HARICA votes "yes" on ballot SC-076v2
Regards,
Antonis
Στις 26/9/24 22:01, ο/η Aaron Gable via Servercert-wg έγραψε:
*Purpose of Ballot*
This is v2 of this ballot; you can see the discussion thread for v1
here:
https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-August/004798.html
*
*
This ballot attempts to address three concerns:
- The confusion around "reserved" serials, which do not actually exist
because all Precertificate serials are assumed to also exist in
corresponding Certificates and are therefore actually "assigned";
- Confusion around whether, and how quickly, OCSP responders must
begin providing authoritative responses for Certificates and
Precertificates; and
- Confusion around whether and how the OCSP requirements apply to
Certificates which do not contain an AIA OCSP URL, but for which the
CA's OCSP responder is still willing to provide responses.
These concerns have been previously discussed in this Mozilla policy
bug <https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/280>, this ServerCert
WG bug <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/issues/422>, and this
Bugzilla incident <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1905419>.
It addresses these concerns by:
- Stating that OCSP responses must be available within 15 minutes of
signing a certificate containing an AIA OCSP URL;
- Removing the concept of a "reserved" serial entirely;
- Moving all OCSP requirements into Section 4.9.9, leaving Section
4.9.10 (which RFC 3647 says is meant to place requirements on relying
parties, not on CAs) empty; and
- Organizing the requirements in Section 4.9.9 into three clusters:
- Definitions of "validity interval", "assigned", and "unassigned";
- Requirements on OCSP Responders, which apply only to responses
from AIA OCSP URLs found in issued certs; and
- Requirements on OCSP Responses, which apply to all responses
regardless of whether the certificate in question has an AIA OCSP URL.
GitHub PR representing this ballot:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/535
Rendered view of the resulting text:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3/docs/BR.md#499-on-line-revocationstatus-checking-availability
*Motion*
*
*
The following motion has been proposed by Aaron Gable (Let's Encrypt /
ISRG), and is endorsed by Ben Wilson (Mozilla) and Antonis
Eleftheriadis (HARICA).
*Motion Begins*
*
*
Modify the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates", based on Version 2.0.6, as
specified in the following redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/929d9b4a1ed1f13f92f6af672ad6f6a2153b8230...a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3
*Motion Ends*
*
*
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:
*Discussion Period (at least 7 days)
*
*
*
Start: August 29, 2024 19:00 UTC
End: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC
*Voting Period (7 days)*
*
*
Start: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC
End: October 3, 2024 19:00 UTC
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