Thu, Jul 4, 2024, 11:27 Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg < servercert-wg@cabforum.org> wrote: > IANAL, but... > > That patent <https://patents.google.com/patent/US11700263B2/en> was filed > on 2019-10-11. > > The Princeton paper > <https://www.princeton.edu/~pmittal/publications/bgp-tls-usenix18.pdf> that > first highlighted the need for MPIC in the WebPKI dates back to *2018*, > and section 5.1.3 of that paper describes *"Let’s Encrypt’s preliminary > deployment of multiple vantage points in their staging environment"*. > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org> on behalf of > Chris Clements via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > *Sent:* 01 July 2024 21:42 > *To:* So, Nicol <nicol...@commscope.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate > WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > *Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 > V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple > Network Perspectives" > > CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not > click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know > the content is safe. > > All, > > We have considered the communication from CommScope dated May 30, 2024. > > We would like to proceed with a vote on Ballot SC-067 V3 on July 15, 2024. > If any SCWG participant has questions regarding the communication or the > referenced patent, we encourage them to seek legal counsel. > > Thank you > -Chris > > On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 4:50 PM So, Nicol via Servercert-wg < > servercert-wg@cabforum.org> wrote: > > I’ve come to be aware of a granted US patent that *seems* relevant to the > subject matter of Ballot SC-067 V3. The patent is US 11700263 B2 [1]. I > don’t know whether the patent has been considered in previous discussions > in the CA/B Forum or the SCWG, but I thought I should bring it to the > attention of SCWG members, in case it has not. > > > > If the patent has not been considered previously, I propose that we extend > the discussion period of this ballot so that members have an opportunity to > consult with their legal counsel for advice. > > > > CommScope expresses no opinion on the patent, including but not limited to > its validity and whether it covers the practices introduced in Ballot > SC-067 V3. > > > > Best regards, > > Nicol So > > CommScope > > > > [1] https://patents.google.com/patent/US11700263B2/en > > > > *From:* Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org> *On Behalf Of > *Chris > Clements via Servercert-wg > *Sent:* Monday, May 20, 2024 10:30 AM > *To:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List < > servercert-wg@cabforum.org> > *Subject:* [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: > "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple > Network Perspectives" > > > > > > *Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3*: > > > > This Ballot proposes updates to the *Baseline Requirements for the > Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates* (i.e., > TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration” (“MPIC”). > > > > *Background*: > > > > - MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from multiple > Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described within the > Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and > 3.2.2.5. > > - Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will > require using MPIC. > > - This work was most recently motivated by research presented at > Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for > years prior as well. > > - The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries > to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain > validation processes described in the TLS BRs. > > - Additional background information can be found in an update shared at > Face-to-Face 60 [2]. > > > > *Benefits of Adoption*: > > > > - Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain > control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the > impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4]. > > - Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global > BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a > significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6]. > > - Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network > perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces > the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of > domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8]. > > - Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a > day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9]. > > > > *Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure*: > > > > - While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from > Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic > expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to > support Members in drafting this ballot. > > - The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed > for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the > future. > > - Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the > CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions > invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the > CA/B Forum. > > - Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement. > Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide > royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the > researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of > any other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC. > > - The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in Discussion > Round 1. > > - For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to > replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the > Forum in any capacity. > > - Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their > own counsel. > > > > *Proposal Revision History*: > > > > - Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation > Subcommittee collaboration) [10] > > - Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11] > > > > *Previous versions of this Ballot*: > > - Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note, > some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other > ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069). > > - Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. Note, > some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other > ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072). > > > > *References*: > > [1] > https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf > > [2] > https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link > > > [3] > https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600 > > > [4] https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis > > [5] > https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski > > > [6] > https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf > > > [7] > https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee > > [8] > https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee > > [9] > https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html > > > [10] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6 > > [11] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8 > > [12] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487 > > [13] > https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5 > > [14] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507 > > [15] > https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 > > > > > The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan Dickson > of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable (ISRG / Let’s > Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly). > > > > *— Motion Begins —* > > > > This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and > Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline > Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4. > > > > MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline: > > > https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 > > > > > *— Motion Ends —* > > > > This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for > approval of this ballot is as follows: > > > > *Discussion (at least 11 days)* > > - Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC > > - End no earlier than: 2024-05-31 14:30:00 UTC > > > > *Vote for approval (7 days)* > > - Start: TBD > > - End: TBD > > > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > Servercert-wg@cabforum.org > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg > > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > Servercert-wg@cabforum.org > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg >
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