Geoff,

I don't recall if I sent this proposed, revised version to you, or not. Anyway, here it is. I apologize that I "accepted" all of my changes, so you'll need to do a diff to see the edits that I made.

My proposed changes reduce the number of discrete steps, both by combining some steps, and by changing the order of some operations

Steve



Individual Submission                                          G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                             G. Michaelson
Intended status: BCP                                               APNIC
Expires: January 26, 2011                                        S. Kent
                                                                     BBN
                                                           July 25, 2010


                      CA Key Rollover in the RPKI
             draft-huston-sidr-aao-profile-0-keyroll-00.txt

Abstract

   This document describes an algorithm to allow an entity who
   undertakes the role of a Certification Authority in the Resource
   Public Key Infrastructure to perform a rollover of its key pair.
   This document also notes the requirements placed on Relying Parties
   who maintain a local cache of the objects that have been published in
   the distributed Resource Public Key Infrastructure repository
   publication structure.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 26, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.1.  Terminology and Concepts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  CA Key Rollover Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Relying Party Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
































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1.  Introduction

This document describes an algorithm to be employed by a Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastucture (RPKI) [ID.ietf-sidr-arch] to perform a rollover of its key pair.

   The document defines a conservative procedure for
   such entities to follow when performing a key rollover so that
   Relying Parties are in a position to be able to validate all
   authentic objects in the RPKI using the validation procedure
   described in [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] at all times.

1.1.  Terminology and Concepts

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], the
profile for RPKI Certificates [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] and the RPKI repository structure [ID.ietf-sidr-repository-structure].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.


2.  CA Key Rollover Procedure

A certification Authority (CA) in the RPKI is an entity that issues certificates and CRLs, and RPKI signed objects. Over time, there will be many instances of a CA. A CA instance is associated with a single key pair [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]) during normal operation (not including the key rollover procedure described here or cryptographic algorithm transition). The implication in the context of key rollover is that, strictly speaking, a CA does not perform a key rollover per se. In order to perform the equivalent of a key rollover, the CA instantiates a new instance of itself, with a new key pair, and then substitutes this new CA instance into the RPKI hierarchy in place of the old CA instance.

   There are several considerations regarding this procedure that MUST be
followed by a CA performing a key rollover operation. The critical consideration is that the RPKI has potential application in the area of control of routing integrity [ID.ietf-sidr-arch], and key rollover should not cause any transient hiatus where a Relying Party (RP) is led to incorrect conclusions regarding the authenticity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI. A CA cannot not assume that all Relying Parties will perform path discovery
  in the same fashion, and therefore the key rollover procedure MUST
   preserve the integrity of the CRLDP, SIA, and AIA pointers in RPKI



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   certificates.

In the procedure described here, the CA creates a new CA instance, and has the associated new public key published in the form of a new CA certificate. While the current and new CA instances share a single repository publication point, each CA instance has its own CRL, and its own manifest. Initially, the new CA publishes an empty CRL and a manifest that contains a single entry for the CRL.

The CA performing the rollover waits for a period of time to allow every Relying Party to discover and retrieve this new CA certificate and store it in its local RPKI Repository cache. This period of time is termed the "staging period". During this period, the CA will have a new CA instance, with no subordinate products, and a current CA instance which has issued all subordinate products. At the expiration of the staging period the "new" CA instance MUST replace all (valid) subordinate products of the previous CA instance, overwriting the old subordinate products in the CA's repository
   publication point.  When this process is complete, the current CA instance
   is retired, and the new CA instance becomes the current CA.

During the staging period the new CA instance re-issues all subordinate products of the current CA. The procedure described here requires that, with the exception of manifests and CRLs, the re-issued subordinate products
   be published using the same repository publication point object
   names, effectively overwriting the old objects with these
re-issued objects. The intent of this overwriting operation is to ensure that the AIA pointers of subordinate products at lower tiers in the RPKI hierarchy remain correct, and that CA rollover does not require any associated actions by any subordinate CA.

In describing the algorithm several reserved terms are used to distinguish different instances of the CA that is rekeying. The term CURRENT designates the instance of the CA that is active. An active CA accepts and processes certificate issuance and certificate revocation requests. The starting point for this algorithm is a CURRENT CA the key of which is being rolled over. The CURRENT CA instance is used by Relying Parties when verifying certificates and signed objects, with one exception, as noted below.

The term NEW designates the CA instance that is being created. The NEW CA is not active, and thus does not process certificate issuance and revocation requests, until it becomes CURRENT. The NEW CA does issue a CRL and an EE certificate in association with its manifest, to provide a trivial, complete, consistent instance of a CA. (When a CA certificate is encountered by an RP, the RP expects to find a matching CRL, and that CRL MUST be enumerated on a manifest.) Thus, the NEW CA has a brief, transient existence before it replaces the CURRENT CA.




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When the CURRENT CA instance is replaced by the NEW CA instances, the CURRENT CA is designated as the OLD CA instance. At this stage of processing, the OLD CA and all of the products that it issued (certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects) are removed from the repository, and the algorithm is complete.

   To perform a key rollover operation the entity MUST perform the
   following steps in the order given here.  Unless specified otherwise
   each step SHOULD be performed without any intervening delay.  The
   process MUST be run to completion.


1. Generate a key pair for use by the NEW CA. Because the goal of this algorithm is key rollover, the key pair generated in this step MUST be different from the pair in use by the CURRENT CA.

2. Generate a certificate request with this key pair and pass the request to the entity that issued the CURRENT CA certificate. This request MUST include the same SIA extension that is present in the CURRENT CA certificate. This request, when satisfied, will result in the publication of the NEW CA certificate. This CA certificate will contain an Subject Name selected by the issuer, which MUST be distinct from the Subject Name used in the CURRENT CA certificate. The CPS for the Issuer of the CURRENT and NEW CA certificates will indicate the time frame within which a certificate request is expected to be processed, and this time frame may vary among Issuers. In many cases, the CA may be alerted to the issuance of the NEW CA certificate only by observing the publication of the NEW CA certificate in the repository. In such cases, the CA SHOULD monitor the repository publication point of its Issuer, to determine when the NEW CA certificate has been published. After it discovers that the NEW CA certificate has been published, the CA MUST generate an empty CRL, and a manifest that contains only this CRL, and publish these items at the CA's publication point. The CA SHOULD generate and publish these items as quickly as possible, to minimize confusion for RPs that will encounter the NEW CA certificate. Because the NEW CA is not active, it is RECOMMENDED that the CRL for the NEW CA have a nextUpdate value will cause it to be replaced at the end of the Staging Period (see steps 3 and 4 below).

3. After the NEW CA certificate and the corresponding CRL and manifest have been published, the CA enters a Staging Period. This duration of the Staging Period is determine by the CA, but it MUST be no less than 24 hours. The Staging Period is intended to allow all RPs to download the NEW CA certificate, prior to publication of certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects under the NEW CA. During the Staging Period, the CA SHOULD reissue (but not publish) all of the products that were issued under the CURRENT CA. This includes all CA certificates, and RPKI signed objects, and a manifest for these products. Section 4 describes how each reissued product relates to the product that it replaces. During the Staging Period, the CA SHOULD continue to accept and process certificate issuance requests and MUST continue to accept and process certificate revocation requests. If any certificates are issued by the CURRENT CA during the staging period, they MUST be re-issued under the NEW CA during the period, and published at the end of the period. Any certificates that are revoked under the CURRENT CA MUST NOT be re-issued under the NEW CA. <do we want to say anything about interaction with the CPS here?>

4. Upon expiration of the Staging Period, the CA MUST publish the signed products that have been re-issued under the NEW CA, replacing the corresponding products issued under the CURRENT CA. This replacement is implied by the file naming requirements imposed by [ID.ietf-sidr-repository-structure] for these signed products. The trivial manifest for the NEW CA (which contained only one entry, for the NEW CA's CRL) is replaced by a manifest listing all of these reissued, signed products. At this point the CURENT CA becomes the OLD CA, and the NEW CA becomes the CURRENT CA. It is anticipated that this step is very brief, perhaps a few minutes in duration, because the CA has reissued all of the signed products during the Staging Period. Nonetheless, it is desirable that the activities performed in this step be viewed as atomic by relying parties. Thus (we need a flag object here??)

5. The CA now generates a certificate revocation request for the OLD CA certificate and submits it to the Issuer of that certificate. When the OLD CA certificate is revoked, the CRL for the OLD CA is removed from the repository, along with the manifest for the OLD CA. The private key for the OLD CA is destroyed.


3.  Relying Party Requirements

This procedure described above defines a "Staging Period" for CAs performing a key rollover operation. This period is no shorter than 24 hours. Relying Parties who maintain a local cache of the distributed RPKI repository MUST perform a local cache synchronization operation against the distributed RPKI repository at regular intervals of no longer than 24 hours.


4. Reissuing Certificates and RPKI Signed Objects

This section provides rules a CA MUST use when it reissues certificates and RPKI signed objects as part of the key rollover process. Note that CRLs and manifests are not reissued, per se. They are generated for each CA instance. A manifest catalogs the contents of a publication point relative to a CA instance. A CRL lists revoked certificates, relative to a CA instance. Key rollover processing for CRLs and manifests is described above, in Section 3.


4.1 CA Certificates

When a CA, as part of the key rollover process, reissues a CA certificate, it copies all of the field and extension values from the old certificate into the new certificate. The only exception to this rule is that the notBefore value MAY be set to the current date and time.

4.2 RPKI Signed Objects

An RPKI signed object is a CMS signed-data object, containing an EE certificate and a payload (content). When a key rollover occurs, the EE certificate for the RPKI signed object MUST be reissued, under the key of the NEW CA. A CA may choose to treat this EE certificate the same way that it deals with CA certificates, i.e., to copy over all fields and extensions, and change only the notBefore date. If the CA adopts this approach, then the new EE certificate is inserted into the CMS wrapper, but the signed context remains the same. (If the signing time or binary signing time values in the CMS wrapper are non-null, they MAY be updated to reflect the current time.) Alternatively, the CA MAY elect to generate a new key pair for this EE certificate. If it does so, the object content MUST be resigned under the private key corresponding to the EE certificate. In this case the EE certificate MUST contain a new public key and a new notBefore value, it May contain a new notAfter value, but all other field and extension values remain constant. (If the signing time or binary signing time values in the CMS wrapper are non-null, they MAY be updated to reflect the current time.)



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5.  Security Considerations

   [To be added]


6.  IANA Considerations

   [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
   considerations stated in this document.]


7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the review comments of Tim
   Bruijnzeels in preparing this document.


8.   References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

  [ID.ietf-sidr-repository-structure]


8.2.  Informative References

   [ID.ietf-sidr-arch]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
              progress), March 2009.

   [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
              Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Internet
              Draft draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18.txt, February 2009.











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Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: [email protected]
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   George Michaelson

   Email: [email protected]
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA  02138
   USA

   Email: [email protected]





























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