If the "have been informed" was my message today, I was talking about the message you posted Nov 30, the one I attached to my message, in which you said that the authors should address the comments received, pointed to the issue tracker, etc, for the sidr-cp-07 version.

--Sandy

On Wed, 10 Mar 2010, Geoff Huston wrote:

[I have been informed that my note I posted yesterday in response to the Last 
Call did not get circulated on the SIDR mailing list - I'll try once more - 
Geoff]


I do not believe that this document is ready for submission to the IESG. Some 
issues still remain with this document, as listed below.

Geoff

On 06/03/2010, at 9:05 AM, Sandra Murphy wrote:

The authors of Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) have 
submitted a new version in accordance with comments received in the last call 
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-cp-08).

I am opening a last call on this document for one week, ending Friday, March 12.

Note that comments on this revision are restricted to whether the issues have 
been adequately addressed.


1. Introduction, para 1 - is the use of the verb "will" normative (i.e. MUST), or intentional "SHOULD" or 
optional" "MAY". I'd like to see the second sentence changed to say "MAY" or if that is not acceptable, to 
say "may"

2. Introduction, para 1 - third sentence - is this "will" more accurately a 
"can"

3. Introduction, para1, third sentence - "uniqueness" is not an outcome of verification 
of a certificate. It would be more accurate to drop "uniqueness" from this assertion.

4. section 1.2, para 1. The same assertion is made that associated 
certification with uniqueness. The constraint on an address issuer that creates 
a unique distribution of resources is not an intrinsic attribute of 
certification of the issuance.

5. section 1.4.1 - the document appears to preclude the actions of LIRs / ISPS 
in distributing AS numbers. I do not believe that this is appropriate, nor 
accurate, in today's environment

6. section 2.2 - is a CA responsible for publishing ALL certifications it 
issues, or can it be selective in publication? The section is unclear on this

7. section 2.2 - a similar question is raised regarding CRLs and RPKI-signed 
objects. Is the CA requires to publish ALL such issued objects?

8 section 2.3 - the document does not specify a CA's actions regarding the 
publication of expired and revoked certifications, nor indicate of the CA's CPS 
should include such information.

9. section 2.4 - is the "shall" here a "SHALL" in a normative sense or a "MAY"?

10. section 3.2.1 - is this "will require" a MUST require or a SHOULD require?

11. section 3.2.2 - is this "will" a MUST, SHOULD or a MAY?

12. section 3.2.3 - is this "will" a MUST, SHOULD or a MAY?

13. section 3.2.5 - is this "will" a MUST, SHOULD or a MAY? - This occurs in 
subsequent sections that describe actions of the CA, and the use of normative language in 
describing these CA actions is recommended. These instances are not further flagged here,.

14. sections 3.2 and 3.2 - I am not sure that these need to be separate - for 
example is issuance after revocation any different from initial issuance - i.e. 
the same criteria of 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.5 apply, so why is 3.3.2 
called out - what new information is being provided here that is not already 
provided in the previous section?

15. section 3.4 - why does this section of the text NOT refer to the actions of 
a CA as described in sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.5? It appears that 
revocation is described in more informal terms and issuance, yet the 
constraints on the CA to ensure that authenticity of the request are intended 
to be the same.

16. section 4.1.1 - normative language required - the "should" referred to here is 
unclear. Subsequent sections also use "should" where normative language would be clearer.

17. section 4.5.2 - this section refers to "all the CAs in the chain that issued the 
certificates relevant to the certificate in question" without further clarification or 
explanation. In the light of related work on local TA generation I am left with the question of 
what exactly is being referred to here in this "chain"./ I would prefer this term to be 
defined.

18. section 4.8 - why is the treatment of augmentation of a subject's INRs 
treated differently to  reduction in a subject's INRs? While section 4.8 deals 
with the steps involved in issuing a new certification in the case where a 
subject's INR's are augmented, there is no corresponding description of the 
process in reduction, other that the single sentence in section 4.8.1 that does 
not refer to any other part of the CPS.

19 section 4.10 - is it truye to say that "This PKI does not make use of OCSP or SCVP" or 
is it more appropriate to state that "RPs SHOULD NOT rely on the use of OCSP or SCVP"?

20 - section 5.8 "The termination of a CA shall therefore be subject to the agreement between 
the issuer and the subscriber and will be described in the CPS for the issuer." I am finding 
it difficult to reconcile this need for "an agreement" in the light of the observation 
that where a CA no longer has any INR resources then it cannot function as a CA in the RPKI, 
whether or not an agreement is reached, Why then is an agreement stipulated here?

Style comment:

Is the use of double ' chars instead of a " or ' char deliberate? For example, I 
would've expected to see " marks in section 1.3 when describing the name of the 
document, and thereafter when denoting the use of particular terms.



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