On Thu, 17 Sep 2009, Sandra Murphy wrote:
I recognize that there is an fear that this system somehow puts ISPs
under someone's control. I would answer that there is not any more
control than is already the case.
David Conrad already responded to this, pointing out the technical
possibilities.
I think it's also instructive to look back at the message that started
this thread (also from David Conrad), which astutely observes:
"... their parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc. in the
trust hierarchy potentially could, by intent, whim, or error,
instantly and completely remove their ability to send/receive Internet
traffic[1]?
...
[1] Note that the actual accuracy of this statement is not
particularly relevant since there will be folks who will spin the
capabilities of the system in this way."
However the system IS used, I'm sympathetic to David's concern that
the potential for control could be a barrier to deployment. Which
leaves us with the question of how to design a system that is
resistant to capture and control. Or perhaps, as Jeff Schiller
proposed, build something that doesn't change the current balance of
power.
What would we need to do differently in the RPKI design to prevent
capture and control?
-- Sam
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