OISTE Votes YES to SC-076v2 > > From: Servercert-wg <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> On Behalf Of Aaron Gable via > Servercert-wg > Sent: Friday, September 27, 2024 3:01 AM > To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > Subject: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins: Ballot SC-076v2 "Clarify and > Improve OCSP Requirements" > > Purpose of Ballot > > This is v2 of this ballot; you can see the discussion thread for v1 here: > https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-August/004798.html > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__lists.cabforum.org_pipermail_servercert-2Dwg_2024-2DAugust_004798.html&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=4dHcG1Gn0XgZA_r34WS95phUFn83IH-v6tNiwvf9bkM&e=> > > This ballot attempts to address three concerns: > - The confusion around "reserved" serials, which do not actually exist > because all Precertificate serials are assumed to also exist in corresponding > Certificates and are therefore actually "assigned"; > - Confusion around whether, and how quickly, OCSP responders must begin > providing authoritative responses for Certificates and Precertificates; and > - Confusion around whether and how the OCSP requirements apply to > Certificates which do not contain an AIA OCSP URL, but for which the CA's > OCSP responder is still willing to provide responses. > > These concerns have been previously discussed in this Mozilla policy bug > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_mozilla_pkipolicy_issues_280&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=tXdQcx_QsxJhPwnL48n2Cbbn8Nyvr8MGqQb56ZcKPm0&e=>, > this ServerCert WG bug > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_cabforum_servercert_issues_422&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=TiqvDP3MQGCqWjzgLvjrWLZdxiLrS0fu_phPhsSboZM&e=>, > and this Bugzilla incident > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__bugzilla.mozilla.org_show-5Fbug.cgi-3Fid-3D1905419&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=HOb3CEpMidm7uBT1xSsmEa4mpku786_AnIgFh5n8H0I&e=>. > > It addresses these concerns by: > - Stating that OCSP responses must be available within 15 minutes of signing > a certificate containing an AIA OCSP URL; > - Removing the concept of a "reserved" serial entirely; > - Moving all OCSP requirements into Section 4.9.9, leaving Section 4.9.10 > (which RFC 3647 says is meant to place requirements on relying parties, not > on CAs) empty; and > - Organizing the requirements in Section 4.9.9 into three clusters: > - Definitions of "validity interval", "assigned", and "unassigned"; > - Requirements on OCSP Responders, which apply only to responses from AIA > OCSP URLs found in issued certs; and > - Requirements on OCSP Responses, which apply to all responses regardless > of whether the certificate in question has an AIA OCSP URL. > > GitHub PR representing this ballot: > https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/535 > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_cabforum_servercert_pull_535&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=BWQoRogDcBK7C2Vedno40E1WcHQIQz2J94zl1LuQHDA&e=> > Rendered view of the resulting text: > https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3/docs/BR.md#499-on-line-revocationstatus-checking-availability > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_cabforum_servercert_blob_a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3_docs_BR.md-23499-2Don-2Dline-2Drevocationstatus-2Dchecking-2Davailability&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=pciooG_P8eqyhzMTbgWjRUdLQz9awQfogntXT6RuGP0&e=> > > Motion > > The following motion has been proposed by Aaron Gable (Let's Encrypt / ISRG), > and is endorsed by Ben Wilson (Mozilla) and Antonis Eleftheriadis (HARICA). > > Motion Begins > > Modify the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of > Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates", based on Version 2.0.6, as > specified in the following redline: > > https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/929d9b4a1ed1f13f92f6af672ad6f6a2153b8230...a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3 > > <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_cabforum_servercert_compare_929d9b4a1ed1f13f92f6af672ad6f6a2153b8230...a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=f_bZ-xsbQ6W0WvHSNsY5K3cqGB-WTyjstR6nFz5VEvg&e=> > > Motion Ends > > This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for > approval of this ballot is as follows: > > Discussion Period (at least 7 days) > > Start: August 29, 2024 19:00 UTC > End: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC > > Voting Period (7 days) > > Start: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC > End: October 3, 2024 19:00 UTC > _______________________________________________ > Servercert-wg mailing list > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__lists.cabforum.org_mailman_listinfo_servercert-2Dwg&d=DwICAg&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=OmBhktxCPSSFOdVvdBXI5wxNC924MgMPRjG39SLDKCJo4346g_H9bao1Tyk5-mqK&s=JxE0aEmJ4vGJXoqJvwJgETZxQ6xHX28yfDy8lTeZsZM&e=
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