As has been discussed on the mailing list and in several recent WG meetings, even with TLS (which I'm proposing we drop), we do not currently have effective replay protection in the RPKI up-down protocol (expired draft-ietf-sidr-rescerts-provisioning). The solutions for this are relatively straightforward, we just have to update the spec to include them.
The first level of replay protection would be just to check the timestamp in the CMS message, and enforce a rule that any new message from a particular peer (protocol, not routing sense of "peer") must have a newer timestamp than any we've seen until now. The CMS profile we're using already includes timestamps, so we get this for free, and we don't need synchronized clocks, we just need to know that the timestamp as viewed by the sending party has increased. This, by itself, should be enough to detect replay attempts. The second level of protection would be if we also need to detect messages being dropped out of the protocol exchange (ie, this one is about selective message blocking, not replay per se). A timestamp won't suffice for this, but a counter will. So if we're concerned about this we should add a serial number to the XML header. Geoff proposed something like this back in 2007, although his proposed mechanism was a bit more complicated than I think we'd really need for this threat. All we'd really need would be an XML attribute containing a simple nonnegative integer serial number: the client would increment this to the next value when sending a new message, the server would just echo back the client's value. I'm reasonably certain that we need the first rule (timestamp check), as there is at least one known attack (replay of an old issuance request) without it. I'm not sure we need the serial number, but Steve Bellovin recommended that we at least think about it. For both of these, there is the little issue of what an implementation is meant to do if the rule is violated. Log something, almost certainly, but should it reject the message? Probably, for timestamp violation, similarly for serial number repeating or going backwards. Not quite so obvious for a gap in the serial number sequence, seems like rejecting the message in this case would invite a cheap denial of service attack, so my inclination would be to raise an alert but allow the message in this case. At minimum, I propose that we add the timestamp check rule. This requires no change to the message format. _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
