> The purpose of the SIDR working group is to reduce vulnerabilities in
> the inter-domain routing system. The two vulnerabilities that will be
> addressed are:
> 
>   * Is an Autonomous System (AS) authorized to originate an IP prefix
>   * Is the AS-Path represented in the route the same as the path
>        through which the route update traveled

I'm a bit confused --what happened with the discussion around Joels'
wording? Is this supposed to be the final taking into account that
discussion? I would suggest that trying to prove how an update came to
be where it currently is isn't the underlying problem to be solved.
Perhaps something like:

* Is the AS-Path represented in the route a correct representation of
the path to reach the destination, and does the AS Path correctly
represent the intentions of the autonomous systems listed?

Though I know some folks are going to say, "you can't prove intentions,"
when you get down to it, when you say, "prove the path the update took,"
you are, in reality, saying, "prove that everyone in the AS path
intended to send the update," so these are the same thing.

I'm also not certain I agree with Randy that it's a "nit" to use NLRI
instead of "the update." The one is a bit of information, the other
seems to imply a packet --and there is no end to end "update packet" in
BGP --at least not that I know of. An update only exists point to point
between two speakers, I think (?).

:-)

Russ

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