Hi All,

my 2 cents with the implementation of our 'rpkid' and (ad-hoc, not-yet-caching) 
validator in mind..

On Feb 18, 2011, at 2:04 AM, Rob Austein wrote:

> At Tue, 8 Feb 2011 19:41:41 -0500, Stephen Kent wrote:
>> 
>> I concur with Geoff re the desirability of the staging period.  I 
>> disagree with Rob's suggestion that the staging period is at the 
>> wrong place in the document, or in the phased approach to key 
>> rollover.
>> 
>> From my perspective, the fundamental rationale for the staring period 
>> is two-fold:
>> 
>>      -  we want a delimited interval after which a CA can have 
>> reasonable confidence that all RPs will have retrieved the new CA 
>> key, before transiting to a new CA key and subordinate, signed 
>> products.
> 
> I have no problem with -allowing- a CA to wait for a staging interval
> here.  I do still object to -requiring- every CA to wait for a staging
> interval here.

right and as stated elsewhere in case of an emergency roll the interval may be 
zero.

> 
>>      - we also want a delimited interval for RPs so that they can 
>> acquire a new CA key prior to the transition to that key for 
>> subordinate signed products.
> 
> Not at all obvious.  So long as the new CA key is published before the
> subordinate signed product, either it just works or you're into the
> grey area of loose consistency, where there are so many ways to lose
> that it's almost not worth trying to enumerate them.  The net could
> partition.  One of the rsync servers could be down.  Your clock could
> be wrong.  Etc ad nausium.
> 

I am in two minds about this:

1) I think in case of a *planned* roll-over the staging period may help

Though I agree it's not guaranteed to give 100% consistency as mentioned by 
Rob, I also believe that for the two reasons phrased by Steve it's the best the 
publication side can do to try and prevent issues that RPs may encounter.

otoh:
2) For anything less than MUST, the RP software SHOULD be able to deal with no 
staging period in case of emergency rolls

I have some ideas about defensive coding to detect possible scenarios like this 
and re-fetch, or make sure to look for a new CA cert when the old one is 
revoked etc, but I still doubt that all possible corner cases can tackled. I am 
happy to talk about possible approaches with other implementers, but I think 
this is probably not best discussed here in this thread.

I think the bottom line is that if the draft says no staging period for 
emergency rolls, as we all agree on I think, this implies that RPs have to be 
able to deal with this. So one might say if you can deal with this, then this 
should be okay for planned rolls as well... It's just that I am afraid that 
there is still more that can go wrong here, so I prefer to keep the staging 
period for *planned* rolls.

So personally I favor SHOULD...

> If I accept your changes, I not only need to add a third operation
> (start using the new key and cert), I also need to make names for the
> pesky things visible in the control protocol, expose those names in
> the user interface, etc, because somebody might restart the rollover
> operation during the staging period.  Whole collection of new ways for
> operator to get confused and shoot self in foot, to no gain that I can
> see, because you still haven't convinced me that the staging period is
> necessary in the first place.

To keep things reasonable we decided to restrict this to one roll-over at a 
time, imposed by the software. I.e. a roll-over has to be completed before a 
new one may be initiated.

In our case *planned* key roll-overs are managed by automated processes (when 
key older than 5 years) and use a 24 hour staging period. However in case of an 
emergency operators can force initiation of a roll-over at any other time and 
reduce the staging period to zero. In case of a double emergency we can do an 
emergency roll, and then do another.. though I sincerely hope this will never 
be needed ;)


>> I also agree that, as Roque noted, in the case of an emergency rekey, 
>> the 24-hour staging period may be inappropriate. But an emergency 
>> rekey is not the same as a planned key rollover.  I suggest that we 
>> note this difference up front and say that, in case of an emergency, 
>> the CA re-issuing the cert which is being re-keyed SHOULD consider 
>> the impact on routing of a quicker transition to a new cert+key, and 
>> behave as it sees fit, given the circumstances surrounding the rekey.
> 
> So code has to be capable of carrying on without waiting for the
> staging interval.   Good.

+1

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