There is still a problem in this document that needs to be fixed.
Section 3.1 of the document explicitly states that there is no
requirement for subject names to be globally unique in the RPKI. As I
have pointed out several times before, this is a violation of X.509,
which says that "CAs are unambiguously defined by a distinguished name"
and that a directory name is "A construct that singles out a particular
object from all other objects. A name shall be unambiguous (that is,
denote just one object); however, it need not be unique (that is, be the
only name which unambiguously denotes the object)."
While some people have expressed a concern that a few issuers may create
name collisions even if there is a requirement that names be
unambiguous, no one has provided an argument as to why such a
requirement cannot be specified in the SIDR documents. Name collisions
are a security risk, and so should be avoided to whatever degree is
possible. While one may not be able to prevent malicious (or
incorrectly designed) issuers from creating collisions, one can easily
instruct those who are following the specifications to not create them.
The problem of name collisions is further compounded by the fact that
draft-ietf-sidr-cp-10.txt (and other SIDR WC documents) explicitly
permits name collisions, but provides no warnings about the
risks/problems that name collisions create. If two CAs issue
certificates and CRLs under the same name then an X.509 compliant path
validation library may accept certificates even though they have been
revoked or may reject (as revoked) certificates that are valid. Yet,
there are no warnings in any of the SIDR WG documents about the security
risks created by name collisions. In fact, the documents do just the
opposite: they provide (incorrect) rationalizations for why there is no
need to avoid name collisions in the RPKI.
draft-ietf-sidr-cp needs to require subject names to unambiguously
identify a single entity in the RPKI. There is no reason that such a
requirement cannot be imposed. As I demonstrated in a previous email
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg01739.html), this
is a requirement that is very easy to implement and does not require
"Certification authorities to coordinate PKI-wide unique Subject
names." So, a name uniqueness requirement can be imposed just as easily
as these requirements:
* The distinguished name for every CA and end entity consists of a
single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by the issuer
of the certificate. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute MAY be
included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative
distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of
certificates associated with the same entity.
* The Subject name in each certificate MUST be unique relative to all
Subject names certified by the same Issuer.
* Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each
Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing the
certificate.
As I have stated before, just because the SIDR WG documents require
names to be unambiguous (as is required by X.509), that does not
preclude draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs from indicating that there is a risk
that name collisions will occur.
Dave
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